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- Bridging the Gaps: Local Government and Nonprofit Collaborations
  Todd Collins
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- Does Person-Organization Fit Mediate the Relationship between Affect-Based Work Antecedents and Public Employee Job Satisfaction?
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- Citizen Perceptions of Government Policy Success: A Cross-National Study
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Current Issues in Practice

- Priority Issues from a Health Implementation Plan: A Qualitative Study of Local Foundation and Nonprofit Leaders’ Perceptions
  Daniel J. Schober
  Shannon M. E. Bowers
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Book Review

- Corruption, Accountability, and Discretion Edited by Nancy S. Lind and Cara E. Rabe-Hemp
  Tyler J. Klatt
Statement of Purpose

The Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs (JPNA) focuses on providing a connection between the practice and research of public affairs. This is accomplished with scholarly research, practical applications of the research, and no fees for publishing or journal access. JPNA publishes research from diverse theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary backgrounds that address topics related to the affairs and management of public and nonprofit organizations.
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Introduction to the Issue

Lindsey M. McDougle – Rutgers University-Newark

This issue of Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs (JPNA) is filled with a number of articles that provide insights into how public and nonprofit organizations perform essential functions related to their roles. These articles should provide readers of JPNA with useful information in understanding more about the public and nonprofit sectors.

To begin the issue, Collins and Gerlach’s (2019) research article focuses on a fundamental question in understanding the relationship between nonprofit and public organizations: Why do local governments and nonprofits collaborate? Using original survey data collected from government and nonprofit managers in North Carolina, the authors examine the perceptions of public and nonprofit managers concerning their past inter-sectoral collaboration experiences and their willingness to engage in future inter-sectoral collaborations. Interestingly, they find that successful past collaboration experiences do not necessarily lead to a willingness to collaborate in the future.

In the next research article in this issue, Lim, Lee, and Bae (2019) investigate whether person-organization fit mediates the relationship between affect-based work antecedents—specifically, transformational leadership and role clarity—and public employee job satisfaction. The authors hypothesize that transformational leadership and role clarity can be used to trigger the effect of value congruence on job satisfaction in public organizations. To test this hypothesis, they rely on a viewpoint survey of South Korean government officials and estimate structural equation models. Although they find that person-organization fit does in fact mediate the relationship between transformational leadership and job satisfaction, they find that it does not mediate the relationship between role clarity and job satisfaction.

Schafer and Zhang (2019) provide a test of the instrumental perspective of stakeholder engagement in the next research article in the issue. Focusing on the policy area of municipal contracting out, the authors explore whether stakeholder engagement provides public administrators with insights into how they can better evaluate innovative policy options that allow them to overcome limited administrative capacity. They also explore whether stakeholder engagement provides public administrators with opportunities to mobilize support in light of political opposition.

In the next research article in this issue, Mead (2019) undertakes a review of charitable solicitation laws in the largest cities in the United States (US). He finds that several cities in the US impose extensive registration requirements and other restrictions on charitable solicitation. Indeed,

rather than empowering donors, preventing fraud, or benefiting government, he finds that the purpose of these requirements and restrictions is usually to regulate traffic flow, avoid annoyances at people’s homes, and prevent in-person solicitation in certain areas.

The final research article in this issue is a cross-national examination of citizens’ perceptions of government policy success. In the article, Aitalieva and Morelock (2019) pose the question: What explains citizens’ perceptions of government policy success? To answer this question, the authors rely on multilevel modelling strategies to examine data gathered across 21 national samples from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government IV module. Their findings indicate that citizens’ evaluations of the success of public policies vary within countries as well as between countries. Within country variation in perceptions, they find, is largely a function of individual sociodemographic attributes and political attitudes. In contrast, across country variation in perceptions, they find, is largely a function of the quality of public institutions within a country and (to a lesser extent) prevailing economic conditions.

In our sole Current Issues in Practice article in this issue, Schober, Bowers, and Posner (2019) examine how senior leaders of health foundations and nonprofit organizations perceive key health issues (such as violence, housing, and chronic disease) included in the Chicago Department of Public Health’s implementation plan. Through semistructured interviews, the authors explore what these leaders believe are the most important health challenges facing the city. They find that participants identify the importance of addressing broad conditions related to violence, economic development, and education across the lifespan using multisector collaboration strategies. This is a finding that helps to reemphasize the importance of the work of Collins and Gerlach (2019)—the very first research article in this issue.


References


Bridging the Gaps: Local Government and Nonprofit Collaborations

Todd Collins – Western Carolina University
John David Gerlach – Western Carolina University

Local governments and nonprofit organizations often struggle to provide quality services to their residents and clients. One potential way for these organizations to overcome obstacles in service provision is to engage in joint programming and service delivery. In this study, we use original survey data collected from local government and nonprofit managers in the state of North Carolina to examine recent trends in collaboration between these sectors. Specifically, we explore the perceptions of these managers concerning the types of collaborations that work best, the types of collaborations that are least successful, and the factors that foster or hinder cooperation. We also explore the perceptions that these managers have about the other. We hypothesize that positive perceptions of the other sector, greater access to resources, operating in a more urbanized environment, and participation in past positive cross-sector collaboration experiences will all lead to increased collaboration between local governments and nonprofits. We find, however, that although an organization’s resources and managerial perceptions of the other sector do influence collaboration, having participated in a past successful collaboration does not necessarily lead to an increase in future partnerships.

Keywords: Local Government, Nonprofit, Collaboration, Partnerships

The interweaving of governmental programs and nonprofit organizations is increasing (Kettl, 2015); and, collaborations between local governments and nonprofit organizations now play an important role in service delivery. These collaborations are often mutually beneficial arrangements given that local governments tend to seek additional expertise and capacity while nonprofits tend to pursue increased resources (Gazley & Brudney, 2007). Both sectors, though, often seek collaboration as a matter of necessity—especially given increased demands on time and resources as well as increased competition for funding (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1984).

Collaborations, however, are not cost-free endeavors. Resources, particularly employee time, must be spent in coordinating and maintaining collaborations. As a result, conflicts can arise over decision-making authority, institutional goals, and program accountability.

While a great deal of scholarly attention has focused on collaborations *between* nonprofit organizations, we understand much less about why local governments and nonprofit organizations choose to collaborate with one another. This study, therefore, seeks to tackle this issue. Specifically, in this study we ask: *What factors influence collaboration among local governments and nonprofit entities?*

To answer this question, we examine how managers’ perceptions of the other sector, organizational resources, geographic setting, and past collaboration experiences all influence the likelihood of engaging in future cross-sector collaborations. Using an original survey of government and nonprofit leaders in North Carolina, we questioned managers in these organizations about their collaborations with the other sector as well as their perceptions of any accomplishments that have been achieved from past collaborations. Overall, this study builds on prior research and makes a preliminary assessment of potential predictors of cross-sectoral collaborations.

**Understanding Collaboration**

Nonprofit organizations collaborate with one another in an effort to jointly supply services or bolster their individual capabilities to meet client needs. Sowa (2009) found that early child care and education nonprofits strategically collaborated with one another often with the intent of seeking benefits for their core services and programs. This type of collaboration strengthens the capabilities of nonprofit organizations. Indeed, these collaborations often signal a path toward increased capacity since these collaborations can lead to positive impacts on management processes and outcomes. (Guo & Acar, 2005). These collaborations can also increase the level of services available to clients (Selden, Sowa & Sandfort, 2006).

Although collaborations *among* nonprofit organizations can certainly yield many benefits, we know much less about whether the same benefits emerge from cross-sector collaborations. Yet, more and more the complexity of social issues has led governments and nonprofit organizations to collaborate with one another (Cornforth, Hayes, & Vangen, 2015). In a time of increased demand for services, partnering with government often allows nonprofits to shortcut lengthy processes of collecting information on specific citizen groups (Young, 2000). Some research, for instance, has shown that government and nonprofit collaborations can occur out of necessity to streamline processes and avoid service duplication (Wolff, 1992).

In this study we examine a set of potential drivers of collaboration that have not been extensively studied, if at all, in the government and nonprofit collaboration literature. Specifically, we explore how, if at all, opinions of the other sector, access to greater resources, geographic restrictions, and prior collaboration experiences influence government and nonprofit collaborations.

**Organizational Perceptions**

It is naïve to believe that collaborations between local governments and nonprofit organizations are only driven by sheer necessity. Many collaborations are more nuanced. Thus, to neglect a local government’s perceptions of a nonprofit organization, and vice versa, would be missing a major piece of the puzzle that allows us to form a clear picture of why the two sectors do or do not collaborate.

Two major factors that have been shown to influence collaboration decisions are trust (Alexander & Nank, 2009; Snavely & Tracy, 2002; Witesman & Fernandez, 2012) and negative mutual
perceptions (Cairns & Harris, 2011). Nonprofits often work with public agencies to address social problems in disenfranchised communities (Alexander & Nank, 2009). Such high stakes make trust and favorable perceptions of the other sector imperative.

The perception of an organization’s quality is also meaningful in collaboration decisions among local governments and nonprofit organizations. Indeed, it is important for organizations to collaborate with other organizations that they view in a favorable manner. Gowan, Seymour, Ibarreche, and Lackey (2001), for instance, found that perceptions of quality in public organizations were often lower among employees and managers than customers. Such low perceptions of quality could lead a potential collaborator to avoid what may be perceived as wasting organizational time.

In this study we examine whether managers’ quality assessments of organizations in the other sector and their perceptions of overall differences in operations between the two sectors impacts their likelihood of collaboration. We expect to find that more favorable perceptions of the other sector will lead to increased collaborations. This finding would reinforce previous literature showing that quality means something and is a significant driver of collaboration efforts.¹

**Hypothesis 1:** When managers of local governments and nonprofit organizations hold negative perceptions of the other sector, they will be less likely to report engaging in prior collaborations. They will also be less likely to anticipate engaging in future collaborations.

**Organizational Resources**

Local governments and nonprofit organizations are continually mindful of their resource situations; and, they often seek ways to remedy shortfalls. For local governments, a resource deficiency can mean a lack of expertise in a particular service delivery area. For nonprofits, a lack of resources often means a lack of funding (Gazley & Brudney, 2007). Recognition of these needs tends to be a motivator influencing collaboration (Gazley & Brudney, 2007). While Smith (2012) asserts that governments and nonprofits sometimes compete for resources, it is possible that they also partner in the face of limited capacities. Indeed, collaborating with one another can save organizations in both sectors money. For example, nonprofit organizations have access to human capital in the form of volunteers and other part-time or temporary employees that can be a benefit to local governments (Shields, 1992).

Resource dependency theory (RDT) assumes that organizations with fewer resources will be more likely to engage in collaborations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) found that organizations are motivated to collaborate with one another in order to survive in times of resource scarcity. Since organizations are affected by their environments, uncertainty drives survival decisions and causes organizations to collaborate and pool resources (Pfeffer, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1984).

Although RDT suggests that fewer resources will lead organizations to collaborate, some organizations (even in the face of scarce resources) may be ill-equipped to collaborate since collaborations are not free of costs. Contracts need to be made between organizations, relationships need time to develop, and there are time and administrative costs that will need to be incurred. Some collaborations may even require a full-time staff position to coordinate organizational partnerships. For these reasons, AbouAssi, Makhlouf, and Whalen (2016) have argued that organizations with greater capacity are more likely to seek collaborations. However, Cairns and Harris (2011) found that a lack of capacity outside of financial resources—e.g., time
and skills—may challenge an organization’s ability to collaborate. Mulroy (2003) also found that organizational funding uncertainties can inhibit collaboration.

These mixed findings present a conflict in the literature. That is, while RDT suggests that organizations with fewer resources will be more likely to seek collaborations, some scholars assert that these same organizations may have less capacity—e.g., time, staff, and/or monetary resources—to enter into collaborative relationships. We, therefore, hypothesize that while organizational capacity may influence the extent to which organizations have relied on collaboration in the past, access to resources will shape future expectations regarding collaboration based on the need for organizational survival. This is particularly important in a contemporary post-recession economy.

**Hypothesis 2a:** Organizations with greater resources will have engaged in more past collaborations with organizations in another sector (either local government or nonprofit).

**Hypothesis 2b:** Organizations with fewer resources will anticipate more future collaborations with organizations in another sector (either local government or nonprofit).

**Geography**

Few studies have addressed geographic (particularly urbanity versus rurality) limitations as a factor influencing government and nonprofit collaborations. Citing findings from Davis and Weber (2001) and Galloro (2001), Sowa (2009) distinguished between urban and non-urban early childhood education providers. However, this study is a rarity in terms of research exploring urban and non-urban divides in cross-sector collaborations.

Operating in a rural environment can be challenging for local governments. Poverty is often rampant in these areas and occurs alongside many other local government struggles (DePillis, 2014). One struggle is that rural governments usually lack the tax revenue to change the realities of poverty. Despite this challenge, demand for government services tends to be consistently high in rural areas.

Rural nonprofits also face challenges. According to at least one survey, approximately 73% of rural nonprofits report annual budgets of less than $500,000 (Fanburg, 2011). However, these same organizations cover an average service area of 49.1 square miles. This is in contrast to the 0.5 square miles and 4.8 square miles of average service area covered by urban and suburban nonprofits, respectively (Fanburg, 2011).

These geographic challenges make local government and nonprofit collaborations in rural areas a natural step toward better serving communities. Yet, these challenges also make collaborations difficult. Indeed, although rural organizations possess a scarcity of resources which (in theory) incentivizes collaborations, they are also faced with fewer potential partners. Thus, with generally fewer resources and fewer potential partners, we hypothesize that rural local governments and rural nonprofit organizations will collaborate less than their counterparts in urban areas.

**Hypothesis 3:** Organizations in rural areas will report having engaged in fewer past collaborations than organizations in urban environments. Rural organizations will also be less likely to anticipate engaging in future cross-sector collaborations than their urban counterparts.
Prior Collaboration Experiences

Organizations also interact in order to achieve legitimacy (Nathan & Mitroff, 1991; Provan & Milward, 2001). This is a core institutional explanation for why two entities may choose to collaborate. Linden (2002) has argued that when organizations have collaborated in the past, future risks may be mitigated by positive experiences. Essentially, this means that experiencing collaborative success can lead to future collaborative desires.

The concept of path dependency is, in part, predicated on this notion. When an organization finds that an arrangement works and is successful, not only is deviation from that arrangement undesirable it also tends to be extremely difficult (Pierson, 2000). Baum (1996) wrote of a similar phenomenon known as “repetitive momentum.” Once an action yields successful results, momentum for continuing that action builds. This acceptance of successful practices and the desire to continue these practices may apply to organizational collaborations as well. Thus, we hypothesize that once a local government or nonprofit organization feels that a collaborative effort has accomplished its intended goals and has yielded effective results that entity will show more willingness to collaborate in the future.

Hypothesis 4: Organizations that have experienced positive prior experiences in cross-sector collaboration will be more likely to anticipate future collaborations.

Data and Methods

To examine past and future collaborations between local governments and nonprofit organizations, we conducted a survey of nonprofit managers and local government managers in North Carolina. Our distribution lists were obtained from the North Carolina Center for Nonprofits (for nonprofit organization contacts), the North Carolina League of Municipalities (for city government contacts), and web page searches (for county government contacts). This was a closed survey only available by email or mail invitation. In total, we reached out to 1,290 executive directors, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and organizational leaders of different 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, 534 city managers, and 100 county managers. Only one individual from each organization was able to access the survey.

All respondents were first contacted by email with an invitation to participate through Qualtrics online software. Reminder emails were sent two weeks after the initial invitation to all those who had not yet responded. All invitations were linked to a specific email address and multiple attempts to open the survey were prohibited. The survey was opt-in.

To explore collaborations, we asked a mixture of multiple choice and open-ended questions concerning past collaborations (in the past three years), respondents’ impressions of the other sector (that their organization collaborated with), and their anticipation of future collaborations. Surveys distributed to respondents in different sectors were identical, with the occasional rewording to make the question applicable to either nonprofits or local governments.² We selected a broad definition of “collaboration,” which we defined in the survey as:

[Any] active, formal, or informal partnerships...through which your organization shares financial or other resources, including such things as delivering services, developing strategic plans or initiatives, applying for grant funding, working with clients or volunteers, fulfilling contracts, sharing or supplying office space or other resources, or other forms of cooperation.
Our response rate was 14%, although this varied by organizational type. Our response rate for nonprofit organizations was 15%. Our response rate for city managers was 12%. Our response rate for county managers was 9%. The types of nonprofit organizations that responded also varied. They included health-related agencies, youth advocacy organizations, arts councils, educational institutions, and professional associations, among others. The size of the local governments ranged from small towns with only one full-time employee to large counties and metropolitan municipal governments with thousands of employees.

Respondents ranged from leaders representing organizations with budgets in the thousands of dollars to those representing organizations with multimillion dollar budgets. Sample frequencies are shown in Tables 1a and 1b. As shown in Table 1a, about 9% of the nonprofits that responded to the survey indicated that their organization worked mainly in the “arts, culture, or humanities,” subfield. Statewide, also approximately 9% of all nonprofits in North Carolina have a primary focus on arts, culture, or humanities.

In examining factors that potentially influenced collaboration, we were primarily concerned with two questions presented to respondents in the survey. The first was the self-reported frequency of their organizations past collaborations. The second was respondents’ perceptions concerning the likelihood of future collaborative partnerships. In addition to these primary concerns, we were also interested in relationships between these two questions and respondents’ impressions of the other sector, their perceived level of organizational resources, the organization’s geographic location, and the organization’s prior experience with collaborations.

Our questions concerning perceptions of the other sector focused on a variety of issues such as perceptions of the general quality of services provided by the other sector as well as perceptions of whether the other sector could be relied on to represent the entire community. To measure organizational resources, we included an objective measure of each organization’s annual revenues. This measure was created using a seven-point scale of self-reported yearly revenue for nonprofit respondents and an identical seven-point scale of yearly revenues (obtained from public records searches) for local governments. In addition to this objective measure of organizational resources, we included two subjective measures. These measures were included in order to examine whether respondents believed that their agency had the resources for collaboration as well as their perceptions of whether logistical differences between sectors (e.g., hours of operation or office locations) made it difficult to collaborate.

To measure geographic differences, we created four mutually exclusive indicator variables: rural local governments, urban local governments, rural nonprofits, and urban nonprofits. In determining rural and urban areas, we relied on U.S. Census data. Using this data, we classified counties with more than 250 people per square mile as urban. This resulted in 20 of the counties being categorized as urban and 80 of the counties being categorized as rural.

Lastly, to assess how past interactions likely influenced future collaborations, we included respondents’ answers to a series of questions about past collaborations with the other sector. These questions asked respondents about their opinion as to whether past collaborations were effective overall, saved the organization money, increased the quantity of services provided, increased the quality of services provided, and/or increased citizen engagement.
### Table 1a. Sample Frequencies Compared to State Frequencies (Nonprofits)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>( n ) (Sample %)</th>
<th>State % (Where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Revenue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=&lt;$100k</td>
<td>1=32 (16%)</td>
<td>1=41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2=$100k-$499,999</td>
<td>2=55 (28%)</td>
<td>2=33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=$500k-$999,999</td>
<td>3=44 (22%)</td>
<td>3=8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4=$1M-$4,999,999</td>
<td>4=45 (22%)</td>
<td>4=11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5=$5M-$9,999,999</td>
<td>5=7 (4%)</td>
<td>5=2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6=$10M-24,999,999</td>
<td>6=7 (4%)</td>
<td>6 and 7=5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7=$25M+</td>
<td>7=8 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Type/Setting</strong></td>
<td>0/1=Urban</td>
<td>Urban=136 (86%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0/1=Rural</td>
<td>Rural=61 (14%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonprofit Subfield</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>17 (9%)</td>
<td>Arts=9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>49 (24%)</td>
<td>Education=19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>10 (5%)</td>
<td>Environment=5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>41 (21%)</td>
<td>Health=12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Service</td>
<td>46 (23%)</td>
<td>Human Service=33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>20 (10%)</td>
<td>Social=10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>Religious=8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12 (7%)</td>
<td>Other=2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Organizational type/setting is an indicator variable.

### Table 1b. Sample Frequencies Compared to State Frequencies (Local Governments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>( n ) (Sample %)</th>
<th>State % (Where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Revenue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=&lt;$100k</td>
<td>1=2 (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>1=41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2=$100k-$499,999</td>
<td>2=12 (4%)</td>
<td>2=33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=$500k-$999,999</td>
<td>3=5 (3%)</td>
<td>3=8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4=$1M-$4,999,999</td>
<td>4=20 (7%)</td>
<td>4=11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5=$5M-$9,999,999</td>
<td>5=5 (3%)</td>
<td>5=2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6=$10M-24,999,999</td>
<td>6=12 (4%)</td>
<td>6 and 7=5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7=$25M+</td>
<td>7=18 (7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City of County</strong></td>
<td>1=County</td>
<td>1=9 (12%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=City</td>
<td>1=100 (16%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Type/Setting</strong></td>
<td>0/1=Urban</td>
<td>Urban=24 (30%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0/1=Rural</td>
<td>Rural=50 (70%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Organizational type/setting is an indicator variable.

### Results

Our first goal was to determine overall trends indicated by our survey responses. Descriptive statistics reveal that our respondents reported generally high levels of collaboration. Over half of respondents (55%) reported that their organization had collaborated with an organization in the other sector “frequently” or “very frequently” in the past three years. Only 14% of respondents reported that their organization had not collaborated with the other sector in the past three years.

When asked about their interactions with the other sector, 49% of respondents reported that their organization’s interactions with the other sector had increased in the past three years. Another 46% of respondents reported that their organization’s interactions with the other sector had
remained constant in the past three years. Only 5% of respondents reported that their organization’s interactions with the other sector had decreased in the past three years.

We also asked respondents whether they perceived that interactions with the other sector would increase, decrease, or stay the same over the next three years. In response to this question, 48% of respondents said that they believed working with the other sector would increase over the next three years. Another 48% of respondents said that they believed interactions with the other sector would stay the same over the next three years; and, only 4% of respondents said that they believed their work with the other sector would decrease over the next three years.

In addition to these questions about past and future collaborations, we also asked respondents to identify the service areas where past collaborations occurred between their organization and organizations in the other sector. Respondents were then able to select as many service areas that they believed were applicable (out of 19 provided). They were also able to include a service area that was not listed by typing their answer in an open-ended response field. The three most selected service areas included education ($n=120$), social services ($n=117$), and economic development ($n=100$).

We also asked the specific duties, services, and/or resources that were shared between the organizations. Respondents could again select multiple options (out of 13 provided) or include a shared response that was not listed by typing their answer in an open-ended response field. For this question, the three most selected duties (or shared resources) included information exchanges ($n=175$), grant funding ($n=142$), and public/private partnerships ($n=124$).

Respondents were also asked a series of questions concerning accomplishments of their past collaborations. The majority of respondents reported favorable experiences with collaborations. Indeed, 53% of respondents stated that past collaborations were either “effective” or “very effective.” Another 29% of respondents stated that past collaborations were “somewhat effective.” Approximately 9% of respondents stated that their past collaborations were either “ineffective” or “very ineffective,” and about 5% commented that their past collaborations were “somewhat ineffective.” For example, in discussing a collaboration with a city parks department, one nonprofit manager noted that “It took a while to get everyone to the table, but now that they are there it works because everyone receives something from the partnership.”

As displayed in Table 2, we also asked about the extent of collaborations to meet more specific outcomes. Most respondents reported that collaborations seemed to accomplish a great deal, such as increasing access and quality of community services, increasing citizen engagement, and increasing trust levels between local governments and nonprofits. However, past collaborations seemed less successful at increasing resources. Indeed, fewer respondents reported that collaborations increased funding for either the nonprofit or local government; and, less than one-third (31%) of respondents reported that collaborations reduced competition for resources between local governments and nonprofits at least “to some extent.” As one nonprofit manager in our survey commented, “Case managed services at the high school level proved unsuccessful [sic] in that incarnation because school personnel did not have the flexibility and autonomy to do the job effectively and meet state and federal requirements while providing individualized services to students.”

As a final measure of overall trends, we asked a series of questions concerning respondents’ impressions of the other sector. We asked each local government respondent whether s/he agreed or disagreed with a set of statements concerning nonprofit organizations and vice versa for nonprofit managers. Here again, the questions were worded exactly the same for organizations in
Table 2. Accomplishments from Past Collaborations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>To Some Extent</th>
<th>To A Great Extent</th>
<th>Not Sure/Does Not Apply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saved money for the organization</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased community services</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased the quality of services</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured new funding for the nonprofit</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured new funding for the local government</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced competition between local governments and nonprofits</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased volunteers and other resources</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased trust in the other sector</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased citizen engagement in community activities</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

both sectors with the exception of slight rephrasing to make the questions appropriate for that sector.

As displayed in Table 3, there were several trends that emerged concerning impressions of the other sector and potential limitations to collaboration. Nearly one-fourth (24%) of respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that competition for resources limited collaborations between nonprofits and local governments. Another limiting factor for many organizations was resources. Indeed, 27% of respondents “agreed” that a lack of resources within their organization inhibited partnerships. Only 12% of respondents “agreed” that operational differences between nonprofits and local governments were a limiting factor. This finding suggests that logistics, such as hours of operation or office locations, did not significantly inhibit working together. There were some concerns about representation. Nearly one-fourth of all organizations (23%) “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the other sector “cannot be relied on to represent the entire community.” Lastly, most respondents (67%) “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the statement that the other sector provided “unreliable or poor quality services.”

To further examine levels of association between our independent factors and collaboration, we used Kendall’s tau-b test which is appropriate since we have ordinal variables. Other measures for interval level data may not show proper levels of association (Liebetrau, 1983). Kendall’s tau-b provides a level of association ranging from -1.0 to 1.0, with larger values indicating stronger associations and statistical significance of the relationship. Table 4 displays the Kendall’s tau-b coefficients for each of our independent variables. The p-values are provided in parentheses. As shown in Table 4, several variables have a statistically significant relationship to past and future collaborations.

Concerning Hypothesis 1, we expected that for each of our “Opinions of the Other Sector” variables there would be a negative effect. That is, we expected that those expressing lower opinions of the other sector would be less likely to have engaged in past collaborations. Our findings support this hypothesis. Specifically, our findings show that organizations with negative opinions of the other sector are significantly less likely to report prior collaborations across all four of our opinion questions. Future collaborations appear to be influenced by two of our four opinion questions. These findings are in line with previous studies showing that trust is a key factor in cross-sector collaborations (Alexander & Nank, 2009; Snavely & Tracy, 2002; Witesman & Fernandez, 2012).
Table 3. Opinions about the Other Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “Private interests (including those of nonprofits) do not belong in public service delivery.”</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “Competition for resources discourages local governments and nonprofits from collaborating.”</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. “[Our organizations] do not have the staff or time to manage collaborations with nonprofits.”</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. “Differences in hours of operation, office locations, or other administrative differences between nonprofits and local government make it difficult to collaborate.”</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. “[The other sector] provides unreliable or poor quality services.”</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. “[Our organization] has not developed strong enough relationships with the nonprofit sector to partner with them.”</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. “[The other sector] cannot be relied on to represent the entire community.”</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our results also show that Hypothesis 2a is supported by both objective and subjective measures. Objectively, we find that respondents who reported that their organizations had higher revenues were also more likely to report prior collaborations. This result provides validation to the assertion of AbouAssi, Makhlouf, and Whalen (2016) who argued that greater organizational capacity can lead to increased collaborations with other entities. We find that subjective opinions, such as perceptions of logistical limitations (e.g., hours of operation and other administrative practices), limit past collaborations. Indeed, the perception that a respondent’s agency lacked the resources to collaborate influenced the extent to which they engaged in prior collaborations.

We did not, however, find strong support for Hypothesis 2b. That is, we did not find that revenue was associated with future collaborations. Thus, the rejection of Hypothesis 2b fails to confirm a link between organizational needs and motivations to collaborate, as suggested by Gazley and Brudney (2007). This is not to say that this linkage does not exist. Our findings simply could not confirm it. The lack of support for Hypothesis 2b also fails to substantiate RDT as an explanation for local governments and nonprofit organizations engaging in collaborations.

Concerning organizational type and location, Hypothesis 3 is somewhat supported. That is, rural governments were more likely to report fewer prior collaborations; and, both, urban and rural governments were less optimistic concerning future partnerships. Nonprofits, though, (both rural
Table 4. Levels of Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Past Collaborations</th>
<th>Future Collaborations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opinions of the Other Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Interests Should be Separate</td>
<td>-0.18* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.18* (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Competition</td>
<td>-0.22* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Representative of Whole Community</td>
<td>-0.15* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable/Poor Services</td>
<td>-0.25* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.11* (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and Practical Limitations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Resources for Collaboration</td>
<td>-0.28* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.14* (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Differences</td>
<td>-0.21* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Revenue</td>
<td>0.22* (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Local Government</td>
<td>-0.12* (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.12* (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Local Government</td>
<td>0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.21* (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Accomplishments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Effective Collaboration</td>
<td>0.09 (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saved Money</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Services</td>
<td>0.05 (0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Service Quality</td>
<td>0.09 (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Citizen Engagement</td>
<td>0.71 (0.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.05 (two-tailed).

and urban) were more likely to report that they expected an increase in future collaborations. Future research should explore possible explanations as to why these differences might exist.

Lastly, to examine Hypothesis 4 we looked at associations between self-reported prior collaboration successes and the likelihood of future collaborations. These impressions of past collaborations, justified or not, provide insights into whether nonprofits seek partnerships with local governments (and vice versa) to meet shared goals for the communities they serve. Considering the work of Baum (1996), Pierson (2000), and Linden (2002), we expected that prior experiences would influence a respondent’s expectations of future behaviors. However, this does not appear to be the case for our respondents. None of our past accomplishment variables were significant predictors of future collaborations. Given that our research can best be characterized as exploratory, though, further study of Hypothesis 4 is warranted using a more extensive dataset.

Discussion

Our goal in this study was to provide preliminary insights into potential explanations for the emergence of collaborations between local governments and nonprofit organizations. We also sought to assess the likelihood of future partnerships, which are key facets in collaborative governance. With ever-increasing resource pressures on both local governments and nonprofits, it often makes sense for these two sectors to cooperate when their goals align. In fact, one might question why these partnerships are not more frequent given the increasing needs of nonprofit clients and the citizens served by local governments. As one of our respondents noted, “[contracting with nonprofits] has been a wonderful relationship, and they offer a great service. As a small town, we could not even come close to offering this level of service [which is] reaching into our community.”
It should be noted, though, that some of our respondents expressed caution in partnering with organizations from a different sector due to lack of control over certain endeavors. One respondent, for example, commented that “Success [is] directly related to strong trust factors between employees of both the nonprofit and local municipality. Both entities [need to be] willing to allow [one another] to lead/provide in their particular areas of expertise.”

As shown in Table 4, organizations must have the resources available to initiate and manage collaborations. As noted by one respondent, “We were glad to get out of one grant because the paperwork was horrendous. We needed a full-time person just for the reports.”

As another resource, we also found that organizational revenue was related to past collaborations. Specifically, respondents at organizations with higher revenues were more likely to report past collaborations. These financial resources, however, were surprisingly not a significant predictor of future collaborations (see Table 4). This finding could indicate that respondents in organizations with fewer resources (in the form of revenues) may view future partnerships as a potential solution for revenue shortfalls. Therefore, even though organizations with fewer resources may not have been able to collaborate in the past, leaders of these organizations may be able to see the benefits of collaboration. Still, these respondents at low resourced organizations may be faced with the practical reality of the capacity limits of their organizations—especially if there are no organizations willing to collaborate with them. Given the importance of resources (particularly financial) for these organizations, then, it may be difficult to increase collaborations. Thus, further research on the role of organizational resources and collaborations is certainly warranted.

We also found that opinions of the other sector, to some degree, mattered. For example, respondents expressed a belief that private (nongovernment) interests should not be involved in public actions. There were also perceptions of the quality of services provided by organizations in the other sector. Table 4 shows that generally negative views of the other sector (whether justified or not) were associated with fewer past collaborations and less optimistic predictions of future collaborations. Perceptions of past collaborations, however, had no bearing on perceptions of future partnerships. This suggests that other factors, such as resource limitations, may be more influential than past successes in predicting future collaborations. These factors, though, may also be intertwined. One respondent, for instance, in explaining why his/her organization no longer collaborates with the other sector noted that the partnership “end[ed] up costing us more than the funds provided and we cannot cover the losses every year.” Future research should explore the variety of forces driving cross-sector collaborations at the local level.

As with any exploratory study there are constraints that limit our findings. First, we assessed perceptions of sector leaders in only one state. However, it is possible that collaborations and/or perceptions of collaborations will vary among states. Prior studies, though, have argued that there are advantages to research that focuses on a single state, such as the potential increase in internal validity (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2002).

Second, in this study we measured perceptions of past and future collaborations in terms of frequency and accomplishments. We did not, however, measure the collaborations themselves. Thus, we relied on only managers’ assessments of these relationships without independently assessing the frequency or success of the partnerships. It is possible that respondents may have overestimated or underestimated the frequency of their past collaborations. It is also possible that respondents may lack the ability to accurately assess the accomplishments of past collaborations. However, we also know that perceptions can greatly influence behaviors. Thus, perceptions are worthy of study, particularly for assessing the likelihood of future collaborations.
Lastly, we note that there could be some self-selection bias (Couper, Kapteyn, Schonlau, & Winter, 2007). Indeed, those who held particularly strong feelings (one way or the other) regarding collaborations with the other sector may have been more likely to respond to our survey. Future work should focus on a broader group of respondents, perhaps from many states, and should rely on more systematic sampling strategies.

Conclusion

This study bridges a gap between two related yet distinct sectors, nonprofit and local government. As many communities move toward collaborative governance it is important to assess factors that facilitate government and nongovernment partnerships. In this study, we identified potential drivers of collaboration between local governments and nonprofit organizations. Our work contributes to the theoretical understanding of these collaborations by exploring managers’ perceptions concerning the types of collaborations that work best, the types of collaborations that are least successful, and the factors that foster or hinder collaboration. We add to the literature by exploring the perceptions that managers in both sectors have about the other. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, our main contribution is providing groundwork for future studies of nonprofit-government collaboration.

From a practitioner perspective, our findings should be useful. While exploratory in nature, our findings illustrate not only the value of trust among collaborating entities, but also the importance of organizational capacity in making partnership decisions. As such, practitioners would be well served to carefully evaluate the capacity that their organizations have for collaboration as well as the value added of any potential collaboration partner. Future research should examine nuances of cross-sector collaborations in order to provide more concrete recommendations to practitioners. This study is intended to be only a starting point for the continued examination of this topic.

Notes

1. In our survey, we did not define quality. We allowed each respondent to determine quality in his/her own way. For example, one local government official commented about quality by noting that at times some nonprofit organizations “were either unable to continue services at the expected level or in hind sight [sic] were never properly prepared to deliver services at expected levels.”
2. For example, we asked nonprofit managers, “In the past three years, has your interaction with local governments increased, decreased, or stayed the same?” For the survey sent to local government managers, this question was rephrased to ask, “In the past three years, have your interactions with nonprofits increased, decreased, or stayed the same?” Other than these minor changes all questions on both surveys were identical.
3. Specifically, we asked “Within the last three years, how often has your nonprofit (local government) organization collaborated or partnered with a local government (nonprofit) in any form of public service delivery or planning?” Respondents could answer on a five-point scale ranging from “Very Frequently” to “Never.”
4. Specifically, we asked “Over the next three years, do you expect interactions with local governments (nonprofits) to increase, decrease, or stay the same?”
5. See the Rural Center of North Carolina (http://www.ncruralcenter.org).
6. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from responses to our survey. The selected quotes are intended to be illustrative and not necessarily summative of all trends.
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Disclosure Statement

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In this study we investigate whether person-organization fit mediates the relationship between affect-based work antecedents—specifically, transformational leadership and role clarity—and public employee job satisfaction. We hypothesize that transformational leadership and role clarity, as joint affect-based work antecedents, will trigger the effect of value congruence on job satisfaction in public organizations. Using a viewpoint survey of South Korean government officials, we estimate structural equation models to test this hypothesis. Our findings indicate that person-organization fit does mediate the relationship between transformational leadership and job satisfaction. However, we also find that the mediating effect of person-organization fit on the relationship between role clarity and job satisfaction is not significant. This study contributes to our understanding of how affect-based work experiences can influence the person-organization fit and job satisfaction relationship. Implications are discussed accordingly.

Keywords: Person-Organization Fit, Transformational Leadership, Role Clarity, Job Satisfaction

Public organizations provide opportunities for public servants to perform essential tasks that create and support public service values through assigned roles. As a result, personnel management within public organizations is often designed to encourage employees to connect their jobs to these values (Houston, 2011). The public values literature supports this value-laden management approach (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009; Benington & Moore, 2011; Bozeman, 2007). Wright (2001), for example, suggests that intrinsic forms of work motivation in public organizations—achieved by value service cohesion—can lead to value driven job satisfaction.
To examine the effectiveness of ensuring value service bonds in public organizations, a number of scholars have applied the theory of person-organization fit. Drawing on public service motivation theory, these scholars have tested mediation models where the relationship between public service motivation and job focused work outcomes is mediated by person-organization fit effects (e.g., Bright, 2008; Gould-Williams, Mostafa, & Bottomley, 2015; Jin, McDonald, & Park, 2018a; Kim, 2012; Liu, Tang, & Yang, 2015; Wright & Pandey, 2008). Recent theory has also drawn attention to antecedent mechanisms such as the role of value congruence (Yu, 2009, 2013). Together these studies and theory suggest that work affect frameworks can shed light on how an individual’s affective attachment to organizational work values and roles—i.e., the internalization process—prompts subjective changes in person-organization fit.

Although attempts have been made to develop and test frameworks for causal relationships between public service motivation and person-organization fit (Jin, McDonald, Park, & Yu, 2017) as well as between person-organization fit and job satisfaction (Jin, McDonald, & Park, 2018b), limited research has focused on antecedent mechanisms. As such, the present study contributes to our understanding of the work affect antecedents to the person-organization fit and job satisfaction relationship for public servants. Specifically, building on Meyer and Allen’s (1991) assumption of work experience stimuli for an individual’s affective attachment to an organization, we present an affect-based mediation model of person-organization fit. This model suggests that transformational leadership and role clarity, as work experience antecedents, jointly promote person-organization fit by stimulating employees’ value-laden desires and work roles (Meyer & Allen, 1991). The perceived person-organization fit then elevates intrinsic reactions to one’s value service cohesion—ultimately leading to job satisfaction (Wright, 2001).

Model Development

Person-Organization Fit and Job Satisfaction

Person-organization fit, as originally conceptualized, is the way employees perceive their interactions with their organizational environment (Argyris, 1957). Most of the literature on person-organization fit has generally focused on value congruence, which has been defined as “the congruence between patterns of organizational values and patterns of individuals’ values” (Chatman, 1991, p. 459). Out of the various types of compatibilities that could (in theory) be perceived in the work environment (Cable & DeRue, 2002; Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005), person-organization fit corresponds to the matching of individual value patterns and organizational value patterns.

Drawing on fit perceptions theory, prior research on person-organization fit has suggested that there are differential effects on organizational and job-related outcomes. This research has shown that person-organization fit has a stronger influence on organizational outcomes than it does on job-related outcomes (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Cable & DeRue, 2002; Hoffman, Bynum, Piccolo, & Sutton, 2011; Kristof-Brown, Jansen, & Colbert, 2002; Lauver & Kristof-Brown, 2001). Subsequent meta-analyses have also provided insights into particular attitudinal and behavioral mechanisms (Hoffman & Woehr, 2006; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Verquer, Beehr, & Wanger, 2003). Central to the accumulated evidence is the strong effect of person-organization fit on employee job satisfaction in both private and public sector organizations. Scholars have, therefore, attempted to provide alternative theoretical explanations about the underlying attributes that link value congruence with job satisfaction (e.g., Edwards, Cable, Williamson, Lambert, & Shipp, 2006; Gabriel, Diefendorff, Chandler, Moran, & Greguras, 2014; Jansen & Shipp, 2013; Kristof-Brown & Jansen, 2007; Yu, 2009, 2013).
Public management scholarship has primarily focused on psychological antecedents of person-organization fit. Starting with Perry and Wise’s (1990) theorization of public service motivation, this scholarship has explored motivational traits and examined whether it is the case that “the greater an individual’s public service motivation, the more likely the individual will seek membership in a public organization” (p. 370). The findings from this scholarship have provided consistent evidence that the effect of person-organization fit on job satisfaction is triggered by intrinsic public service motivation (Bright, 2008; Gould-Williams et al., 2015; Kim, 2012; Wright & Pandey, 2008, 2011). As such, a number of scholars have suggested that the value service cohesion that enhances public employee satisfaction builds on the motivational attributes of public service that are internalized by employees.

In order to further determine antecedent characteristics stimulating the person-organization fit and job satisfaction relationship, recent affect-based fit research has developed more in-depth causal models. These models focus on the affective driving forces influencing the motivational role of person-organization fit (Yu, 2009). Jin, McDonald, Park, and Yu (2017), for example, tested a public sector affective influence model to determine whether the effect of public service motivation on person-organization fit depended on an individual’s affective influence process.

Despite these recent attempts, given the lack of evidence for antecedent constructs other than public service motivation, the underlying processes explaining person-organization fit remain underexamined. Therefore, a key to filling this gap in the literature is to explore particular work affect variables and test related assumptions and frameworks.

**Affect-Based Work Experiences and the Mediating Role of Person-Organization Fit**

Using a work affect attachment approach to identify antecedents and study the consequences of person-organization fit are not new scholarly efforts. Often relying on theories of affective consistency for person-environment fit hypotheses, studies of work affect have long provided the conceptual basis for fit perceptions (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Yu, 2009). Meyer and Allen’s (1991) assumptions regarding the internalization processes used to develop work values and roles explain the importance of affective consistency. Indeed, when employees feel comfortable with certain work values and roles they begin to internalize them. They then align those work values and roles with their personal values and role orientations. The motivation to develop affective consistency between work values and roles forms the foundation for the relationship between the organization focused construct—i.e., value congruence—and the service focused outcome—i.e., employee job satisfaction (Yu, 2009, 2013).

Work experiences characterize the individual internalization process when it comes to work values and roles. Beginning with conceptualizations of work experience traits effecting affective attachments between individuals and organizations (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982), research has long explored work experience variables that have significant influence on attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Allen and Meyer (1990), for instance, introduced myriad work experience variables; and, a number of researchers have developed systematic criteria for testing the work experience hypotheses. Moreover, Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, and Topolnytsky (2002) conducted a meta-analysis and found that transformational leadership, role ambiguity, and organizational support were among the strongest affective influences of work experiences.

The affect-based mediation model of person-organization fit proposed in the present study is framed by the assumption that the self-internalization process guides work values and roles. Corresponding to the value and role function of the self-internalization process, transformational leadership and role clarity are predicted to form the causal mechanism influencing the person-
organization fit and job satisfaction relationship. Our model proposes that person-organization fit mediates the relationship between affect-based antecedents (i.e., transformational leadership and role clarity) and public employee job satisfaction. The affect-based antecedents jointly enhance the value service cohesion of public servants by elevating person-organization fit perceptions. How affective attachment to organizational values improves job satisfaction is discussed below.

**Person-Organization Fit as a Mediator between Transformational Leadership and Job Satisfaction**

Burns (1978) initially suggested the transforming role of leadership; and, the conceptual basis for Bass’s (1985) transformational leadership theory in organizational work environments is that transformational leaders are those who lead their followers using four behavioral skills: 1) idealized influence, 2) inspirational motivation, 3) intellectual stimulation, and 4) individualized consideration (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, and Fetter (1990) refined this conceptualization by establishing three core behavioral dimensions of transformational leadership: 1) articulating a vision, 2) providing an appropriate model, and 3) fostering acceptance of group goals. Developments in the theory and research on transformational leadership have further enabled specification of the underlying behavioral orientations and traits of transformational leadership behaviors. The transformational leader’s compelling and inspirational articulation of value systems and goal orientation is the central vehicle for leadership effectiveness associated with work outcomes across sectors (Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Paarlberg & Lavigna, 2010; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Bommer, 1996).

Self-concept theory contends that transformational leaders provide the organizational frame for individual self-identification at work (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). Transformational leadership theory suggests that transformational leaders uncover and activate particular values that their employees have. Transformational leaders also communicate with followers to amplify the salience of these values within the frame of the organization’s values. That is, the frame alignment behaviors of transformational leadership tend to reinforce the psychological process of value congruence (Chi & Pan, 2012). The concepts of transformational leadership and value congruence both draw on an individual’s self-internalized values. These values secure the self-identity affirmation process embedded within an individual’s work environment (Hoffman et al., 2011; Jung & Avolio, 2000; Shamir, 1995).

Studies often focus on value-based attributes of work motivation for “connecting the dots” between transformational leadership and a variety of organizational work outcomes. Park and Rainey (2008), for instance, developed a full structural equation model of transformation-oriented and transaction-oriented public leadership. Their results revealed that transformation-oriented leadership enhances employee job satisfaction and performance through public service motivation. Additionally, Caillier (2016b, 2016c) conducted mediation model analyses and found that mission valence, goal clarity, and self-efficacy mediated the positive relationship between transformational leadership and extra role behaviors among government employees in the United States (US). Furthermore, Wright, Moyinihan, and Pandey (2012) suggested a public service values framework based on empirical evidence demonstrating that transformational leadership and mission valence for public servants was linked through individual public service motivation and perceived goal clarity.

Given these findings, we expect that transformational public managers more so than non-transformational public managers will better articulate particular work values in their organizations. Research has shown that transformational public managers are better able to
articulate why work values are important for the public(s) that they serve (Andersen, Bjørnholt, Bro, & Holm-Petersen, 2016); and, public sector employees are believed to internalize their organization’s value systems. This internalization leads to improved person-organization fit perceptions among public sector employees (Paarlberg & Lavigna, 2010). In this sense, then, value congruence acts as a mediator between transformational leadership and job satisfaction in public organizations and is driven by the affective attachment to public sector work values.

The literature on public leadership also points to direct effects of transformational leadership on employee work attitudes. Using pooled panel data of US federal government agencies, Oberfield (2014) conducted a time series regression analysis to test the causality of a full range leadership theory. He found that transformational leaders strongly improved follower cooperation, satisfaction, and work quality. Similarly, Park and Rainey (2008) presented regression results supporting the direct effects of transformational leadership on employee job satisfaction in public organizations. Transformational leadership, therefore, directly touches upon the affective attachment to an employee’s job since it shapes the employee’s perception of “the importance of the job to the organization and its mission or vision” (Purvanova, Bono, & Dziewczynski, 2006, p. 7).

A number of other scholars (e.g., Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Podsakoff et al., 1990; Podsakoff et al., 1996; Purvanova et al., 2006) have also provided support for the direct relationship between transformational leadership and job satisfaction. In this study, we hypothesize that the positive effect of transformational leadership on employee job satisfaction in public organizations is both direct and indirect, with the indirect effect being mediated through employees’ perception of person-organization fit.

Hypothesis: Transformational leadership in public organizations has both direct and indirect positive associations with employee job satisfaction. However, the indirect association is mediated through perceived person-organization fit.

The Mediating Role of Person-Organization Fit between Role Clarity and Job Satisfaction

Role clarity is defined as the extent to which employees are clear about the priorities and requirements of their jobs (Morrison, 1993). A related concept, role ambiguity, though has most often been the subject of previous organizational scholarship (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970). Because of the high degree of conceptual symmetry between the two concepts, early research on the implications of role clarity often relied on an understanding of role ambiguity’s mechanisms. However, in recent years, it has been suggested that the conceptual basis for focusing on role ambiguity as a means to identify the salient functions of role clarity and the specifications of work environments should be reversed.

The role ambiguity literature builds on the work affect assumptions of role theory perspectives and suggests that rolemaking processes are dynamic. Indeed, this literature often finds that the ambiguity of perceived roles, as an interactive stressor between employees and their organizational environments, negatively affects the dispositional and behavioral characteristics of individuals and other organizational work settings (Graen, 1976; Kahn et al., 1964; Szilagyi, Sims, & Keller, 1976). Early studies, for instance, found that role ambiguity negatively affected employee organizational commitment (Morris & Koch, 1979) as well as job satisfaction and involvement (Bedeian, Armenakis, & Curran, 1981; Drory, 1981). Some of these studies also found that role ambiguity increased turnover intention and anxiety stress (Bedeian et al., 1981; Brief & Aldag, 1976).
Highlighting the importance of supervisory intervention for role clarification, Schaubroeck, Ganster, Sime, and Ditman (1993) provided experimental evidence that role ambiguity increased employee stress and supervisor dissatisfaction. Meta-analyses have also supported the findings that role ambiguity is negatively associated with employee work attitudes and performance (Abramis, 1994; Jackson & Schuler, 1985; Tubre & Collins, 2000). Overall, the literature on role theory indicates that affective influences underpin positive correlations between role ambiguity and job stressor variables as well as negative correlations between role ambiguity and work outcomes.

As previously noted, the role ambiguity literature provides a theoretical basis for the affective relationship between role clarity and work outcomes (Berkowitz, 1980; Lyons, 1971). The conceptual symmetry of the two concepts’ diametrical effects on the same employee outcomes has been supported by research. Recent scholarly works, for instance, have found that role clarity positively affects job satisfaction and the work motivation of public servants (Hassan, 2013; Wright, 2004; Wright & Davis, 2003). Other studies have found negative influences of role ambiguity on public employee job satisfaction (Chu, Lee, & Hsu, 2006; Kim & Wright, 2007). Hassan (2013), for example, found that employee turnover was negatively associated with role clarity, whereas Kim and Wright (2007) found that turnover intention was driven indirectly by role ambiguity. As such, consistent with the literature in this area we expect that role clarity will directly improve employee job satisfaction.

In addition to the direct relationship between role clarity and job satisfaction, the work affect influence of role clarity can also promote person-organization fit perceptions. Values in public organizations are formed through dynamic interactions among employees. Public servants, thus, establish an organizational identification in alignment with the nature and salience of their individual job function (Hassan, 2013; Wright & Pandey, 2011). Value-based approaches to public management not only stress the alignment of compelling value descriptions (e.g., Moore, 2000), they also focus on the practical role of mission valence in terms of job focused outcomes (Wright, 2007; Wright & Pandey, 2011). That is, this research finds that organizational values in the public sector can transform public service tasks into jobs with meaningful and substantive implications that are then internalized by employees.

As a value-based perspective, Wright’s (2004) structural model of work motivation among public employees underscores the conceptual mutuality and closeness between perceived goal clarity and perceived role clarity. This strong mutual causality has been discovered by other public management scholars as well (e.g., Pandey & Rainey, 2006; Pandey & Wright, 2006). Caillier (2016a), for instance, found that perceived goal clarity promotes public service motivation of individual employees by enhancing their organizational commitment. He, therefore, argued that a better understanding of organizational goals in the public sector can lead to greater consideration of the publicness embedded within public service jobs. Consequently, he suggested, this enhances organizational commitment.

Variation in individual work roles can also lead to organizational identification and job satisfaction (Wright & Pandey, 2011). Therefore, in this study we predict that the effect of role clarity on job satisfaction will be mediated through person-organization fit. It should be noted, however, that although identity-based theories provide explanations for promoting organizational identification through role clarity and job specificity (Ashforth, 2001; Bray & Brawley, 2002), role clarity establishes clear guidelines for individual jobs and a clear understanding of how employees contribute to organizational values when job goals are achieved. Thus, a better understanding of the role of job contributions to organizational values provides greater insight into the self-internalization process of work roles. That is, role clarity provides an affective state that allows employees to understand their tangible and meaningful contributions,
how to accomplish certain tasks, and how they will be held accountable for those tasks. Thus, consistent with identity-based theories, Wright (2004) and Wright and Kim (2004) emphasized the importance of job specificity and task significance to achieve affective attachment.

In this study, we posit that role clarity in the public sector will positively influence job satisfaction, which is not only a direct influence but is also mediated by improving person-organization fit. Role clarity will increase compatibility between public service values of the employee and those being carried forward by the organization. As a result, the enhanced value congruence improves job satisfaction.

*Hypothesis*: Role clarity in public organizations has both direct and indirect positive associations with job satisfaction. However, the indirect association is mediated through perceived person-organization fit.

Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual framework.

**Data, Measurement, and Analysis**

**Data**

This study relies on a modified and translated version of the U.S. Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), which was conducted by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2013. This modified survey was administered to South Korean government employees who had been dispatched to the Central Officials Training Institute for occupational work training. The survey was distributed to 724 South Korean public employees over the course of five training sessions. Of these employees, 226 of them completed the survey. This is a response rate of 31.2%. Since the training sessions ended right after the initial survey was returned, no follow-up requests were made.

As shown in Table 1, respondents were both managerial and non-managerial employees from central government agencies, executive committees, and local governments. Males represented approximately 83% of respondents. There was substantial missing data for the rank variable.
### Table 1. Demographic Statistics of Respondents (n=226)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Respondents (n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Unknown</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (approximate)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age Unknown</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Service</td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5 years</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16-20 years</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-25 years</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26-30 years</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 30 years</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Length of Service Unknown</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Senior Executive Grades</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank Unknown</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Grades 1-3 are incorporated into the “Senior Executive Grades” rank in the South Korean national government.

There was also missing data (although not a substantial amount) for other demographic variables. In general, however, even though the survey was not distributed to a random sample of South Korean government officials the composition of respondents matched the composition of the broader population of South Korean government employees in terms of gender, age, and tenure (Korea Institute of Public Administration, 2014).

The use of South Korean survey data can be questioned in terms of theoretical generalizability. However, it should be noted that many studies have considered the South Korean public administration context when examining theoretical models and frameworks for the public sector. For example, Kim (2011) suggested a revised measure of public service motivation by analyzing survey data collected from South Korean firefighters; and, in another study, Kim (2012) provided empirical evidence of the mediating role of person-organization fit by using South Korean civil service survey data. Other public management studies using Chinese or Taiwanese data have also improved our understanding of different aspects of public sector management (Liu, Tang, & Yang, 2015; Yang, 2009).

Since our mediation model focuses on whether individual variation regarding the self-internalization process underlies the person-organization fit and job satisfaction relationship, it is less important that we focus on cultural distinctions for model development. Even for cultural and/or racial influences that have been found to exist in other fit research (e.g., Lyons & O’Brien,
scholars have suggested that there could be effects from varying affective work experiences based on race or culture. Since the South Korean public sector is homogeneous in terms of cultural and racial demographics, we believe that the findings from this study can be used to enrich our understanding of general affect-based work antecedents.

Measurement

Our four study variables—i.e., job satisfaction, person-organization fit, transformational leadership, and role clarity—are all latent constructs. We measured the variables using multiple items on a seven-point Likert scale. The scale ranged from strongly disagree (coded as “1”) to strongly agree (coded as “7”). The items were chosen based on previously validated measures. We then conducted Cronbach’s reliability tests for internal consistency of each measure (Cronbach, 1951). Table 2 presents the measures and their means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s reliability estimates.

Our measure of job satisfaction is composed of three items adapted from the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire’s three-item instrument for overall job satisfaction (Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, & Klesh, 1983). We excluded one item from this instrument because it was not included on the FEVS. To account for this excluded item, we included a job satisfaction item that was on the FEVS. This item asked how satisfied employees were about their involvement with decision-making processes related to their job. This three-item construct has a reliability coefficient of 0.80.

To measure person-organization fit, three measurement approaches have been generally applied: subjective, perceived, and objective fit (Hoffman & Woehr, 2006; Kristof, 1996). In this study we relied on a subjective fit measure that directly asked employees “how well their characteristics fit with their organization’s characteristics” (Hoffman & Woehr, 2006, p. 391). This question was intended to assess each individual’s cognitive state in terms of the perceived congruence between their personal characteristics and their organization’s profile. Cable and DeRue (2002) developed a three-item measure for person-organization subjective fit; and, our measurement for this construct uses two of these three items. The reliability estimate for this two-item construct is 0.88.

Podsakoff and colleagues (1990) developed, and validated through confirmatory factor analysis, a widely accepted instrument for transformational leadership. This instrument validates three dimensions of core transformational leader behaviors: articulating a vision, providing an appropriate model, and fostering acceptance of group goals. In our study, we used these same items for our measure of transformational leadership. The reliability estimate for this construct is 0.91.

Many studies have relied on Rizzo et al.’s (1970) survey items to measure role ambiguity and role clarity. The instrument originally consisted of six items that directly asked about the clarity of one’s job and responsibilities at work. In our study, we included two items of the measure—acknowledging that this reduced two-item construct may suffer from validity concerns. The reliability estimate for this construct is 0.87.

Analysis

In this study, we employed structural equation modeling to examine the hypothesized mediating effects of person-organization fit and the direct and indirect relationships among the study variables (Kline, 2011). We applied Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach to structural equation modeling. Specifically, we conducted two types of covariance structure
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item and Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person-Organization Fit (POF)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF1   The things that I value in life are similar to the things that my organization values.</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF2   My personal values match my organization’s values and culture.</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformational Leadership (TL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL1   Supervisors articulate the organizational mission, vision, and values to employees.</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL2   Supervisors provide employees with a clear understanding of how their tasks contribute to organizational mission and goals.</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL3   Supervisors develop challengeable and achievable goals.</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Clarity (RC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC1   I clearly know the range of authority that I have.</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC2   My job has clear, planned goals and objectives.</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction (JS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS1   All in all, I am satisfied with my job.</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS2   All in all, I like working here.</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS3   I am satisfied with my involvement with decision-making processes pertaining to my tasks.</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n=226 for POF, TL, and JS; n=224 for RC.

analyses using Mplus Version 6.12. First, we conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to ensure convergent and discriminant validity of our study variables. Among the models, the four factor CFA measurement model resulted in the best fit to the data. In the second step, we estimated a full structural equation model using conventional regression analysis as well as path analysis. This analysis was used to test whether the hypothesized model structure produced a good fit to the observed covariance structure of the data.

Results

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The four factor measurement model and five other alternative CFA models were tested for model fit and validity of the study variables. The alternative models were: 1) a person-organization fit and transformational leadership combined model; 2) a person-organization fit and role clarity combined model; 3) a person-organization fit and job satisfaction combined model; 4) a transformational leadership, role clarity, and job satisfaction combined model; and, 5) a null one factor model. Table 3 presents estimates of the model fit indicators for each model.

The four factor model resulted in the best fit statistics and matched our assumption of good model fit to the data. Despite the significance of the chi-square test of model fit (p<0.001), the ratio of chi-square ($\chi^2=61.51$) to the degrees of freedom (df=29) is 2.12. This is lower than the cutoff ratio of five for acceptable model fit (Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977). Other model fit statistics for the four factor model (e.g., Root Mean Square Error of Approximation=0.07; Comparative Fit Index=0.98; Tucker-Lewis Index=0.96; Standardized Root Mean Residual=0.03), however, all indicate a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Thus, comparison of all fit
statistics supports the four factor model (McDonald & Ho, 2002; Williams, Vandenbarg, & Edwards, 2009).

Table 4 shows standardized factor loadings of the study variables, average variance extracted (AVE) estimates, and inter-factor correlations. The AVE estimates and standardized factor loadings are sufficiently high. This indicates convergent validity for all of the study variables. The inter-factor correlations are standardized covariance estimates between the study variables in the chosen CFA model. These estimates range from 0.38 to 0.67. Discriminant validity is ensured in that no study variable has any inter-factor correlations higher than the square root of AVE for corresponding variables. Thus, we have confidence that the measures shape the corresponding latent characteristics and can be applied to test our research framework.

**Model Test**

The findings of the full structural equation analysis partially support our hypotheses. Because the structural model is identified only in terms of model parameters, the model fit indices are the same as those from our four factor CFA measurement model. Table 5 and Figure 2 provide parameter estimates and their significance levels for the hypothesized structural model. The direct, indirect, and total effects shown in Table 5 are standardized parameter estimates for the structural relationships among the study variables.

For Hypothesis 1, the direct effect of transformational leadership on job satisfaction is 0.34 ($p<0.001$). The indirect effect, mediated by person-organization fit, is 0.12 ($p<0.01$). These findings suggest that person-organization fit has a direct positive association with job satisfaction. The standardized estimate for this direct effect is 0.37 ($p<0.001$). The standardized total effect that sums up the direct and indirect effects is 0.46 ($p<0.001$). Twenty-six percent of the total effect of transformational leadership on job satisfaction is attributable to the mediation. As hypothesized, then, these results provide strong empirical evidence that transformational leadership has direct and indirect positive associations with job satisfaction and the indirect relationship is mediated through person-organization fit.

Our findings for Hypothesis 2, however, are not supported. Although the direct effect of role clarity on job satisfaction is strongly significant ($\beta=0.27; p=0.001$), the indirect effect is not significant at the 0.05 level ($\beta=0.06; p=0.07$). These results are likely attributable to the insignificant relationship between role clarity and person-organization fit at the 0.05 level. For this relationship, the standardized parameter estimate is 0.17 ($p=0.06$). The standardized total effect of role clarity on job satisfaction is 0.33 ($p<0.001$), of which 19.3% is mediated by person-organization fit. These findings do not provide strong support for the mediating role of person-organization fit between role clarity and job satisfaction for public servants.
Table 4. Standardized Factor Loadings, AVE, and Inter-Factor Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor and Item</th>
<th>Std. Loading</th>
<th>AVE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Job Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS1</td>
<td>0.78**</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS2</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS3</td>
<td>0.70**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Person-Organization Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF1</td>
<td>0.95**</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF2</td>
<td>0.82**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transformational Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL1</td>
<td>0.88***</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL2</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL3</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role Clarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC1</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC2</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n= 224. ***p<0.001. Square root of AVE=0.760 (JS); 0.886 (POF); 0.882 (TL); 0.876 (RC).

Table 5. Structural Parameter Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POF→JS</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL→JS</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC→JS</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL→POF</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC→POF</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL→POF→JS</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC→POF→JS</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL→JS</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC→JS</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: β=standardized parameter estimate. SE=standard error. p=two-tailed p-value. R²=0.62 for JS and 0.21 for POF. Percent of mediation=26% for TL→JS and 19.3% for RC→JS. ***p<0.001.

Figure 2. Full Structural Equation Model
Discussion and Conclusion

In this study we examined whether person-organization fit mediates the relationship between affect-based work antecedents and public employee job satisfaction. Although prior research has demonstrated the positive impact of person-organization fit on employee job satisfaction, limited research has explored work experience variables that might have affective influence on the value matching context. As such, our work contributes to an understanding of these underexamined antecedents.

The full structural equation analysis in our study shows that perceived person-organization fit mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and job satisfaction. Our analysis, though, does not show that person-organization fit mediates the relationship between role clarity and job satisfaction. Thus, on the one hand, our study provides evidence of the antecedent role of transformational leadership in upholding value service cohesion for public employee satisfaction. On the other hand, our study leaves open a number of questions about the role clarity and person-organization fit relationship. Thus, more research exploring this relationship is needed.

The strong significance of the mediating effect of person-organization fit between the transformational leadership and job satisfaction relationship indicates that there could be behavioral attributes of transformational leaders influencing this relationship. Indeed, transformational leaders often inspire and evoke a follower’s orientation toward a focal set of public service values (Park & Rainey, 2008). The association between transformational leader behaviors and employee perceptions of value congruence can impact job satisfaction. This association suggests that when public managers articulate and deliver compelling and visionary values criteria, employee perceptions of value congruence can increase and improve job satisfaction (Paarlberg & Lavigna, 2010; Wright et al., 2012).

Research on public sector leadership has long advanced the value-based alignment role of transformational leadership in enhancing attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (Morse, 2010). Paarlberg and Lavigna (2010), for instance, applied the value-based perspective to transformational leadership in the public sector. They identified how transformational public managers formulate compelling organizational values, recognize employee values and ideologies, communicate about the alignment of values criteria, increase value congruence, and suggest shared visions about the services for which employees are responsible. Through this process, they argue, value congruence is achieved since public employees internalize organizational criteria as compatible with their principal work values.

There is difficulty in interpreting the mediating effect of value congruence between role clarity and job satisfaction due to the insignificance of the association between role clarity and person-organization fit. Indeed, our findings indicate that the individual clarification process of work roles may not necessarily lead to identification with the job’s contributions and roles in terms of organizational values. We, thus, argue that there is a lack of theory and research on the relationship between role clarity and value congruence. While public management scholars have often focused on role ambiguity in the context of goal setting theory (Rainey, 1993, 2009), how role ambiguity influences person-organization fit is still largely unknown.

Since we acknowledge this unknown we also note that caution is required when attempting to interpret the mediating effect of person-organization fit the on role clarity and job satisfaction relationship. For public servants who have clarified work roles and contributions, there should be more evidence supporting the affect-based attribute of role clarity on job contributions. Role clarity leads to the affective attachment to work roles. The self-internalization of work roles may
increase the compatibility of public service values set by the organization and those set by the employee (Meyer & Allen, 1991). Our results, however, lack empirical support for the indirect relationship between role clarity and job satisfaction mediated through person-organization fit. Subsequent in-depth studies are needed to further identify the underlying dynamics between the two constructs.

The affect-based mediation model suggests that there can be self-internalization of work values and roles developed through transformational leadership and role clarity. This can be an essential vehicle for the effect of person-organization fit on employee job satisfaction in the public sector. Our model development examined the assumption that person-organization fit in public organizations arouses a sense of meaningfulness as related to individual public service jobs for those who have internalized work values and roles. However, our findings only partly support this joint mediation model of person-organization fit. As such, we recommend that future research continue to explore work affect antecedents.

Still, the joint discussion of affect-based constructs in this research can contribute to the advancement of management practice in the public sector. The merits and drawbacks of establishing a particular organizational management strategy are mainly assessed from a functional point of view in public organizations. However, to understand the attitudinal and behavioral nature of public sector employees’ dynamic psychological states, leaders in public organizations should be aware of the practical implications of managing work affect experiences (Brief, 2001).

Despite the benefits of our research, we should point out that there are limitations to our study. First, although we conducted structural equation modeling the cross-sectional nature of the data used in the analysis do not guarantee causal relationships. The second limitation is that the data are sourced from only a single survey. Thus, there is a potential for common source measurement bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Third, although we provided evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for our study variables, our analysis does not completely rule out the possibility of common method bias by which systematic error variances become significant and empirical results are confounded (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Finally, although it was not the focal point of our research to examine the distinctive implications of management practices across cultures, the lack of a deeper understanding of the cultural context is still a drawback. Indeed, the results of our study might not be generalizable to other countries. However, as noted earlier, we believe that the use of South Korean data can improve the external validity of theoretical approaches to organizational behavior.

Despite these limitations, our affect-based mediation model of person-organization fit explored the causal paths through which value service interactions in public organizations are promoted. As such, our research helps us to understand how and why the value congruence and job satisfaction relationship is driven by the joint effects of transformational leadership and role clarity. Our model development also uncovered important managerial practices and considerations concerning particular affect-based work environments. Future research should continue to fill the conceptual and analytical gaps in this area by refining both theory and practice.

**Disclosure Statement**

The author(s) declare that there are no conflicts of interest that relate to the research, authorship, or publication of this article.
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Who is Engaged and Why? Testing an Instrumental Perspective on Stakeholder Engagement

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From an instrumental perspective, public administrators are expected to analyze their environment. They are also expected to take proactive steps to manage environmental impacts. These actions are intended to ensure that public administrators are able to achieve their goals. Part of analyzing their environment involves the engagement of stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement is believed to provide public administrators with insights into how they can better evaluate innovative policy options that allow them to overcome limited administrative capacity. Stakeholder engagement is also believed to allow public administrators with opportunities to mobilize support in light of political opposition. The purpose of this article is to test these claims within the policy area of municipal contracting out. In the article, we find strong support for these ideas. Thus, our findings should inform public administration theories about the role and importance of stakeholder engagement.

Keywords: Public Management, Stakeholders, Engagement, Local Government

The public administration literature has often viewed government’s relationship with external stakeholders in two different lights. Traditional public administration literature has suggested that government responds to external stakeholders when these stakeholders have a powerful and privileged status in society (e.g., Bovaird, 2005; Stivers, 1992; Vigoda, 2002; Weible, 2006; Yang & Callahan, 2007). As a result, public administrators are seen as passive reactors (Feldman & Khademian, 2002; Stivers, 1992) or as negotiators (Nalbandian, 1991) when it comes to the interests of stakeholders. However, literature on New Public Management (NPM), governance, collaboration, and strategic management describes public administrators as proactive rather than reactive. These literatures suggest that public administrators are instrumental and strategic and may engage with stakeholders purposively to achieve goals and yield benefits (Bingham, Nabataichi, & O’Leary, 2005; Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014; Bryson, Patton, & Bowman, 2011; Moore, 1995; Moynihan, 2003; West & Bowman, 2004).

The present study seeks to examine and test this instrumental perspective. Specifically, we explore the extent to which public administrators engage stakeholders purposefully; and, we provide insight into who public administrators engage and why. To do so, we make use of novel data from the 2007 International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) survey. Although the primary purpose of this survey was to explore the nature of contracting out in local governments, a portion of the survey focused on stakeholder engagement. Therefore, we use this data along with data from the U.S. Census Bureau to explore the extent to which stakeholders within this particular policy area are engaged. We also use this data to explore how conditions within the decision environment, along with opposition and administrative capacity, can be used to explain patterns of engagement within municipalities.

We focus on the contracting out decision in municipalities for theoretical and methodological reasons. From a theoretical perspective, the contracting out decision represents a ubiquitous and fundamental question for local governments (e.g., Boyne 1998; Brown & Potoski, 2003; Warner & Hebdon 2001; Zhang, Gibson, & Schafer, 2018). That is: How do you offer services? The decision to contract out, then, provides a context that is both highly salient to local governments and fairly universal as a substantive policy question that local governments must address.

Indeed, the topic of contracting out is often described in the strategy literature as the adoption of innovation given that it is viewed as a new approach to service delivery by municipal governments (Damanpour & Schneider, 2008; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Walker, 2006). Innovative policies tend to produce strong reactions within communities (Borins, 2002; Damanpour & Schneider 2008; Hess & Adams, 2007; Walker, Avellaneda, & Berry, 2011). As a result, not only do innovative policies test government’s instrumentality (Borins, 2001; Damanpour & Schneider, 2008; Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, Schwabsky, & Ruvio, 2008) they also provide a particularly acute setting for studying instrumental approaches to public management.

Although previous research (e.g., Schafer & Zhang, 2016) has suggested a relationship between stakeholder engagement and local government contracting outcomes, a more nuanced probe of this relationship remains unexplored. Thus, contracting out provides a unique policy environment in which to explore the hypotheses later put forth in this study.

From a methodological perspective, ICMA has produced seven datasets on municipal contracting out since 1982 (ICMA, 2012). Although we focus on only the 2007 data for this study, the questions asked on the survey have been repeated over time and were developed by the leading practitioner-oriented organization focused on researching the practices of public administration (ICMA, 2012). We, therefore, have confidence in the reliability and validity of the questions included on the survey.

Within the policy context of contracting out, we attempt to make a two-fold contribution to the literature on stakeholder engagement in the public sector. First, we examine whether public administrators actively shape the policy process using an instrumental approach (as opposed to react to it) (Feldman & Khademian, 2002; Svara, 1998; Wilson, 1887). This examination will allow us to determine the extent to which public administrators actively and purposively engage stakeholders to achieve a particular goal. Second, we explore who is engaged as a stakeholder and why. This will allow us to uncover the many purposes that stakeholders serve in the policy process and highlight new ways of thinking about stakeholders’ role in governance. This exploration also allows us to provide an answer to the following call to researchers, “To understand the new governance, we cannot simply examine tools; we must understand the role of human kind—the citizens, stakeholders, and public administrators who are the tool makers and tool users” (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’leary, 2005, p. 548).
Our findings provide strong support that environmental conditions lead to more external stakeholder engagement. Specifically, we find that increased political opposition within the external environment increases the extent to which stakeholders are engaged. Additionally, we find that a lack of administrative capacity regarding the policy decision under consideration increases stakeholder engagement. We also find various patterns of engagement, with particular clusters of stakeholders conditioned by their external environment. Overall, our findings show that public administrators (at least those in this study) recognize that certain stakeholders can have value in specific circumstances in the policy process. We conclude by arguing that stakeholder engagement is a purposeful action undertaken by these administrators to manage their policy environment. This finding supports an instrumental perspective to the engagement of stakeholders.

**Purposeful Stakeholder Engagement**

While definitions of stakeholders can vary, particularly in their inclusivity (Bryson, 2010), stakeholders can broadly be defined as “...any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). Nabatachi (2012) further adds that stakeholders have “active and legitimate interests...by virtue of their professional role or involvement in formal organization” (p. 21). In this way, the definition of stakeholders is inclusive of citizens but focuses more on the organized, professional, and active interests of stakeholders within and outside the community (Nabatachi 2012).

An instrumental perspective of stakeholder engagement assumes that in a policy process stakeholders will be engaged strategically in order to serve some clear purpose in the governance process (Freeman, 1984; Gergen, 1969; Moynihan, 2003; Preston, 1990; Soma & Vatn, 2014). This perspective does not view stakeholders as being engaged in order to advance lofty democratic ideals about the role of citizens in a democracy. Moreover, this perspective does not view government as a mere pawn in a political system that is only responsive to those that are most able to work within the confines of the system (Boviard, 2005; Stivers, 1992; Vigoda, 2002). Rather, stakeholders from an instrumental perspective are engaged in order to achieve goals and yield benefits to the agency (Skelcher, Rynck, Klijn, & Votes, 2008). Participation among stakeholders is not just something to be done according to this perspective, it is one of many inputs in a complex system that can offer clear benefits and provide assurance that goals are being achieved (Soma & Vatn, 2014). Although the instrumental perspective of stakeholder engagement has not often been studied (Reed, 2008; Reed et al., 2009) this perspective may help to explain patterns of engagement that can reconcile competing views of administrative action in democratic societies (Feldman & Khademian, 2002; Vigoda, 2002).

Beginning with the NPM movement, government actions toward stakeholders have been described as not only purposeful, strategic, innovative, and entrepreneurial, but also endowed with discretion and capacity to seek out stakeholders as partners to bring meaningful and demanded change (Moore, 1995; Osborne & Gabler, 1992). This view is in contrast to some earlier explanations of bureaucratic behavior that once considered government to be purely responsive to stakeholders and easily captured by stakeholder interests (Stivers, 1992). Contemporary views now see public administrators as collaborative and strategic since they often rely on stakeholder resources and information to achieve their goals (Bryson, 2004).

From an instrumental perspective, then, one might expect public administrators to weigh the costs and benefits of stakeholder engagement. Indeed, public administrators may more purposefully rely on stakeholder involvement as a tool to achieve objectives and accrue
meaningful benefits to their agency (Bryson, 2004; Bryson, 2010; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Moynihan, 2003). In doing so, these public administrators may be more thoughtful about whom to engage and under what circumstances. This may result in at least two conditions in government’s decision environment that are able to be managed more effectively. These conditions are strong political opposition and insufficient administrative capacity.

Political Opposition

The inherently political system in which government operates means that every policy area is likely characterized as having a range of oppositional, and oftentimes conflictual, opinions. The characterization of the environment as being oppositional may be especially true within the decision context that this research examines—that is, the contracting out of government services (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Peters & Pierre, 1998) and the adoption of innovations (Borins, 2000, 2002). While opposition may be ubiquitous in these environments, the instrumental perspective assumes that clear actions will be taken in order to lessen the impact of opposition.

Stakeholder engagement can aid in lessening the impact of an oppositional environment by building support (Behn, 1978; Bryson, 2004; Moore, 1995; Moynihan, 2003; Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950). This support can increase the acceptability, legitimacy, and sustainability of any policy action eventually chosen (Beierle, 2002; Bryson et al., 2011, Nutt, 2002). Cultivating support and building winning coalitions are key to the administrative task of making sure that whatever course of action is chosen does not mar the implementation process as a result of costly delays or active efforts to delegitimize a policy (Lawrence & Degan, 2001).

Identifying, mobilizing, and building coalitions have all been highlighted as key tasks of public administration (McGuire, 2002; Moore, 1995; Purdy, 2012). For instance, Skelcher and colleagues (2008) have suggested that the development of governance networks serves to shape and develop coalitions that can ensure realization of political objectives. Moreover, Irvin and Stansbury (2004) have argued that engaging stakeholders can help build alliances. When these alliances consist of influential community members, they argue, these individuals can spread their enthusiasm for a policy and diffuse opposition.

Weible (2007), in an analysis of stakeholders for marine protected areas, demonstrated how stakeholders provide political support by lobbying, mobilizing resources, pushing for change, and spending time convincing the public to adopt new policy initiatives. Krueathep, Suwanmala, and Bureekul (2012) also found that when stakeholder interests were in conflict more collaboration with external network actors occurred. Moreover, Wang (2001) found that the extent of political competition among different groups in a city had a significant and positive impact on who was involved in administrative decision-making. Thus, engagement of stakeholders can be used as an instrument to manage oppositional political environments. Indeed, by engaging stakeholders outside of the core institutional actors we expect that the administrative face of government will purposefully work to create coalitions that can be used to coalesce public opinion in support of administrative decisions.

Hypothesis: As oppositional intensity increases, engagement with stakeholders will also increase.

Administrative Capacity

The second environmental condition that may give rise to increased stakeholder engagement is a lack of administrative capacity. Feiolk and West (1993) define the administrative capacity of
Who is Engaged and Why?

government as having the requisite knowledge, technical skills, and expertise of an organization to evaluate feasibility among a set of policy alternatives. Similarly, Hilderbrand and Grindle (1994) noted that administrative capacity consists of having requisite information and the analytical ability to process that information. Although administrative capacity is critical to achieving the goals of an agency, the capacity to make informed and intelligent decisions varies by agency and policy context (Bowman & Kearney, 2011; Head, 2008; Honadle, 1981). For instance, Howlett (2009) demonstrated that implementing new initiatives, as compared to simply advancing old initiatives, demands greater administrative capacity. Moreover, Head (2008) found that collaborative networks were more likely to emerge in policy contexts where simple technical solutions for an issue were neither relevant nor feasible.

Notably, previous research has shown that the contracting out decision can be information and analytic capacity intensive. Brown and Potoski (2003) demonstrated that the decision to contract out has numerous costs associated with careful and rational analysis. They found that, to a large extent, many governments are not equipped to evaluate the full costs of contracting out. Thus, the high information and processing costs associated with the evaluation of the contracting out decision can make this decision environment one in which administrative capacity is demanded of organizations but is not actually present (Smirnova & Leland, 2014).

Engaging with stakeholders when faced with a difficult decision like contracting out can provide governments with information to overcome risks and costs associated with a particular decision process. Accessing this information, however, is not always easy given that it tends to be decentralized (Thomas & Poister, 2009). Therefore, to maximize the acquisition of information, managers must often reach out to several stakeholders. Reed (2008) has argued that by increasing inputs, such as the number of people providing information on a policy system, more robust and higher quality information can be obtained; and, although greater information is not synonymous with good information, Bierele (2002) found that information received from stakeholders is typically of high quality.

In the context of contracting out, there are multiple elements of a service (or service area) that stakeholders can provide information about that may not be under the direct purview of government. For example, stakeholders can provide more information about service quality or elements of the supply chain that are needed in order to provide a quality service. Thus, stakeholders can provide government with information to overcome obstacles in asymmetric contracting out environments.

_**Hypothesis 2:** As insufficiency in administrative capacity increases, engagement with stakeholders will also increase._

**Who are Stakeholders?**

Stakeholders are critical to effective public administration (Bryson, 2004, 2010). However, identifying who stakeholders are in a given policy area is largely situational and often considered an applied exercise (Brugha & Varvasovska, 2000; Reed et al., 2009; Soma & Vatn, 2014; Thomas & Poister, 2008; Weible, 2007). Stakeholder analysis, thus, can refer to myriad techniques (Bryson, 2010; Reed et al., 2009).

The general process of stakeholder analysis begins with identifying the focus, the issue, or the intervention for which stakeholder analysis is being done (Bryson, 2010; Prell, Hubacek, & Reed, 2009; Reed et al., 2009). In this way, the identification of stakeholders is usually limited to the
decision context or “system boundaries” under consideration (Reed et al., 2009, p. 1947). In this study, we were limited in the identification of stakeholders to those that ICMA had already identified as being engaged in the contracting out decision. This limitation, however, does not inhibit our ability to theorize about the role that individual stakeholders play in a given context (Soma & Vatn, 2014; Weible, 2007). Indeed, Jennings and Hall (2011) identified a range of stakeholders in state level policy administration and theorized about the different types of information that these stakeholders provided government agencies.

Building on the beliefs that stakeholders are engaged to manage strong political opposition and insufficient administrative capacity, we expect that some stakeholders will be engaged for coalition building purposes. On the other hand, we expect that some stakeholders will be engaged for their information value. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis$_3$: As opposition increases in an environment, stakeholders that are able to build coalitions and provide political support will more likely be engaged.

Hypothesis$_4$: As insufficiency of administrative capacity within a government agency increases, stakeholders that are able to provide information will more likely be engaged.

Data and Methods

Our data on stakeholder engagement comes from the 2007 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) survey. Although the purpose of the survey was to examine contracting out in city and county governments, the survey also included several questions about the environmental and internal conditions of agencies as well as the processes that these agencies use to facilitate contracting out (including external stakeholder engagement). Although this data has been widely used by contracting out scholars (e.g., Brown & Potoski, 2003; Fernandez & Ryu, 2008; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Levin & Tadelis, 2010; Warner & Hebdon, 2001), there has been limited use of this data to explore stakeholder engagement in the contracting out decision (for an exception see, Schafer & Zhang, 2016).

The survey that we obtain our data from was distributed to administrators of approximately 6,000 municipalities and counties in the United States (US). The response rate was 26.6% (n=1,599). For the purposes of this study, we limit our analysis to only municipalities (n=874) so that we can examine the data within the context of demographic and financial data from the US Census Bureau.

Measurement

Dependent Variables

Our key dependent variable is the type of stakeholder engaged in each municipality. To construct this variable, we created an additive index using the survey question: Who outside your local government organization was involved in evaluating the feasibility of private service delivery? Responses included: 1) potential service deliverers, 2) professionals/consultants with expertise in the particular service area, 3) service recipients/consumers, 4) managers/Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) of other local governments who have experience using private service delivery, 5) citizen advisory committees, and 6) state agencies, leagues, or associations. An option for “other”
was also provided. If a municipality indicated that they engaged three of these stakeholders, the external stakeholder engagement index for that municipality was calculated as three.

Since this index may not be inclusive of all stakeholders, the content validity of the index can certainly be questioned. However, as previously noted, most studies of stakeholders are limited by the decision context in which they are examined. Consequently, most studies of stakeholders by design likely do not include the full range of stakeholders that they could (Reed et al., 2009). Still, when we examined prior studies that have listed external stakeholders within a given policy area (e.g., Schalk, 2011; Thomas & Poister, 2008; Walker, Avellaneda and Berry, 2011; Weible, 2007), we found that all major categories of stakeholders in these prior studies were also included on the ASD list of external stakeholders. For instance, Thomas and Poister (2008) organized the Georgia Department of Transportation’s stakeholders into customers, advocacy and interest groups, suppliers and business partners, policymaking and oversight bodies, similar agencies with different jurisdictions, and partner agencies. All of these categories of stakeholders are included in the list of external stakeholders provided on the ASD.

In addition, we undertook careful analysis of the “other” stakeholder responses in order to ensure that all applicable stakeholders had been included in our analysis. Only 17 responses were written in and several of these were not external stakeholders. However, two municipalities did note that their local Chamber of Commerce was a stakeholder category; and, one municipality noted that nonprofits were a stakeholder category. We did not create additional categories based on these responses, but this did help us to confirm that most external stakeholders had already been included on the ASD.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 were examined using the index of external stakeholders described above. In order to explore hypotheses 3 and 4, factor scores based on external stakeholders were generated. This allowed us to identify patterns of stakeholder engagement within each municipality. We conducted a factor analysis (Torres-Reyna, 2010) of the dummy variables that were used to construct the initial index. Table 1 reports the findings of this analysis.

Two factors with eigenvalues equal to or higher than 1 were retained based on the Kaiser criterion (Torres-Reyna, 2019). The factor-loading matrix (using varimax rotation) is presented in Table 2. The loadings are listed in rank order. The matrix shows that there are two clusters (or categories) of stakeholders that municipalities engage. Factor1 accounts for 31% of the observed variance and consists of “Managers/ CAOs of other local governments,” “Potential service delivers,” and “State agencies, leagues, or associations.” Factor2 accounts for 18% of the observed variance. This factor consists of “Citizen advisory committees,” “Service recipients/Consumers,” and “Professionals/Consultants.”

In a separate analysis undertaken to explore hypotheses 3 and 4, we saved the factor scores as new variables for each municipality. We then used these scores as our dependent variables in models 2 and 3 (in Table 6).

**Independent Variables**

To measure our two key independent variables of interest, political opposition and administrative capacity, we created two additional additive indices using the ASD survey. Our index for political opposition was created based on the survey question asking: “Has your local government encountered any obstacle in adopting private service delivery?” The response options that we used in the creation of this index were: 1) opposition from citizens, 2) opposition from elected officials, 3) opposition from local government line employees, 4) opposition from department
heads, and 5) restrictive labor contracts/agreements. We added only the “yes” responses to each question to construct the index. Thus, these scores range from 0 to 5. A “yes” to the last response (i.e., restrictive labor contracts/agreements) could indicate a political environment that is more opposed to contracting (Fernandez, Smith, & Wenger, 2007; Hefetz & Warner, 2004). For this reason, we included it in our political opposition index.

We statistically examined our political opposition index using factor analysis. The index is unidimensional, based on the Kaiser criterion that an eigenvalue be greater than one in order to be retained. We, therefore, have confidence that this index accurately captures a singular concept. In addition, using the 1992 and 1997 versions of the ASD survey, Hefetz and Warner (2004) used similar questions to construct an “opposition index.” They did not, however, examine this index in relation to external stakeholder engagement as we do in the present study.

The index for administrative capacity is also based on the question: “Has your local government encountered any obstacle in adopting private service delivery?” However, the response options that we included in the construction of this index were: 1) lack of staff with sufficient expertise in contract management, 2) lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of private alternatives, 3) lack of precedent or institutional rigidities, 4) problems with contract specifications, and/or 5) lack of adequate contract monitoring systems. This index is, again, additive of all “yes” responses. Thus, as the value for the index increases this indicates that municipalities have less administrative capacity. In contrast, a lower value on the index indicates greater administrative capacity.

The first two responses included in our administrative capacity index clearly relate to our earlier definition of administrative capacity—particularly since these items pertain to the expertise and evidence available to staff in order to evaluate alternatives. The third response is a measure of capacity, as it captures the extent to which the agency has the ability to learn and adapt. As earlier noted, the contracting out decision is particularly information intensive due to contract specification and monitoring (Brown & Potoski, 2003). The fourth and fifth responses pertain to the administrative capacity to deal with specific attributes of contract specification and monitoring.
We statistically examined the validity of our administrative capacity index using factor analysis. In doing so, we found that this index was also unidimensional. We, therefore, have confidence that the index accurately captures a singular concept, which is administrative capacity.

Admittedly, there are a number of limitations with using these indices. First, the construct validity of both indices can be questioned as they have not been externally validated to accurately capture the concepts that we have attributed to them. However, as noted previously, ICMA has consistently reproduced the ASD survey over the years. Each iteration of the survey has included the questions that we focus on in this study. This indicates, to some extent, that the constructs have face validity. We are also able to demonstrate the construct validity of the indices from the results of our factor analysis.

Another potential issue in this analysis relates to the additive construction of our measures. Concerning the stakeholder engagement variable, the survey asked only if stakeholders were engaged. Respondents were not asked how often they were engaged. Thus, we are unable to measure the intensity of stakeholder engagement. We are also unable to establish whether certain stakeholders are engaged more often than others or whether different stakeholders are engaged for different reasons.

Finally, it should be noted that we made efforts to examine each variable individually (and as indices). We also considered weighting variables. However, there were no strong statistical or theoretical reasons to do so.

**Control Variables**

There are a number of other variables that may also explain a municipality’s engagement of external stakeholders. Therefore, we included a range of control variables consistent with literature on stakeholder engagement, the decision environment of contracting out, and the broader concept of public engagement.

The first set of control variables includes specific factors related to contracting out that might influence stakeholder engagement. The instrumental perspective offered here suggests that stakeholder engagement may vary based on the degree to which the policy under consideration is innovative (Borins, 2002; Howlett, 2009). Although there is evidence suggesting that the contracting out decision is innovative (see review of literature, above), some municipalities may already have a percentage of their services contracted out. Thus, we included a control variable to measure the percentage of services already outsourced. Considering that each service has unique aspects, we expect that the level of contracting out already taking place will lead to an increase in stakeholder engagement. This may be especially true if administrators have already learned about the value of stakeholder engagement.

The second set of control variables included are municipal characteristics. These include political ideology, form of government, highest level of education, household median income, population size, and the number of full-time employees within the municipality.

A community’s overall political ideology is an important consideration in the adoption of any policy. To assess political ideology, we included a measure of the perception of demand for smaller government. When a community demands smaller government there may be fewer impediments to contracting out. On the ASD survey, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the community’s demand for smaller government. A “yes” response was coded as “1.” A no response was coded as “0” and was used as the referent category.
Form of government is a commonly used variable in studies of general citizen engagement (e.g., Ebdon, 2002; Wang, 2001; Wang, Hawkins, & Berman, 2014; Yang & Callahan, 2007) as well as in studies of external stakeholder engagement (e.g., Boxelaar, Paine, & Beilin, 2006; Handley & Howell-Moroney, 2010). Therefore, we account for form of government with a variable that indicates whether the city’s form of government is: 1) mayor—council, 2) city—manager, or 3) commission. The mayor—council form is used as the referent category in our analyses.

Consistent with the logic of instrumentality, we expect the city—manager form of government, compared to the commission and the mayor—council forms of government, to engage external stakeholders more since professional managers are trained to treat involvement as a tool of governance (Handley & Howell-Moroney, 2010; Yang & Callahan, 2005;). However, previous research on citizen engagement has shown that the commission and the mayor—council forms of government tend to engage citizens more (Yang & Callahan, 2007; Zhang & Yang, 2009). In the context of external stakeholder engagement, we refer to the assumption of instrumental action; and, we expect that the manager—council form of government will be most likely to engage external stakeholders given that their professional and technocratic knowledge base may make them more proactive and aware of the benefits of doing so.

To account for city size, we included a measure of each city’s population in the year the survey was distributed as well as the number of full-time employees in each city. Yang and Callahan (2005) have suggested that smaller cities may be the more likely to engage citizens since “...residents in smaller jurisdictions tend to have more interactions with elected officials, are more knowledgeable about issues, possess a greater sense of community, and therefore are more likely to participate” (p. 196). However, they did not find support for this hypothesis. Instead they found that larger municipalities had higher levels of citizen engagement. Therefore, we expect larger communities will be more likely to engage external stakeholders. We also expect that the number of full-time employees will limit the extent of external stakeholder engagement, as there will be more internal resources to manage the contracting out process.

We measured education level of the population as the percentage of persons within each municipality with a high school degree or above. We expect education level will have a positive effect on external stakeholder engagement. Indeed, several scholars have noted that one of the limitations of working with the public is the public’s lack of education and training about the inner workings of government. This type of training, some have suggested, would help to ensure the usefulness of public input (Callahan & Yang, 2005; Nabatachi & Amsler, 2014). It should come as no surprise, then, that Yang and Callahan (2007) found that the level of education in an area had a positive effect on public involvement in local government, as perceived by public managers. Thus, a more educated citizenry is likely to be associated with increased stakeholder engagement by municipalities.

We measured income level of the population using household median income. Wealthier citizens are believed to have more time to dedicate to participation in governance activities. As such, these citizens may be more willing to offer their time to participate in governance activities once engaged. Carr and Halvorsen (2001) found that across mechanisms for public engagement, citizens that participated in governance activities had higher than average income levels. In the context of stakeholder engagement, then, community income level may also increase the degree to which stakeholders are engaged in the policymaking process.

We also included several controls for the geographic location of municipal respondents. Regions were categorized based on ICMA’s region codes and included: “1-Northeast” (which consists of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, District
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Engagement</td>
<td>[Index]: potential service deliverers; professionals/consultants; service recipients/consumers; managers/CAOs of other local governments; citizen advisory committees; state agencies, leagues, or associations.</td>
<td>2007 ICMA ASD Survey</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>[Index]: opposition from citizens, elected officials, local government line employees, department heads; and, restrictive labor contracts. [Index]: insufficient supply of competent private deliverers, lack of staff with expertise in contract management, lack of empirical evidence of the effectiveness of private alternatives, lack of precedent, problems with contract specification.</td>
<td>2007 ICMA ASD Survey</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Capacity</td>
<td>% of Services Outsourced Log of percentage of services outsourced. Demand for Smaller Government [Dummy]: change in political climate <em>(indicating a decreased role for government).</em> Form of Government 1=mayor—council 2=city—manager 3=commission Education % of constituency with at least some high school education in a municipality. Income Median income in municipality. Population Population of municipality. Full-Time Employees (FTE) Number of full-time employees in a municipality. Region 1=Northeast 2=South East 3=Midwest 4= Mountain Plains 5= West Coast Metro Status 1=Central city in MSA 2=Suburban 3=Not in MSA</td>
<td>2007 ICMA ASD Survey 2010 American Community Survey 2010 American Community Survey 2010 Census of Local Government Finance Data 2010 Census of Local Government Finance Data</td>
<td>+ + + - - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3. Variable Descriptions and Hypothesized Directions*

Finally, we included a measure of the metropolitization of each municipality. A central city in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is coded as “1,” a suburban municipality is coded as “2,” and municipalities not located in an MSA are coded as “3.” This is an important control variable since the metro status of a city is often a critical consideration in contracting out decisions (Mohr, Deller, & Halstea, 2010) and innovative policy implementation (Homsy & Warner, 2015).

Table 3 includes variable descriptions, data sources, and the hypothesized direction of all independent variables. Table 4 includes summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables.

Models

The dependent variable in Table 5 is the additive index of external stakeholder engagement ranging from 0 to 6. This variable is a count of the types of stakeholders that are engaged in each municipality when “evaluating the feasibility” of contracting out. The appropriate modeling approach for count data is Poisson regression (Dunteman & Ho, 2006). However, there are a large number of zeros in our data and the variance (1.01) marginally exceeds the mean. For this reason, we considered the use of either a zero-inflated Poisson regression model or a negative binomial regression model. Both of these models are used for count data with high dispersion. However, after running post estimation commands in Stata for both models, we found that the Poisson model (despite the value of the variance) was the best modeling approach. As such, we proceeded with a Poisson model in Table 5. Consistent with Cameron and Trivedi (2009), though, we used robust standard errors.

For models 2 and 3 in Table 6, we used the factor scores generated from our factor analysis analyzing the component questions of the external stakeholder engagement index. For the purposes of this analysis, these indices represent continuous variables. Thus, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate these models. The independent variables in models 2 and 3 are the same as those used in Table 5. Robust standard errors are also obtained for these models in order to account for heteroscedastic residuals.

Results

Table 5 includes the Poisson regression results, incidence rate ratios, and the effect of a one-unit change of each independent variable on the dependent variable of interest—which is a count of the types of external stakeholders engaged in the contracting out decision. Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, our indices for political opposition and administrative capacity are statistically significant and positively correlated with external stakeholder involvement. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the political opposition index (indicating increasing opposition to contracting out) increases the number of external stakeholders engaged by 26.18%. A one-unit increase in the administrative capacity index (indicating decreasing administrative capacity)
Who is Engaged and Why?

Table 4. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Engagement</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Capacity</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Services Outsourced</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Smaller Government</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>31.51</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>75.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (dollars)</td>
<td>55,450</td>
<td>23,456</td>
<td>19,247</td>
<td>237,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>50,359</td>
<td>102,529</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>1.552e+06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Status</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor1</td>
<td>-1.11e-08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor2</td>
<td>-9.91e-09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Poisson Regression Results: Count of the Types of External Stakeholders Engaged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Poisson Regression Results</th>
<th>Z-Statistic</th>
<th>Incidence Rate Ratio</th>
<th>Actual Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>(7.25)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>26.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Capacity</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>(4.18)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>20.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Services Outsourced</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>97.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Smaller Government</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>(3.15)</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>51.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government (city—manager)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>(-0.33)</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government (commission)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>(-0.46)</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>(-0.69)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Southeast)</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
<td>(2.41)</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>57.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Midwest)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>25.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Mountain Plains)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>30.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (West Coast)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>16.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Status (Suburban)</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>(-2.15)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-25.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Status (Not in MSA)</td>
<td>-0.45***</td>
<td>(-2.83)</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-35.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-1.22***</td>
<td>(-4.36)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-70.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 874

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

increases the number of external stakeholders engaged by 20.24%. Figures 1 and 2 graphically display the relationship between these variables and the increase in the predicted count of external stakeholders engaged.

Several of our control variables are also significant and in the expected direction. The percentage of municipal services outsourced and citizens’ demand for smaller government both increase the extent of external stakeholder engagement. It is worth noting that with a one-unit increase in the percentage of services outsourced, local government officials are 97% more likely to engage
**Figure 1.** Marginal Effect of Political Opposition Index on External Stakeholders Engaged

Note: Gray area indicates 95% confidence interval.

**Figure 2.** Marginal Effects of Administrative Capacity Index on External Stakeholders Engaged

Note: Gray area indicates 95% confidence interval.
external stakeholders. By contrast, when citizens demand smaller government local government officials are 51% more likely to engage external stakeholders.

In addition, the results from our Poisson regression model show that the household median income variable is statistically significant. The magnitude of this effect, however, is trivial. Interestingly, form of government failed to show any statistical significance in the model. In fact, the council—manager form of government did not (statistically) behave any differently than the mayor—council form of government in relation to the number of stakeholders engaged. This finding is inconsistent with findings from previous research showing that the council—manager form of government is more likely to engage citizens.

From a geographical perspective, we did not find a distinct pattern across municipalities in their stakeholder engagement practices. The only exception to this was that local governments located in the North Central region were more likely to engage stakeholders than those located in the Northeast region. However, we did find that governments located in center cities engaged more stakeholders than governments located in either suburban areas or governments located in nonmetro municipalities. This was expected as central city governments tend to be more diversified and often have greater need to engage stakeholders in decision-making.

The results of our Poisson regression model are consistent with an instrumental theory of stakeholder engagement. That is, as political opposition and a lack of administrative capacity increase, the types of stakeholders that governments engage also increase. To unpack this finding, the next step in our analysis was to estimate two OLS regression models (see model 2 and model 3 in Table 6). The dependent variables in both models are the factor scores of external stakeholders engaged.

Table 6. OLS Regression Results: Factors 1 and 2 Based on Stakeholders Engaged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 2 Factor 1</th>
<th>Model 3 Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>0.14*** (3.96)</td>
<td>0.14*** (3.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Capacity</td>
<td>0.18*** (3.06)</td>
<td>0.09 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Services Outsourced</td>
<td>0.18 (0.99)</td>
<td>0.44** (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Smaller Government</td>
<td>0.46** (2.53)</td>
<td>0.31 (1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government (city—manager)</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.55)</td>
<td>0.09 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government (commission)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.53)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (-2.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.00 (0.82)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00* (1.90)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.00 (-0.99)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>0.00 (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.00 (-1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Southeast)</td>
<td>0.15 (1.22)</td>
<td>0.29** (2.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Midwest)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.98)</td>
<td>-0.00 (-0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Mountain Plains)</td>
<td>0.12 (1.01)</td>
<td>0.13 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (West Coast)</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.18)</td>
<td>0.12 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Status (Suburban)</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.47)</td>
<td>-0.20 (-1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Status (Not in MSA)</td>
<td>-0.12 (-1.06)</td>
<td>-0.25* (-1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.55*** (-2.74)</td>
<td>-0.19 (-1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
Model 2 presents the results of each independent variable’s effect on factor1. As previously noted, factor1 consists of the following stakeholders: 1) potential service deliverers, 2) managers and CAOs of other local governments, and 3) state agencies, leagues, or associations. The results of the regression analysis show that political opposition increases the engagement of these external stakeholders by 14%. A lack of administrative capacity increases the engagement of these external stakeholders by 18%. Findings for the control variables for model 2 are consistent with the findings for the control variables shown in the Poisson regression model in Table 5.

Model 3 in Table 6 presents the results of each independent variable’s effect on factor2. As previously noted, factor2 consists of the following stakeholders: 1) professionals/consultants, 2) service recipients, and 3) citizen advisory committees. The results of this analysis show that political opposition increases the engagement of these external stakeholders by 14%. Moreover, a lack of administrative capacity is an insignificant predictor of engagement with this cluster of external stakeholders. The results of models 2 and 3 indicate that some external stakeholders are indeed engaged to overcome a lack of administrative capacity while others are engaged to overcome political opposition. The results further suggest that the public administrators in this study actively manage their environments by engaging external stakeholders.

**Discussion**

Models 2 and 3 show that a lack of administrative capacity is associated with factor1; however, lack of administrative capacity is not associated with factor2. This finding provides some evidence that public administrators actively shape the policy process as opposed to merely react to it.

The factor1 cluster of stakeholders are likely to provide public managers with useful information concerning the contracting out policy decision that will help them to overcome a lack of administrative capacity. For example, potential service deliverers may be able to offer well developed bids for municipalities to help them identify hidden costs (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Hefetz & Warner, 2004). Moreover, managers of other local and state governments, leagues, and/or associations may serve as repositories for best practices. These external stakeholders can all provide public managers with insights into substantive issues (Jennings & Hall, 2012).

In contrast, the stakeholders included in our factor2 cluster were engaged as a result of strong political opposition. Service recipients, in particular, are critical to political persuasion given that they have a vested interest in the outcome (Rowley & Modoveanu, 2003). Thus, service recipients can be expected to mobilize around an issue. Citizen advisory committees can also act as coalition builders because they serve as a liaison between government and the public (Schaller, 1964). These committees provide leadership and voice within a community.

Interestingly, we found that consultants and professionals were also in this category (although they had the lowest factor loading). While some may not consider consultants to be political actors who are engaged as a result of strong political opposition, consultants have often been thought to “depoliticize” environments (Beveridge, 2012). These experts (in their own right) are often used to help build support for political ideas. They are also often used to provide political coverage for politicians. Indeed, consultants allow politicians to refer to the consultants’ findings as the basis for their policy decisions, rather than a politician’s own ideologies. Thus, consultants make it easier for politicians to adopt a politically contentious policy in the name of technical necessity (Saint-Martin, 1998, 2005). Consistent with this argument, Howlett and Migone (2013) in their
survey of Canadian government consultants found that consulting reports provided more process information regarding how to adopt a policy—including advice about the acceptability of policy proposals—as compared to more technical or substantive policy content. This could mean that consultants help to build coalitions and political support around opposition.

Taken together, the results of this study suggest that public managers should think critically about the environment in which the contracting out decision occurs. When evaluating the feasibility of contracting out, public managers should strategically identify stakeholders that can ameliorate the specific issue(s) they face (whether political opposition, administrative capacity, or both). While some may find it obvious that public managers would act strategically, we see this issue as far from settled—particularly in the context of innovative policy decisions.

Conclusions

In this study we found that municipalities with political opposition to contracting out and less administrative capacity were more likely to engage multiple external stakeholders as part of the policy decision process (while controlling for a range of relevant factors). Moreover, we found that clusters of stakeholders were engaged for specific purposes. Some stakeholders were engaged in order to provide political and coalitional support to municipalities, while others were engaged to provide information and analytic capacity to municipalities.

Our findings, thus, contribute to the limited literature specifically on stakeholder engagement (and to some extent the broader literature on public engagement) by public administrators. While stakeholders have long been recognized as powerful actors in local governments their influence has not always been viewed as providing benefits to government. Often, like public engagement, stakeholder engagement has been viewed as either a normative value of government that must be legally accounted for or as a depleting source of frustration that must be attended to. However, our findings cast new light on these views. In particular, we demonstrate that stakeholders have instrumental benefit to the administration of government. Viewing stakeholders and the public as meaningful and helpful contributors to the governing process may be a pivotal and motivating step toward advancing engagement processes in government.

We were also able to overcome the issue of limited theory development on the topic of stakeholder engagement as we categorized stakeholders by the purpose(s) that they served in the contracting out policy decision. Although further research (across a variety of policy areas) is needed to confirm the patterns of engagement that we found in this study, our findings highlight the fact that by focusing on a specific policy area scholars are not necessarily limited in their ability to develop theory about stakeholders. This should be encouraging as broader ideas about the value of stakeholders are needed in order to increase our understanding of the role that stakeholders play in the work of public administration.

Second, the findings from this study are consistent with an instrumental perspective on stakeholder engagement. Some municipalities view stakeholders as sources of strategic importance; and, in order to achieve their goals these municipalities have sought to elicit stakeholder participation in policy decision processes (e.g., contracting out). This suggests that some municipalities may be strategic in their approach to engaging stakeholders as well as their approach to policymaking more generally. These municipalities are likely to recognize the value of stakeholders in decision processes and, as such, they may proactively elicit stakeholder participation.
Finally, our findings add to what we know from contemporary theories of public administration, such as NPM, that suggest public administrators are proactive in their engagement with stakeholders. Indeed, our findings indicate that public administrators actively manage their environments (e.g., by engaging with external stakeholders). They also recognize systems level issues that can influence policy outcomes.

Still, it is important to point out that nearly 50% of the municipalities in our study did not indicate that they attempted to engage any type of external stakeholder at all in evaluating the feasibility of contracting out. Thus, while our theory of instrumental stakeholder engagement seems to explain the behavior of some municipalities it does not explain the behavior of all municipalities. As such, there are a number of questions that remain; and, future research should further explore the hypotheses in this study. Ideally, this research will use different policy areas and different measures of proactive management.

Disclosure Statement

Data for this research came from the 2007 ICMA ACS. This data is publicly available for purchase. Data from this research also came from the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau’s Public Finance dataset. While we cannot make the ICMA data open access, we can release a subset of the data within 15 days of publication online. Stata codes used to build key variables of interest are available upon request.

References


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Who is Engaged and Why?


### Author Biographies

**Josephine Gatti Schafer** is the director of the Center for Public Affairs Research at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. In this role, she works directly with public officials and government agencies to build an evidence base for better governance practices. Prior to this role, she was an Assistant Professor at Kansas State University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

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Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

Joseph W. Mead – Cleveland State University

Most discussions of the policy context for nonprofits in the United States focus on federal or state restrictions. Fundraising charities, however, must comply not only with myriad state requirements but an uncertain number of local requirements as well. Based on a survey of the largest cities in the United States, I find that all of these cities have some restrictions on charitable solicitation. Several of the cities also impose extensive registration requirements and other restrictions. These findings highlight the need for nonprofits to be aware of local regulation of their activities.

Keywords: Nonprofit Policy, Fundraising, Charitable Solicitation

Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

“Public fundraising is widely seen as a natural right of charitable organizations” (Hu & Guo, 2016, p. 213). From an organizational perspective, charitable solicitation—i.e., communication seeking a donation—is an important mechanism by which organizations that are reliant on voluntary action sustain themselves. At a macro level, charitable solicitation reflects a literal marketplace of ideas where organizations pitch their causes in order to receive support from the public. These pitches can include things such as applying for grants; mailing, emailing, or telephoning former or future donors; engaging in media marketing campaigns; or including a donation button on their website or social media platform.

Most states regulate charitable solicitation in some way, whether through point-of-solicitation disclosure requirements, registration mandates, or laws against fraud (Barber & Farwell, 2016a, b; Dietz, Barber, Lott, & Shelly, 2017; Sullivan, 2004). Although revenue generation can take many forms, charitable solicitation laws are usually limited to requests for donation rather than attempts to raise money through the sale of merchandise. Some efforts to regulate charitable solicitation have been controversial. These efforts have led to difficult questions about the enforceability, cost, and constitutionality of charitable solicitation regulation (Breen, 2009; Fishman, 2015; Inazu, 2009).

Although a great deal of literature has focused on state laws that regulate charitable solicitation, the local regulation of charitable solicitation has largely gone unstudied. In fact, the nonprofit sector itself has often turned a blind eye to local requirements. Yet, thousands of local governments impose restrictions on charitable solicitation activities. These restrictions range
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

from trivial to severe. Indeed, the findings in this article show that all of the surveyed cities regulate solicitation in some form. Many cities impose severe burdens on soliciting charities to apply for a permit, compile and make public detailed information about the organization, and pay fees. These laws often apply to solicitation that occurs by any means—including mail, telephone, email, and/or through the internet—even when the organization has no other presence in the city.

For example, Columbus (Ohio) requires all charitable organizations to apply for a permit at least 30 days before soliciting residents. Although this law has been on the books for years, the city amended the law in 2017 to make it explicit that the requirements apply to solicitation by any means—“by mail, email or any other written or electronically published article, or over radio, television, telephone or telegraph” (Columbus Ord. 525.15). Additionally, all organizations soliciting in the city must fill out a six-page application that is unique to Columbus. These organizations must also provide supporting documents and pay a filing fee. Over a recent 18-month period, more than 400 organizations obtained a permit to solicit donations in Columbus. Many of these organizations, however, were located in other states. Still, all of the organizations will be required to reapply for a soliciting permit each year. They will also be required to submit a yearly report describing the amount of funds that they raised.

Even though enforcement action against noncomplying charities is rare (Fishman, 2015), cautious or dutiful organizations may expend considerable effort to learn of their legal obligations in each locale. This could add up for organizations. For instance, a national campaign with a broad donor base that seeks to comply with all legal obligations would need to verify laws in thousands of cities and adhere to the regulations each city imposes. As a new wave of constitutional challenges to the regulation of charitable solicitation emerge and questions persist about the effectiveness of other forms of regulation, cities may start to take a fresh look at their role in regulating solicitation in the nonprofit sector.

Background

Layers of Regulation Regarding Nonprofit Activity

Most scholarship about the policy context in which nonprofits operate in the United States begins and ends at either the federal or the state level. At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) administration of tax-exempt status for organizations provides one of the most highly visible modes of control over the nonprofit sector. On the other hand, states supply the governing principles of incorporation and board duties.

Debates about the proper level of government to regulate the nonprofit sector, therefore, have usually been framed within the context of either federal or state governments (as well as appropriate types of enforcement agencies) (Freemont-Smith, 2004). For example, some scholars have called for more uniformity in how nonprofits are regulated by centralizing more functions, such as more coordination between states and the IRS or the establishment of an independent regulatory agency (Freemont-Smith, 2004; Mayer, 2016; Mayer & Wilson, 2010; Nave, 2004). Others have noted that there has been an unceasing march toward federalization of nonprofit regulation (Ascher, 2014; Fishman, 2009; Hopkins, 1980; Silber, 2005).

The bulk of this literature on nonprofit regulation offers little discussion of the local context. However, local government regulation of charities can significantly affect the day-to-day operations of many nonprofits. Some of the more common local regulations include payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) (Brody, 2010; Fei, Hines, & Horwitz, 2016; Grønbjerg, McGiverin-Bohan,
Dula, & Miller, 2016; McGiverin-Bohan, Grønbjerg, Dula, & Miller, 2016), programmatic choices or requirements for government funding or grants (Farrell, Fyffe, & Valero, 2015; Fyall, 2017; Pettijohn, Boris, & Farrell, 2016), and public-private partnerships (Mendel & Brudney, 2012). Less studied aspects of local regulation include nonprofit specific zoning codes or land use controls targeting charitable activities (Galvan, 2006).

Of course, nonprofits influence policy as well and the effects of this influence can be most dramatic at the local level (Mosley & Grogan, 2013). Thus, the tendency for scholarship on nonprofit policy to focus exclusively on federal and state regulations leaves a gap in our understanding of local level impacts.

**Federalism of Charitable Solicitation**

Historically in the US regulation of individual solicitation (i.e., begging) has taken place in various forms for centuries (Quigley, 1996, 1997). However, regulation of organizational solicitation is a more recent occurrence given that this type of solicitation was far less common in the United States until the twentieth century (Barber, 2011, 2017; Cutlip, 1990; Hopkins, 1980). As professional fundraising became more common and concerns about fraud and excessive costs emerged, local restrictions were put in place (Cutlip, 1990). Following World War II, and prompted by concerns of fraudulent or inefficient charities, states began adopting laws to register and restrict charitable solicitation (Barber, 2011).

One approach that states adopted was placing caps on the amount of money that soliciting charities could spend on fundraising. These caps were common starting in the 1970s but were declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in a trilogy of decisions in the 1980s (Harris, Holley, & McCaffrey, 1990; Inazu, 2009). In lieu of outright prohibitions on organizations soliciting donations, states sought to require that solicitors disclose certain information to the state and, upon request, to the individuals they were soliciting. States also started targeting particularly egregious cases of fraud by telemarketers under generic state consumer protection laws.

Since then, charitable solicitation laws have stood relatively unchanged. This is despite advances in technology and shifts in giving behavior (Child, 2016). Indeed, the rise of webpages, email, and social media have all changed the way that donations are now sought and received (Maloney & Rosenthal, 2017). Trends in crowdfunding and peer-to-peer donations, along with other changes to the charitable sector (including the rise of for-profit, hybrid, and social enterprise forms of charity), have left state charitable solicitation rules—some of which still regulate fundraising by telegraph—somewhat outdated.

Despite these few attempts to regulate charitable solicitation at the federal level, the federal government has mostly taken a hands-off approach to dealing with charitable solicitation (Fishman, 2015). For example, the pressures of World War II led to national regulation concerning charities that sought relief related to the war (Barber, 2017). And, in the 1990s, the IRS attempted to revoke the tax-exempt status of an organization that spent an excessive amount (in the IRS’s view) on fundraising. On appeal, however, while sending the dispute back to the tax court the appellate court concluded that the tax code’s prohibition on private inurement did “not empower the IRS to monitor the terms of arm’s length contracts made by charitable organizations with the firms that supply them with essential inputs, whether premises, paper, computers, legal advice, or fundraising services” (*United Cancer Council v. Comm’r*, 1999, p. 1176).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also made only a light foray into regulating charitable solicitation; and, these regulations have only focused on telemarketing by commercial entities. Specifically, commercial telemarketers must respect the national do-not-call registry and they are prohibited from engaging in fraud. These FTC regulations, though, do not pertain to charitable organizations at large (Cain, 2004). Several proposed bills that would have expanded federal oversight of charitable solicitation have died in Congress over the years (Hopkins & Kirkpatrick, 2013); and, other than these modest federal forays into the regulation of charitable solicitation, charitable solicitation has largely not been under federal regulation.

**Limits to the Regulation of Charitable Solicitation**

Aggressive and selective enforcement of charitable solicitation has prompted courts to intervene. The US Supreme Court, for example, has upheld the finding that charitable solicitation is protected free speech. Based on several decisions between 1940 and 1990, the Court somewhat limited the policy options available to any level of government seeking to regulate charitable solicitation. The Court did so by first establishing that governmental disagreement with an organization’s mission or how it accomplishes that mission does not allow it to prevent that organization’s solicitation of donations (although under some circumstances governments can modify the tax treatment of donations) (Bray, Hasey, & Hensley, 2017). The one possible exception to this rule allows government to outlaw solicitation by organizations that finance terrorism (Bell, 2007). Secondly, as noted above, the Supreme Court has also rejected statutory caps that prohibit organizations from seeking donations if they have excessive fundraising expenses (*Riley v. National Federation of the Blind*, 1988). Third, the Court has upheld limits to which types of disclosures government can require at the time of solicitation (Harris et al., 1990).

Every state has the power to prohibit misleading or fraudulent solicitation. However, uncovering and then prosecuting fraud is often difficult; and, staff capacity and political constraints tend to limit the effectiveness of this power (Lott et al., 2016; Sullivan, 2004). In response, state governments have enacted a mix of mandates on charities that solicit in their state. These mandates—such as registration, financial reports, and disclosures to donors—often fall along the outer edge of what the Constitution allows.

**Rationales for Regulating Charitable Solicitation**

As shown in Table 1, scholarship on government regulation of charitable solicitation can be grouped into three categories based on regulatory objective: 1) to empower donors to make more informed decisions with their donations, 2) to ensure that donated funds reach the intended beneficiary, and/or 3) to advance an interest of government or a government official rather than the charitable sector (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Breen, 2009; Irvin, 2005).

**Empowering Donors.** Requiring organizations to submit registration forms, in theory, provides donors with an opportunity to access accurate information from which they can base their donative decisions. Similarly, point-of-solicitation disclosure requirements provide potential donors with relevant information about soliciting charities and allows them to exercise judgment before writing a check (Barber & Farwell, 2016b).

One might question whether increased donor control over organizations is beneficial for the nonprofit sector (Ostrander, 2007) or whether donors even make wise giving choices at all (Steinberg & Morris, 2010). Even assuming the worthiness of the goal of increased donor control, there has been mixed empirical evidence that regulations or disclosure requirements actually
### Table 1. Regulatory Objectives of Charitable Solicitation Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory Objective</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Policy Response</th>
<th>Assumptions/Limitations</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Donors</td>
<td>Donors lack knowledge to make informed decision</td>
<td>Require disclosure of relevant info at the time of solicitation</td>
<td>• Assumes disclosure is clear and relevant • Assumes motives of donors • First Amendment limits what can be required</td>
<td>Barber &amp; Farwell, 2016a, b; Breen, 2009; Steinberg, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Require central disclosure and make information publicly available</td>
<td>• Assumes disclosed information will reach donors • Assumes information is not more easily obtained elsewhere</td>
<td>Barber, 2013; Barber &amp; Farwell, 2016a, b; Breen, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Regulators to Catch Fraud</td>
<td>False or faithless agent</td>
<td>Require disclosure to state on how money is spent</td>
<td>• Assumes report provides sufficient information to assess whether solicited funds have reached the target</td>
<td>Fishman, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mandate organizational oversight over agents (e.g., contract terms, additional reporting, background checks)</td>
<td>• Difficult to uncover and prove</td>
<td>Chisolm, 1995; Fishman, 2007; Helge, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charge and collect fees</td>
<td>• Assumes fees will be paid and exceed costs of administering the program</td>
<td>Irvin, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefitting Government</td>
<td>Donations to out-of-state organizations reduce funds available for domestic causes</td>
<td>Impose onerous registration requirements</td>
<td>• Assumes out of state organizations will be deterred • Requirements cannot be more burdensome on out of state charities • In-state organizations also suffer</td>
<td>Barber &amp; Farwell, 2016b; Irvin, 2005; Nave, 2004;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generate revenue for State Treasury</td>
<td>High profile enforcement against unpopular target</td>
<td>• Assumes that the target of enforcement will be unfairly/undeservedly selected over more culpable targets</td>
<td>Brody, 2004; Irvin, 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

lead to changes in donor behavior (Barber & Farwell, 2016a; Brown, Meer, & Williams, 2017; Cnaan, Jones, Dickin, & Salomon, 2011; Irvin, 2005; Portillo & Stinn, 2018; Sloan, 2009; Yörük 2016). Following a review of empirical literature, one author concluded, “It strains credulity that a preponderance of donors would do the necessary research on a charity’s cost structure before writing a check...Most persons probably trust their instincts because they know the organization or have heard about its work” (Bowman, 2006, p. 294). Nevertheless, disclosure of information may have an effect at the margins particularly when these disclosures occur prior to major gifts.

**Empowering Regulators to Catch Fraud.** A less common justification for solicitation registration requirements is that they provide information to regulators that facilitates enforcement against fraudulent organizations (Breen, 2013). The filed information either allows the regulator to uncover and spot fraud and illegal activity or it assists with additional investigations in the event that a complaint is brought to the regulator’s attention. Scholars have found little evidence, though, suggesting that registration aids enforcement of other laws; and, regulators have not articulated the precise way that the information disclosed aids detection of criminal activity. It is not even clear that the filings are read by anyone. As Fishman (2015) suggests, “Registration is not synonymous with enforcement of the law, oversight by the attorney general or prevention of fraud. Forms, once filed, are not reviewed in most jurisdictions until and unless there are complaints about a particular charity” (p. 16). Moreover, lax enforcement of charitable solicitation laws is not surprising given that there are only 355 full-time employee equivalent state level charity officials nationwide (Lott et al., 2016).

**Benefitting Government.** Another rationale for regulatory actions taken toward charities is to benefit government as an institution rather than the charitable sector. For example, there may be a benefit resulting from government fees. These fees could be collected with at least a partial goal of raising revenue. Indeed, although most annual fees for registration are relatively modest, some states charge a substantial amount. For instance, Massachusetts charges the largest nonprofits more than $2,000 to register for a charitable solicitation permit (Harbor Compliance, 2016). It is unlikely, though, that this potential for revenue generation actually motivates any state to impose a registration requirement.

Another benefit might occur if government decides to limit solicitation by organizations whose efforts benefit residents from other states. This limit may be imposed under concerns that this type of solicitation may reduce the amount of charitable funds available for their own citizenry. However, expressly favoring in-state organizations to out-of-state organizations is likely illegal (Liazos, 2000). While some states impose minor residential requirements (such as having an in-state resident agent) and several states have refused to sign onto uniform multi-registration platforms that would make it easier for organizations from other jurisdictions to comply with the law, there is little direct evidence that solicitation laws are driven by an interest in protectionism.

**Costs of Regulating Charitable Solicitation**

Against unproven benefits, scholars have noted that compliance with charitable solicitation regulations carries real costs (e.g., Freemont-Smith, 2004). These scholars have estimated that the annual financial burden placed on soliciting nonprofits that comply with state level solicitation laws could reach as high $150,000 for some organizations (Irvin, 2005). This cost does not simply include registration fees, but it also includes staff time and other costs associated with learning the rules each city has and ensuring compliance by all board members, staff, and volunteers who might solicit donations.
Exacerbating the cost to charities are the nuances of laws between states. A charity soliciting donations nationally must comply with the laws in every state, which can include registration and reporting requirements and ensuring that the language that each state mandates is included in all solicitations. Although state laws have similar features, charities must carefully determine the distinct rules in every state to ensure compliance.

Methods

To determine the extent to which local regulation of charitable solicitation activity exists, I undertook a review of the laws of the 49 largest cities in the United States (drawn from the largest 50 cities in the country, but excluding San Juan, Puerto Rico). The cities were identified using the 2010 U.S. Census of the Population (see Table 2). Reviewing each city’s codified ordinances, I identified all restrictions on charitable solicitation that existed in each city. I focused only on ordinances that targeted charitable solicitation directly. Laws that incidentally regulated charitable solicitation were not included in this review. For example, a law prohibiting standing on a sidewalk would prohibit standing and soliciting donations, but it would not be included in this review because it does not target soliciting directly.

Relevant laws were identified by conducting a full-text search of each sampled city’s codified ordinances for the following truncated words: “solicit!” “donat!” “charit!”, and “contribution!.” The use of truncated words allows for the identification of all words made by adding letters to the end of it. Trained research assistants searched through the results to identify relevant sections. The author, an attorney with experience in municipal law, reviewed the findings of the research assistants. The attorney also conducted an independent search to ensure that all laws were properly coded and that no other relevant laws were missing. Information about when an ordinance was enacted was taken from the compiler’s notes.

Findings

Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

All of the cities in this review regulate charitable solicitation in some way. Some impose strict or cumbersome regulations such as registration requirements or restrictions on where, when, and how solicitation can be conducted. Some of these mandates duplicate requirements that already exist at the state level, while others go far beyond state equivalents. For example, nearly 20% of the cities (n=9) require that organizations soliciting donations by any means (whether telephone, mail, advertisement, and/or electronically) register with the city beforehand. Nearly 20% of the cities also require that organizations soliciting by roadside or in public spaces register to solicit donations. All but two of the cities have location restrictions that limit soliciting donations in certain parts of the city.

Registration. A handful of the cities (see Table 3) require organizations to register with the city (typically the Chief of Police) before soliciting donations. These requirements largely echo those commonly found at the state level. Several cities also impose requirements before allowing solicitation in public places (e.g., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Antonio, Jacksonville, San Francisco, Fort Worth, and Charlotte), door-to-door (e.g., Nashville), or near roadways (e.g., Jacksonville and San Antonio). Although excluded from Table 3, a few cities have additional nuances to their requirements. These nuances include things like requiring registration for solicitation in government buildings, airports, or transit systems (e.g., Miami) or requiring registration for solicitation raising funds for specific causes like law enforcement (e.g., New York).
Table 2. City Restrictions on Charitable Solicitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sidewalk Solicitation</th>
<th>Roadside Solicitation</th>
<th>Door-to-Door Solicitation</th>
<th>Donation Bins</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>TX</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>CA</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>TX</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Indianapolis</td>
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<td>Columbus</td>
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<td>Omaha City</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>10</td>
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### Table 3. Local Charitable Solicitation Registration Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Means Covered</th>
<th>Exemptions</th>
<th>Registration Requirements</th>
<th>First Enacted</th>
<th>Recently Amended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York, NY Admin. Code 21-111</td>
<td>In public or house-to-house</td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>Names of all directors and officers; cost of fundraising. Must be filed 15 days before start; must contain information about purpose of funds, activities used, and costs.</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA Ord. 44.04</td>
<td>Any means however exempts individuals soliciting for themselves Roadside</td>
<td>Soliciting from existing members</td>
<td>Must be filed 30 days in advance; prohibits individuals soliciting for themselves.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL Ord. 10-8-080</td>
<td>Roadside</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Must be filed 10 days in advance.</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, TX Ord. 36-71</td>
<td>Face-to-face or telephone</td>
<td>Soliciting from existing members</td>
<td>Requires insurance, knowledge of first aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2 days per year. Only allowed twice per year; requires insurance; all funds must go to a state licensed nonprofit.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio, TX Ord. 19-8</td>
<td>Roadside</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Requires insurance, knowledge of first aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2 days per year. Only allowed twice per year; requires insurance; all funds must go to a state licensed nonprofit.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville, FL §804.807</td>
<td>Roadside</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Requires insurance, knowledge of first aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2 days per year. Only allowed twice per year; requires insurance; all funds must go to a state licensed nonprofit.</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA Police Code Art. 9.6</td>
<td>Public spaces</td>
<td>Individuals, soliciting members, on personal property, for political purposes</td>
<td>Requires insurance, knowledge of first aid, and $200 filing fee; limited to 2 days per year. Only allowed twice per year; requires insurance; all funds must go to a state licensed nonprofit.</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, OH Ord. 525.02</td>
<td>Any means however exempts individuals soliciting for themselves Professional fundraisers Roadside</td>
<td>Religious organizations and schools, to members, for less than $500 per year</td>
<td>Must file statement of registration with extensive financials; each solicitor must carry a registration card.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, OH Ord. 525.21</td>
<td>Professional fundraisers</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Information about the solicitor and the plan of solicitation; a bond. Only two days per year; must have approved signs and an insurance policy; all solicitors must be 18 years old. &quot;...all such information...as may be of assistance to the board in determining whether the permit shall be given;&quot; requires a &quot;proper proportion&quot; of money go to cause.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth, TX Ord. 30-7</td>
<td>Roadside</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, TN 6-64-3</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Houses of worship</td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Solicitation Type</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Religious organizations, soliciting from members, American Red Cross</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code 44-1701 et seq.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Registration form; solicitors must carry cards.</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville, KY</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Registration form with detailed info (including social security numbers) on</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 117</td>
<td></td>
<td>solicitors as well as time and location of solicitation.</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas, NV</td>
<td>Roadside</td>
<td>Five business days in advance; street address of organization; proof that</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 11.62</td>
<td></td>
<td>organization has 501(c)(3) tax exempt status; agreement to indemnify city.</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville, KY</td>
<td>Event promotion by professional</td>
<td>Registration form every three months.</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City, OK</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Soliciting from members</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord. Ch. 13, Art. II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan to solicit; information about criminal records of employees; filing a</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque, NM</td>
<td>Professional fundraiser</td>
<td>bond; must disclose amount spent on fundraiser to potential donors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 13, Art. X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Terms of compensation; period of soliciting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno City, CA</td>
<td>Professional fundraiser</td>
<td>File authorization for each solicitor with police dept; requires permit with</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 9, Art. 7</td>
<td>Any means except on personal property</td>
<td>fingerprints of paid solicitors.</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach, CA</td>
<td>and exempts individuals soliciting for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 5.28</td>
<td>themselves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Beach, VA</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Organizations registered with state, several other categories</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>Names and addresses of directors; address information for organization.</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>Any means</td>
<td>Statement that costs will not exceed 16% of direct gifts; statement that no</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.18.050</td>
<td></td>
<td>one will be paid to conduct telephone solicitation; detailed financial</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>information; statement of need for donations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measures Covered. The broadest solicitation laws require any organization soliciting donations from a city resident to register—without specifying method of contact. Los Angeles, for example, requires registration for “[a]ny oral or written request for a charitable contribution made, transmitted, or distributed by any means,” except that it exempts emails and websites in some instances (Ord. § 44.01). Similarly, Columbus registers charitable solicitation by any means “either directly or indirectly” (Ord. § 525.01). In 2017, the city added language to clarify explicitly that its registration requirements apply to email, social media, and mass media solicitations (while continuing to cover telephone and telegraph) (Ord. § 525.15). Houston in contrast limits the scope of its charitable solicitation registration requirements to in-person and telephone requests that take place within city limits (Ord. § 36-71). Other cities (e.g., New York) only require registration when solicitation takes place in person.

Although state laws imposing extensive regulations on professional fundraisers are common, a few cities (e.g., Columbus, Fresno, and Albuquerque) have similar laws. With these exceptions, cities do not mimic state laws that impose heightened burdens on professional fundraising firms.

Exemptions. Like their state counterparts, city registration rules often exempt religious organizations and those that solicit exclusively from members. Although, specific requirements can vary. However, unlike state level registration requirements that often exempt smaller organizations, the cities in the present review have no such exemption for organizations with small amounts of revenue.

Notably, most of the cities that impose broad registration requirements are located in states that have similar state level requirements. These requirements may have been established without considering the state level mandates. Only one city exempts organizations that are registered at the state level (Virginia Beach), while another (Louisville) requires organizations registered with the state to re-sign and submit the state registration form to the city. Many of the other cities impose extensive registration and regulatory requirements on organizations—even when those same organizations are regulated at the state level.

Scope of Requirements. Of the cities that require registration, most mandate that nonprofits file information about organizational finances, particularly how much revenue is anticipated and how much will be spent on the solicitation. This often must be done 10 to 30 days in advance of the solicitation. Some of the cities require the intended use of the funds to be specified. A few of the cities require detailed information about the people affiliated with the organization. Some, for example, require names and addresses of directors. Others require disclosure of criminal history of anyone involved with the solicitation. Additionally, some of the cities require nonprofits to submit the text of their solicitations. A few of the cities even request more specific information. Oakland, for example, requires an assurance that the costs of the solicitation will not exceed 16%. Cities that also restrict roadside solicitation often have insurance requirements and require disclosure of the exact day(s), time(s), and location(s) of the solicitation.

Enforcement and Use. Scholars have found little evidence of vigorous enforcement of charitable solicitation laws at the state level (Fishman, 2015). The same is likely true at the local level. Columbus, for example, has a Charitable Solicitation Board as well as at least one staff member devoted to charitable solicitation. Yet, the city indicated in response to a public record request that it had undertaken no enforcement actions in the prior two years despite hundreds of organizations registering with the city. Indeed, from January 1, 2015 to July 12, 2017 there were 402 organizations that received a charitable solicitation permit from the City of Columbus. No organization that applied during this time was denied a permit. Interestingly, since this time there has been no organization prosecuted for failure to comply.
A review of the webpages of the cities in this article shows that Washington, DC is the only locale that provides electronic access to registration forms (for prior use of this methodology, see Barber, 2013). For most of the cities, information filed by charities must be requested via a written public records request along with payment of copying and processing fees. These burdens associated with accessing information make it unlikely that potential donors will benefit from the information provided.

Regulating Public Solicitations

Only a handful of the cities in this review have broad registration requirements, but almost every city has some spatial restrictions on solicitation. Ordinances that restrict charitable solicitation activities according to space or location typically fall into three categories. First, nearly all of the cities regulate solicitation in public places such as sidewalks or parks, restricting or even banning solicitation in some areas. Second, some laws restrict standing on roadways with the intent to communicate with passing motorists. Although the present review captures only cities that regulate solicitation expressly, some of the cities also rely on laws intended to prohibit loitering on public medians to limit roadside solicitation (Cutting v. Portland Maine, 2015). Finally, many local governments have laws regulating door-to-door “peddlers,” which is a term that has sometimes been defined to include solicitation. These laws require solicitor registration and they also limit the hours of solicitation activities. As the number of solicitors traveling house-to-house has decreased, though, these laws have become somewhat archaic and are rarely invoked.

Sidewalks and Solicitation Free Zones. Almost every city in this review has some restrictions on in-person solicitation on sidewalks. Two exceptions are Cleveland (which repealed its sidewalk solicitation ordinance in mid-2017 following a lawsuit) and Virginia Beach (which repealed its ordinance in early 2018 out of concerns that it was unconstitutional). These laws are often titled “panhandling” or “aggressive solicitation” laws. They typically work by establishing 10, 20, or even 50-foot buffer zones around certain places such as the entrances to buildings, parking structures, intersections, bus stops, and parks.

Other cities create “solicitation free zones.” These zones are usually in downtown business districts (e.g., Atlanta Ord. 106-85 and Memphis Ord. 6-56-3). Memphis also prohibits sitting on a bench while soliciting (Ord. 6-56-5); and, both Memphis and Seattle outlaw soliciting anywhere in a public park (Memphis Ord. 12-84-10 and Seattle Ord. 18.12.150).

Laws against soliciting on transit systems and on airport property are also common. Although no city in this review followed a total ban approach, an earlier survey found that several smaller cities nationwide have banned face-to-face solicitations (National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, 2014). Such a citywide ban, though, has never survived a judicial challenge (Speet v. Schuette, 2013).

Many solicitation laws that focus on sidewalks and the creation of solicitation free zones also often contain restrictions on the manner in which solicitations can be conducted. Common prohibitions include bans on “abusive” comments (e.g., Boston Ord. 16-41), bans on asking someone to reconsider a “no” response (e.g., San Antonio Ord. Art. I, 21-29), and restrictions on the time of day that solicitations can occur. Some prohibit children from soliciting (e.g., Detroit Ord. 33-4-5), while others prohibit groups of two or more from soliciting (e.g., Denver Ord. 38-132 and Minneapolis Ord. 385.60). Solicitation in these laws is usually defined as a request for an immediate donation by any means. There are some exempt nonverbal solicitations (e.g., when solicitors merely hold a sign).
Although these laws lack an explicit exemption for nonprofit solicitation, it is possible that law enforcement officials may target individual solicitors (i.e., panhandlers) rather than individuals working on behalf of an organized charity. In fact, many solicitation laws are labelled as ordinances targeting “panhandling,” which is behavior typically associated with individual solicitation rather than nonprofits. However, as one court noted:

> While the plaintiff here has focused the inquiry on the effects of the ordinance on the poor and homeless, the ordinance itself is not so limited. It applies with equal force to anyone who would solicit a charitable contribution, whether for a recognized charity, a religious group, a political candidate or organization, or for an individual. It would punish street people as well as Salvation Army bell ringers outside stores at Christmas, so long as the appeal involved a vocal request for an immediate donation. (Gresham v. Peterson, 2000, p. 903)

Over the years, there have been legal challenges to restrictions on sidewalk solicitation (Loper v. New York, 1993). In the 20 years from 1995 to 2015, federal courts across the country reached differing conclusions about the constitutionality of soliciting on sidewalks. However, after Supreme Court decisions in 2014 and 2015 clarified the legal standard in First Amendment cases, courts began striking down restrictions on sidewalk solicitations consistently whenever they were challenged (Barmore, 2016; Lauriello, 2016; Mead, 2015). Still, as seen in Table 3, restrictions on sidewalk solicitations remain common (44 of the 49 cities in this review place restrictions on sidewalk solicitations).

*Roadside Solicitations.* Although not as common as restrictions on sidewalk solicitations, many of the cities (29 out of the 49) restrict or ban roadside solicitations. Complete bans are a common approach (e.g., Indianapolis Ord. 407-102 and Charlotte 14-282). However, some of the cities, like San Jose, prohibit roadside solicitations only in certain high traffic areas designated as no solicitation zones.

A few of the cities allow roadside solicitations but impose extensive limits. Jacksonville, for example, prohibits roadside solicitations without a permit. Moreover, the city will only issue such a permit to a nonprofit organization registered with the state (Ord. 804.807). In addition to this prohibition, the organization must provide proof of a million dollar insurance policy and may not solicit more than two days at a time (or two times in a year). Individuals under 21 years of age are not allowed to participate in roadside solicitations in the city; and, all roadside solicitations in Jacksonville must take place during the day.

Kansas City has similar restrictions but also requires signs to be placed around the solicitation as well as the presence of a police officer at all times (Ord. 50-8.5). Las Vegas also has similar requirements but will only issue a permit to an organization that is federally tax-exempt (Ord. § 11.62.020). In the past few years, there have been a few successful legal challenges to roadside solicitation restrictions, particularly when the ban is complete rather than tailored (Barmore, 2016). Still, these ordinances remain common.

*Door-to-Door Solicitations.* Somewhat narrower are laws that restrict or regulate door-to-door solicitations. These laws are justified on the basis of privacy interests in one’s residence, safety concerns that someone might use a door-to-door solicitation as a cover for investigating a criminal target, and the desire that people have to be left alone in their own homes (e.g., Dallas Ord. 42-1). Although regulation of door-to-door solicitations is common, only a fraction of the ordinances
that regulate door-to-door solicitations are specifically intended for charitable purposes. More common regulations apply to commercial solicitors seeking to sell a product; and, these regulations often expressly exempt charitable solicitations (e.g., Nashville Ord. 6.64.010).

Ordinances that do include door-to-door charitable solicitations usually limit the time of day a solicitation can take place. These ordinances also often prohibit solicitors from visiting a residence that has a “no solicitation” sign displayed. A few cities require solicitors to obtain permits prior to starting a door-to-door campaign (e.g., Jacksonville Ord. 250.701). A registration requirement prior to door-to-door canvassing (such as “get-out-the-vote” efforts) was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2002. The Court however left open the possibility that door-to-door charitable solicitors could be required to register, provided that the registration was prompt and ministerial (Watchtower v. Village of Straton, 2002).

Donation Boxes. In recent years, cities have begun regulating unattended donation receptacles that allow people to donate used clothes and/or other items (Gasseling, 2017). These regulations, however, are relatively rare compared to the regulation of solicitations conducted by individuals. Only a few cities in this review (10 out of 49) placed restrictions on where donation receptacles could be located or imposed permitting requirements. San Antonio, for example, requires permits for all unattended containers, prohibits placing a container within 200 feet of a residential property, and limits the size of containers used for donations to four cubic feet (Ord. § 16-913). Miami prohibits the use of donation bins throughout the city (Ord. § 22-161); and, at least one city, Charlotte, regulates donation facilities (not just the containers). This city also imposes size limits on donation bins and requires that bins be monitored while donations are being accepted (Charlotte Ord. § 12.532.1).

Because donation bins invariably display signage signifying that they are being used for the purpose of soliciting a donation, organizations that utilize these bins are able to rely on First Amendment rights. Courts have reached different views, though, regarding the lawfulness of restrictions on donation receptacles. Some courts have struck down total or overly restrictive bans but have upheld more limited regulations on receptacle location (Recycle for Change v. City of Oakland, 2017). In 2014, the Kentucky Attorney General issued a memorandum urging cities to proceed cautiously when regulating donation receptacles. The Secondary Materials and Recycled Textiles Association drafted a model ordinance for cities that encourages a permitting system rather than an outright ban on these receptables (“For Communities,” n.d.).

Discussion

Comparing Local Interests to State

Although some cities have adopted solicitation registration requirements that mirror state requirements, the bulk of local level regulation of charitable solicitation is driven by spatial concerns. Indeed, rather than focusing on empowering donors, preventing fraud, or the diversion of resources, which have been the dominant purposes behind state level charitable solicitation laws as discussed by others (see Table 1), most city regulations are related much more closely to traffic flow, avoiding annoyances at people’s homes, or concerns about in-person solicitation in certain areas. This suggests, then, that although most cities are concerned about charitable solicitation enough to regulate it, they regulate it differently than states; and, they regulate it for different reasons than states.
Interjurisdictional (Non-)Cooperation

It is perhaps a bit surprising that more cities do not coordinate with overlapping state laws when specifying their regulatory requirements. If the purpose of cities occupying this regulatory space is to fill a void left by states, then we would expect to see rules that supplement rather than simply replicate state laws. Instead, we find city ordinances requiring registration are, on their face, indifferent to the existence of similar state laws. In fact, only a single city in this review explicitly exempted local filing requirements for organizations that had already registered with the state (Virginia Beach Chapter 26, Article III). That city’s decision to do so is likely because state law expressly preempts this type of ordinance (Virginia Code § 57-63).

Instead of coordinating with state law, a few of the cities in this review provide exemptions for organizations that are federally tax-exempt. For example, federal tax laws have nothing to say about roadway safety, yet some city laws permit federally tax-exempt organizations to solicit near roadways due to their federal tax status alone (e.g., Las Vegas Ord. § 11.62.020). It is unclear, though, why federal tax status is relevant for soliciting donations near roadways. There is also no obvious explanation as to why a city would rely on federal tax-exempt status to exempt charitable organizations from solicitation filing requirements rather than an organization’s compliance with state charitable solicitation registration rules.

Because city registration requirements predate state laws (Freemont-Smith, 2004, p.370), one explanation could possibility be that cities simply have not undertaken the effort to consider the role that their laws continue to play in light of similar state requirements. Indeed, local governments were an early innovator in the regulation of charitable solicitation. Although many charitable solicitation ordinances for the cities in this review date back to 1980 or earlier, as shown in Table 3, nearly all of the cities have enacted amendments to their ordinances in recent years. For example, Columbus undertook major revisions to its registration requirements in 2017. These revisions included amending the approval process and clarifying that the requirements applied to electronic forms of solicitation. Despite this revision, the city did not deduplicate or streamline registration requirements that overlapped with state law. It is possible, then, that cities may be willing to update their laws but not rethink the major policy choices that led to developing the regulation in the first place. It is also possible that cities may not be willing to revisit how their laws fit into the broader regulatory environment. The local legislative processes involved warrant further exploration beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that at least some cities maintain and update local registration requirements for charities without considering the duplication of the requirement.

Indifference to Constitutional Rights of Charities

Although a full analysis of the nuanced constitutional limits to charitable solicitation are beyond the scope of this article, some of the cities in this review have laws that directly conflict with court rulings. This finding of constitutional issues is consistent with Hopkins and Kirkpatrick’s (2013, p. 74) observation that governments continue to enforce many unconstitutional laws against charities realizing that charities are unlikely to invest the time or money necessary to bring a successful court challenge. Oakland, for example, refuses to allow any organization to solicit donations if it spends more than a set percentage (16% of direct gifts) on the solicitation. The city does so even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down similar provisions (Riley v. National Federation for the Blind of North Carolina, 1988). Notably, Oakland also has not amended its solicitation law in nearly forty years.
Other cities allow officials wide discretion to decide what information must be supplied by organizations and whether a permit should be granted (e.g., Memphis and Columbus). These allowances run afoul of decades of Supreme Court cases (Cox v. Louisiana, 1965; City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 1988). Finally, city restrictions for soliciting on sidewalks have not survived a court challenge in several years, yet these laws remain on the books in nearly every city. However, some cities have begun to repeal laws regulating charitable solicitation. In 2017, Wichita repealed its law requiring a permit before allowing roadside soliciting.

By maintaining laws that are susceptible to court challenge, it may seem that cities are disinterested in ensuring the constitutional integrity of their laws or taking proactive steps to respect constitutional rights of charities in their cities (Vogelsang-Coombs, 2012). However, in light of the increasing amount of constitutional litigation over solicitation laws at the local level, cities may want to consider whether the benefits of their registration requirements and other regulations are warranted when compared to the potential costs imposed on nonprofits and on city officials. A closer examination of constitutional rules is a fruitful topic for future study.

Conclusion

This article adds to the literature by revealing the existence and extent of local regulation of charitable solicitation. Much of the existing scholarly literature has overlooked the local dimension of regulating charitable solicitation. However, a law overlooked by scholars is still a law and nonprofits are expected to follow it.

Because enforcement of laws regulating the nonprofit sector is notoriously lax at the federal and state levels (Fishman, 2015), the potential oversight exercised by local governments could fill a gap left by these other entities. With overlapping regulation, though, comes new costs for charities. Indeed, compliance with innumerable local regulations (in addition to similar state laws) could pose a significant barrier to nonprofits when attempting to communicate their mission to potential supporters.

For cities, then, this article highlights the need for officials to think carefully about the benefits and costs associated with different forms of charitable solicitation regulation at the local level, particularly when considering regulatory efforts conducted by other levels of government. As cities continue to update and amend their charitable solicitation laws—and as a new wave of constitutional challenges to charitable solicitation laws emerge—my hope is that future research will continue to grow our understanding of the local regulation of charities.

Disclosure Statement

The author(s) declare that there are no conflicts of interest that relate to the research, authorship, or publication of this article. The author, however, was personally involved in the repeal of Cleveland’s sidewalk solicitation ordinance.

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**Author Biography**

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What explains citizens’ perceptions of government policy success? To answer this question, we use multilevel modelling strategies to examine data gathered across 21 national samples from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government IV module. Our dependent variable is an index of perceived governmental policy success in six areas. Our analysis reveals that citizens’ evaluations of the success of public policies vary within countries as well as between countries. Our multilevel models indicate that variation in perceptions within countries is largely a function of individual sociodemographic attributes and political attitudes. In contrast, across country variation in perceptions is mainly a function of the quality of public institutions within a country and, to a lesser extent, prevailing economic conditions. These results suggest that citizens’ perceptions of government are not merely influenced by objective outcomes of public policy, they are also influenced by the degree of procedural fairness, professionalism, and integrity within public institutions.

Keywords: Government Performance, Citizen Perceptions of Government, Quality of Public Sector Institutions

In order for citizens to have faith in government it is often necessary for civil servants to implement public policies in an efficient and effective manner. According to Goodsell (2006), “…administration is more than an instrumental tool. It is a social asset at the core of democratic governance. It is responsible for ongoing missions that meet the long-standing and long-term needs of the society” (p. 633).

Despite the importance of having an understanding of citizens’ perceptions of government performance, little is known about the process by which citizens come to synthesize their perceptions into an overall evaluation of effectiveness (Van Ryzin, 2007). To merely say that citizens are satisfied when government performs well and dissatisfied when government performs poorly is far too simplistic of an explanation. Rather, citizens’ perceptions of government performance are likely a reflection of a number of factors beyond objective performance measures.
Citizens Perceptions of Government Policy Success

Thus, understanding how citizens perceive government performance is important for a number of reasons. For one, research suggests that positive perceptions of public sector performance can promote active citizenship (Vigoda, 2002; Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi, 2008). Indeed, public perceptions of competent government management have been viewed as one indicator of a strong and thriving democracy. Research has shown, for instance, that positive perceptions of government performance are associated with higher levels of citizen satisfaction with government services (Vigoda-Gadot, Shoham, & Vashti, 2010), an increased willingness to pay taxes (Glaser & Hildreth, 1999), and changes in ideologies (Kumlin, 2006).

A number of scholars have also pointed to a causal link between citizen perceptions of government performance and levels of public trust in public sector institutions (Marlowe, 2004; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003; Van Ryzin, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot & Yuval, 2003). Ultimately, then, citizens’ perceptions of government performance can be quite influential. As Vigoda (2002) observed, “...performance by the public sector contributes to a healthy development of attitudes and opinions that uphold democracy” (p. 266).

This study provides a global examination of citizens’ perceptions of government performance in the context of public policy success. Through this examination we are able to address a number of questions. First, across countries, what attitudes do citizens hold about government performance? Second, what individual level attributes and attitudes correlate with citizens’ perceptions of government performance? Finally, does national context account for variation in the level of government performance citizens perceive across countries?

Data from national samples across 21 North American and European countries were obtained from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government IV module. Multilevel regression models were estimated to investigate the relationship between citizens’ perceptions of government and individual and country level attributes.

Perceptions of Performance and New Public Management

Within the public sector, performance is often considered to be a reflection of the outputs and outcomes of public policy (Hatry, 2007; Van Dooren, De Caluwe, & Lonti, 2012). However, citizens often develop their perceptions of government performance by relying on a number of information sources. These sources include their own personal experiences, word-of-mouth, media, and formally published government materials such as performance assessments (James & Moseley, 2014).

There is an important distinction, though, between actual performance and citizens’ perceptions of performance. According to Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2007), “Perceptions of administrative performance do not necessarily match actual performance. But perceptions matter as they steer citizens’ actions” (p. 1135). This observation raises an important question: When is government perceived as being truly effective? That is, is government successful only when civil servants implement public policies that accomplish clearly defined results? Or, is government successful when citizens are pleased with the manner in which public services are provided regardless of whether objective measures of performance are high?

This is a question that strongly relates to ongoing efforts to reform the public sector. These efforts intend to make the public sector more efficient, effective, and highly regarded. Indeed, beginning in the 1980s governments around the world began implementing policy and bureaucratic reforms in order to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of public services (Ariely, 2011;
Kettl, 2005). During this time, New Public Management (NPM) reforms redefined the relationship between government and society. These reforms focused on market mechanisms, decentralization, and government downsizing with the overall intent of making policy implementation more efficient and quality oriented. As a largely performance based movement, NPM emphasized outcomes and encouraged government agencies to focus on achieving demonstrable results (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008; Van Ryzin, 2011).

Proponents of NPM have often equated it with “governance” (Kettl, 2005). However, as Peters and Pierre (1998) have argued, although NPM and governance overlap they are not the same concept. Governance is about process, whereas NPM is mainly concerned with outcomes or results. Reforms associated with NPM mostly focus on the “how much” rather than the “how” of public policy. In this study, we argue that in addition to the objective outcomes of public policy, citizen perceptions of government performance are conditioned by a number of factors such as individual sociodemographic characteristics, political attitudes, and the quality of public sector institutions.

**An Integrated Model of Citizen Perceptions of Government Performance**

Although there are a number of explanations about how citizens form perceptions of government performance, the extant literature mainly focuses on citizen satisfaction with public service delivery. These studies have examined the determinants of satisfaction with public services at the local level (e.g., DeHoog, Lowery, & Lyons, 1990; James, 2009; Van Ryzin, 2004; Van Ryzin, Muzzio, Immerwahr, Gulick, & Martinez, 2004; Vigoda, 2002), the national level (e.g., Calzada & Pino, 2008), and within US federal agencies (Morgeson, 2013; Morgeson, VanAmburg, & Mithas, 2011). In order to organize this literature, it is useful to think of individual level explanations for citizens’ perceptions of government performance as falling into two separate categories: sociodemographic explanations and political attitudes toward government.

**Individual Level Correlates**

*Sociodemographic Explanations.* As one set of individual level correlates, sociodemographic explanations for citizens’ perceptions of government performance suggest that these perceptions are the product of socialization and social experiences. Although age, sex, and education have typically been treated as control variables for this type of analysis (e.g., Ariely, 2013; DeHoog et al., 1990; Morgeson & Petrescu, 2011; Morgeson et al., 2011; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007), DeHoog and colleagues (1990) have noted that there is little consensus as to the expected direction of these variables.

Interestingly, though, research on trust in government (which is a related concept) has often found that attitudes toward government are positively related with age. This is likely because as individuals age they tend to desire social connectedness; they also tend to be more collectively oriented and more inclined to have an attachment to institutions (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Christensen & Legreid, 2005; Houston, Aitalieva, Morelock, & Shults, 2016; Keele, 2005). Thus, in this study we hypothesize that older individuals will be more likely than younger individuals to hold positive perceptions of government performance.

Studies have also found that attitudes toward government are positively related to gender—specifically, being male (Brewer & Sigelman, 2002; Houston & Harding, 2013-14; Houston et al., 2016; Keele, 2005). Thus, we also hypothesize that men will be more likely than women to have positive perceptions of government performance.
In terms of education, research has shown that higher levels of education can contribute to a better understanding of the political system in a country (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Lewis & Frank, 2002; Vandenabeele, 2008). We, therefore, hypothesize that individuals with higher levels of education will be more likely to hold positive perceptions of government performance.

Finally, regarding individual level characteristics, research has shown that government employees are more likely to have positive attitudes toward government than private sector employees (Brewer & Sigelman, 2002). Thus, we hypothesize that government employees will be more likely than private sector employees to hold positive perceptions of government performance.

**Political Attitudes toward Government.** As another set of individual level correlates, studies have shown that individuals who affiliate with a left leaning political party tend to hold different perceptions of government than those who affiliate with a right leaning political party (Morgeson, 2013). Members of left leaning parties tend to be more supportive of government (Houston & Harding, 2013-14; Houston et al., 2016), whereas members of right leaning political parties tend to be more critical of government. We, therefore, hypothesize that individuals who belong to left leaning political parties will be more likely to hold positive perceptions of government performance than those affiliated with right leaning political parties.

We also expect that being a member of the current political party in power, as opposed to being affiliated with an out-of-power party, will be associated with more positive evaluations of government performance (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Blau, 2008). Indeed, this so-called “winner effect” has commonly been associated with higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and trust (Anderson & Guillery, 1997; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002) as well as with positive feelings about government responsiveness and efficacy (Clarke & Acoc, 1989). We, therefore, expect that individuals belonging to the political party in power, as opposed to those affiliated with an out-of-power political party, will be more likely to hold positive perceptions of government performance.

**Country Level Correlates**

Beyond variation in citizens’ perceptions of government performance within countries there are likely differences across countries as well. Therefore, we also expect for citizens’ perceptions of government performance to be conditioned by national context. Only a handful of studies, though, have explored citizens’ perceptions of government performance from a cross-national perspective (e.g., Ariely, 2011, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot et al., 2010). These studies suggest a number of key variables that may have particular importance. In this study we consider two categories of country level variables: macroeconomic conditions and the quality of public sector institutions.

**Macroeconomic Conditions.** Citizens likely view the condition of a country’s economy as a reflection of public policy success or failure. Economic performance is objective. Thus, it can serve as an indicator of the results of public policy. For example, studies have shown that macroeconomic conditions are significantly associated with the level of political trust across countries (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Houston et al., 2016). We, therefore, expect economic performance to influence perceptions of government performance in a similar way.

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the unemployment rate, and inflation are all macroeconomic indicators commonly used in the literature to determine the economic
performance of a country and to make an international comparison (Houston et al., 2016). We hypothesize that individuals living in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita will perceive the performance of government more positively. Conversely, we hypothesize that individuals living in countries with higher levels of unemployment will be more likely to hold negative perceptions of government performance. We also hypothesize that the higher the inflation rate is in a country the more likely individuals in that country will hold negative perceptions of government performance.

Quality of Public Sector Institutions. Institutional quality is another measure that quantifies the processes of public administration—not merely the outcomes. Indeed, a well functioning government with high quality institutions is likely to influence citizens’ perceptions of government performance. Just as trust in government is positively enhanced by procedural fairness, professionalism, and integrity (Houston et al., 2016; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005; Van Ryzin, 2011), citizens’ perceptions of government performance may be as well. Thus, we expect that individuals who live in countries characterized as having better quality public sector institutions will be more likely to hold positive perceptions of government performance than those who live in countries characterized as having low quality public sector institutions. Specifically, we hypothesize that a government’s procedural effectiveness rating will influence citizens’ perceptions of government performance.

In summary, citizens’ perceptions of government performance are commonly explained by individual level correlates that include sociodemographic variables and political attitudes toward government. In addition to these individual level correlates, country level variables may also be important. With only a few exceptions (e.g., Ariely, 2011, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2011), however, extant literature has failed to take into consideration the full range of explanations for citizens’ perceptions of government performance. To fill this void in the literature our analysis tests individual and country level explanations for citizens’ perceptions of government performance using data from 21 North American and European countries.

Research Design and Measurement

This study examines citizens’ perceptions of government policy success in a multilevel context. The analysis is presented in two stages. First, attitudes toward government policy success are examined. Second, multilevel analysis results are presented.

Data

The data used in our analysis comes from the 2006 ISSP Role of Government IV module (ISSP Research Group, 2008). This module contains data from surveys administered worldwide. National samples were drawn from adult populations in each participating country using a multistage stratified sampling design. Data collection techniques differed depending on local conditions.

To ensure data quality, ISSP methodological groups have studied the sampling design as well as the administration of this annual survey. According to Smith (2009, p. 12), “The ISSP has assisted the expansion of social-scientific knowledge by gathering data on important social topics in comparative perspective” (p. 12). In our study, we examine data from the ISSP for 21 countries in North America and Europe.
Dependent Variable

For our dependent variable, we used responses to the following survey questions: How successful do you think the government in [country name] is nowadays in each of the following areas: 1) Providing health care for the sick? 2) Providing living standard for the old? 3) Dealing with threats to security? 4) Controlling crime? 5) Fighting unemployment? 6) Protecting the environment?

All six questions were measured on a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from “very unsuccessful” to “very successful.” For each question responses were coded so that the highest value indicates the most satisfactory response (i.e., 5=very successful).

To construct our dependent variable, we used these six survey questions to create factor scores with values ranging from -2.30 to 2.59. Table 1 displays the factor loadings of the individual survey items on the first unrotated factor. All six factor scores have substantial positive loadings. This indicates that the data support the notion of a unidimensional conception of citizens’ perceptions of government policy success.

Cronbach’s alpha for the six questions is 0.79. This value is above the commonly used minimum standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability. Thus, this reliability score confirms the appropriateness of combining all six individual survey questions into a single scale (Bean & Papadakis, 1998). To ensure equal weighting of variables, all variables were standardized before summing them into factor scores.

Independent Variables

For our individual level correlates, the following sociodemographic variables were included in the analysis as binary variables: male, low education (i.e., below the usual requirement for entrance into universities), high education (i.e., university degree or higher), government employee, left leaning political party affiliation, right leaning political party affiliation, and affiliation with the current governing political party in power. This last variable identifies individuals who affiliate with the political party that holds a plurality of executive cabinet level posts in the national government (at the time). As an additional individual level sociodemographic variable we also included respondents’ age. This variable was measured as continuous.

Beyond these individual level attributes, we measured national context using four variables. Objective government performance was measured by three macroeconomic indicators: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in $1,000) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (constant 2006 international dollars), the unemployment rate (in percent), and the rate of inflation (also in percent). The data source for these variables was the 2006 World Development Indicators of the World Bank (World Bank, 2012).

The effectiveness and fairness of public sector institutions, which can be indicative of quality, represents another dimension of government performance. The quality of public sector institutions is measured using the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Indicator (GEI) for 2006. The GEI measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of government bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of government’s commitment to policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011).
Table 1. Factor Analysis: Citizen Perceptions of Government Policy Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How successful do you think the government in [country name] is nowadays in each of the following areas:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing health care for the sick</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing living standard for the old</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with threats to security</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling crime</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting unemployment</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the environment</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale reliability score (Cronbach’s alpha)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Method

Multilevel regression analysis was used to estimate the models in this analysis. Multilevel models, or hierarchical linear models, are appropriate for the present data given that these data are hierarchically structured with data on individuals collected through surveys (level-1) clustered, or nested, within countries (level-2) (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2012). The advantage of this estimation approach (over a simple pooled regression model) is that a hierarchical linear model does not assume that respondents are independent of one another since it is often more appropriate to assume that individuals within each cluster (i.e., country) have attitudes that are correlated as a function of the national context in which they reside. Multilevel estimators also more efficiently account for heterogeneity across clusters. For these reasons, multilevel models with random intercepts were estimated for the two-level hierarchical data structure used in this analysis.

The models were estimated using a restricted Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) method in HLM 7. Model diagnostics (see Snijders & Bosker, 2012) indicated that random effects should be included for the following individual level variables: left leaning political party affiliation, right leaning political party affiliation, and current governing political party in power. As is common in multilevel analyses, continuous predictors were grand mean centered.

Findings

Our first research question asked: Across countries, what attitudes do citizens hold about government performance? Table 2 reports the average government policy success index score for each country in the sample along with its standard deviation. The index values range from a low of -2.30 to a high of 2.59, with an average standard deviation of 0.89. Country averages and standard deviations indicate that there is variation in citizens’ attitudes toward government policy success within countries. These summary statistics also indicate variation in citizens’ attitudes across countries.

Cross-national variation is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure we display the average government policy success index score for each country ordered from highest to lowest. Citizens in Switzerland, Denmark, and Finland, we find, are on average the most positive about government policy success. On the other hand, citizens in Croatia, Portugal, and Russia are on average the least positive about government policy success. One interesting observation that emerges from the data is that Central and Eastern European countries that began transitioning to democratic
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Government Policy Success Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>23,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governments and capitalist economies (i.e., former Soviet Bloc countries) are over represented in the bottom half of Figure 1. The finding that these former Soviet Bloc countries appear at the bottom of this figure is consistent with studies showing that new democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe face challenges resulting from low government performance (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This suggests that the maturity or quality of public institutions may matter to citizens in their perceptions of government performance.

When conducting multilevel analysis it is necessary to consider whether there is sufficient variation between countries, as opposed to only variation within countries. Such an assessment allows us to justify the inclusion of country level effects when estimating models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2012). To make this determination, a null model was estimated that excluded all individual level and country level variables. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) computed from the null model was equal to 0.20. This indicates that about 20% of the variation in the dependent variable is attributed to unobserved country characteristics. Therefore, the estimation of the null model provides evidence of a significant country level effect on citizens’ perceptions of government performance; and, thus, the need to employ multilevel analysis.

The multilevel regression models reported in Table 3 provide a test of the individual and country level hypotheses introduced earlier. It is important to note that the individual level variables perform similarly across each of the models indicating the robustness of our findings. Model 1 in Table 3 is a basic model consisting of individual level correlates measuring sociodemographic characteristics and political attitudes.

In terms of sociodemographic attributes, the male and the high education variables are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with previous research, our findings show that men and
those who are highly educated are among the most likely to express positive perceptions of government performance. Our findings also indicate, though, that there is not a statistically significant relationship between citizens’ perceptions of government performance and age or being employed as a government employee.

The models in Table 3 provide partial support for our hypotheses relating political identity to citizens’ perceptions of government performance. Contrary to previous literature, however, affiliation with a left leaning political party (although statistically significant) does not perform as expected. Indeed, those who identify with a left leaning political party are less likely than those who affiliate with a right leaning, moderate, or no political party to express positive perceptions of government performance.

As expected, though, the variable measuring whether citizens affiliate with the political party that holds a plurality of executive cabinet level posts in the national government is positive and statistically significant. This variable shows that those affiliated with the current party in power, more so than those unaffiliated with this party, are more likely to express positive attitudes toward government performance.

Beyond these individual level correlates, we also considered the importance of national context for conditioning citizens’ perceptions of government policy success. Specifically, we examined two different explanations for variation in citizens’ perceptions of government policy success between countries: economic conditions and the quality of public sector institutions. For the sake of parsimony, a final composite model is included. In this model we combined the statistically significant country level correlates from the preceding models.
Table 3. Multilevel Regression Models: Government Policy Success Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Base Model</th>
<th>(2) Economic Performance</th>
<th>(3) Quality of Public Sector Institutions</th>
<th>(4) Composite Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociodemographic Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government employee</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Attitudes Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left leaning political party</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right leaning political party</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing political party in power</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Level Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macroeconomic Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in thousands of dollars/capita</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate (%)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality of Government Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness indicator</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Effects (Variance Components)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.161***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left leaning political party</td>
<td>0.018***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right leaning political party</td>
<td>0.032***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing political party in power</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level-1 n</td>
<td>16,402</td>
<td>16,402</td>
<td>16,402</td>
<td>16,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level-2 n</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>39,093.16</td>
<td>39,104.99</td>
<td>39,083.34</td>
<td>39,097.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Model 2 in Table 3 examines the impact of national macroeconomic conditions on our dependent variable. Of the three indicators of economic conditions in our study, we find that only national GDP per capita and the inflation rate are significantly correlated with citizens’ perceptions of government performance. The third indicator, the unemployment rate, is not a statistically significant correlate.

As hypothesized, we also find that citizens of wealthier countries are more likely to perceive higher levels of government policy success. Likewise, the higher the level of inflation in a country, the lower citizens’ perceptions are that government policies are successful. It should be noted, however, that the statistical significance for the inflation rate coefficient is achieved using a less demanding threshold ($p ≤ 0.10$).

Model 3 in Table 3 examines the effect of the quality of public sector institutions on citizens’ perceptions of government policy success. We expected that citizens’ perceptions of government policy success would positively reflect the quality of the public institutions charged with formulating and implementing public policies. As shown in Table 3, the World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that individuals who live in countries that are characterized as possessing better quality public sector institutions are more likely to perceive public policies in their country to be successful.

Model 4 in Table 3 (which is a composite model) includes the significant country level correlates from models 2 and 3. This model allows us to test the utility of each country level explanation for citizens’ perceptions, while controlling for other country level variables and still maintaining a parsimonious model. In this model, economic conditions are no longer statistically significant correlates of citizens’ perceptions after controlling for government effectiveness. The quality of public institutions is a more pronounced country level correlate of our dependent variable. Countries with well developed public institutions are perceived by their citizens as having more successful government performance. This suggests that ultimately the process of providing public services may weigh more heavily on citizens’ assessments of policy success than the actual economic results of public policy.

In sum, citizens’ attitudes about the success of public policies vary within countries and between countries. The multilevel models in this study indicate that variation in citizens’ perceptions within countries is a function of sociodemographic attributes and political attitudes. Across country variation is largely a function of the quality of public institutions in a country and, to a lesser extent, prevailing economic conditions. These latter results suggest that building quality public institutions is important for enhancing citizens’ perceptions of government policy success— not merely focusing on policies that improve economic conditions.

Discussion

Citizens’ perceptions of government policy success are important to understand. According to Linde and Ekman (2003), “...democratic legitimacy derives to a great extent from the long-term performance of the democratic regime” (p. 406). Ultimately, though, the adequacy of this performance is judged through the eyes of citizens. Given the importance of this topic to democratic governance as well as the lack of scholarly attention on the topic, our study is an important addition to the literature on factors that influence citizens’ perceptions of government. In the study, we relied on survey data from 21 national samples of citizens from North America and Europe to estimate a series of multilevel regression models. Using these models, we examined individual and country level determinants of citizens’ perceptions of government performance.
Although previous studies have examined correlates of citizen satisfaction with government performance at the local level (e.g., DeHoog et al., 1990; James, 2009; Van Ryzin, 2004; Van Ryzin et al., 2004; Vigoda, 2002), the national level (e.g., Calzada & Pino, 2008), and the federal level (e.g., Morgeson, 2013; Morgeson et al., 2011), only a few studies have examined citizens’ perceptions of government performance cross-nationally (see, Ariely, 2011, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot et al., 2010). Thus, this study was intended to add to the limited cross-national literature.

Our findings indicate that perceptions of government policy success vary among citizens both within countries as well as between countries. We, therefore, conclude that to better understand citizens’ perceptions of government it is necessary to study their perceptions using both individual and country level data. Our multilevel analysis suggests that perceptions of government policy success correlate with individual level attributes. Specifically, we found that men were more likely than women to express positive perceptions of government. Given that men tend to be more prominent in key positions within government (Rosenbluth, Salmond, & Thies, 2006) and are also less likely to be exposed to experiences of inequality in social institutions (Houston & Harding, 2013-14), this finding is hardly surprising. It is possible such male dominance may lead women to believe that they will not be treated fairly when dealing with government institutions (Richardson, Houston, & Hadjiharalambous, 2001). Furthermore, women may feel diminished by the presence of a “glass ceiling” that can prevent them from advancing in their careers (Richardson et al., 2001).

It is interesting to note that being a government employee did not have a significant impact on citizens’ perceptions of government performance. This is surprising given that at least one study (Marlowe, 2004) suggests government employees are more likely to be supportive of government policies since they are a part of the government machinery. Our findings, however, suggest that being a cog in the machinery of government does not condition citizens to be more positive about the success of public policies.

We also found that those who were highly educated were more likely to express positive perceptions of government. College educated respondents are likely to be members of professional organizations that require them to go through a licensing process. Therefore, those who are college educated may be more likely to trust the ability of public administrators to regulate their professional activity. They may also have more trusting attitudes toward these administrators (Marlowe, 2004). Individuals with higher levels of education may also have a more realistic view of the civil service and a greater understanding of the political administrative system (Marlowe, 2004; Richardson et al., 2001). Thus, they are often more tolerant of government’s malfunctioning (Van de Walle, 2007).

In our study we also found that political attitudes matter. Those who affiliated with a left leaning political party were more critical of government performance than those who affiliated with a right leaning, moderate, or no political party. This finding suggests that political parties characterized by liberal ideologies that also embrace a positive role for government in addressing problems may express greater dissatisfaction with what public policy has accomplished. Perhaps the promise of a liberal political agenda is not being fulfilled in the minds of these citizens.

We also found that in addition to one’s ideological leanings, affiliating with the governing political party in power enhanced citizens’ perceptions of government policy success. This finding indicates that the outcomes of national elections may matter for influencing citizens’ perceptions.
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In terms of our country level correlates, we found that the presence of high quality administrative institutions was an important correlate of citizens’ perceptions of government policy success. These results, combined with those of our individual level findings, reveal that perceptions of government performance are not merely influenced by the results of public policy alone. Other factors matter. In particular, the procedural aspects of public sector performance are factors that matter in influencing citizens’ perceptions of government.

Limitations

This study examined citizens’ perceptions of government from a cross-national perspective. According to Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen (2005), public administration scholars have largely ignored citizen views. As they point out, “From the very beginning, the citizen has been neglected as an object of study in public administration, due to the discipline’s early focus on organization studies and political-administrative relations” (p. 232). This study helps to lessen this scholarly deficit given the essential role that citizens play in a democratic system. To this end, comparative public opinion research is useful in that it allows the researcher to distinguish between patterns that are specific to one country as opposed to those that are more universal in nature (Smith, 2009).

One of the limitations of this analysis is that it is not possible to know exactly what respondents were thinking about when they indicated that they perceived government policy to be successful in a particular policy area. To address this limitation, we controlled for political attitudes and general perceptions of government, which likely condition responses on the items that serve as the basis for constructing our dependent variable. Another limitation of this study is that most of the countries included in the 2006 ISSP Role of Government IV module are established Western and European democracies. As such, the generalizability of our findings to nondemocratic and developing national contexts is limited.

Our analysis is further limited by the questions included in the module. In particular, respondents’ experiences with government policies in the areas that comprise the dependent variable cannot be assessed; yet, these experiences likely influence their perceptions of government policy success (Pino, 2005). For example, James (2011) found that citizen satisfaction is often dependent on expectations that are set based on prior levels of performance. Likewise, Van Ryzin and Charbonneau (2010) found that citizens’ perceptions of performance for certain public services are often a function of their usage of those services.

As an additional limitation we should note that the data collection for the majority of countries in the module was conducted in either 2006 or 2007 (with the exception of the data from Poland collected in February of 2008 and the data for Denmark collected from January 2008 to May 2008). Thus, this study is cross sectional in nature. Due to this, we are unable to make causal inferences between individual and country level variables and citizens’ perceptions of government performance.

Finally, it is important to consider that the data in this study were collected during a relatively prosperous period before the Great Recession. However, countries like Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and France were especially impacted by the recession (Dotti, Sani, & Magistro, 2016; Foster & Frieden, 2017; Martini & Quaranta, 2018; Torcal, 2014; Van Erkel & Van Der Meer, 2016), which transformed economic conditions and political attitudes around the world for many years. It is important to note, then, that the Great Recession may have altered citizens’ perceptions of government performance. Still, it is useful to analyze how citizens felt about government’s performance before the recession. Thus, this limitation actually provides a possible avenue for
future research. Indeed, the recent release of the 2016 ISSP *Role of Government IV* module provides an opportunity to examine the influence of the Great Depression on citizens’ perceptions by examining pre- and post-recession perceptions of government performance.

Despite these limitations, several implications can be drawn from our multilevel analysis. First, citizens’ perceptions of government are conditioned by sociodemographic variables such as sex and education. Second, citizens’ perceptions of government are politically conditioned by party affiliation and attitudes toward the political system. Third, as shown from the findings in the country level models, establishing high quality administrative institutions is important for enhancing citizens’ perceptions of government performance. This finding should be of interest to public administrators seeking to improve citizens’ perceptions. Indeed, by improving the professionalism, transparency, and procedural justice of administrative institutions, public administrators may be able to also improve citizens’ perceptions of government. Fourth, the extent to which high quality administrative institutions are characterized by a public service ethic and procedural justice, not just enhanced competency, suggests that NPM bureaucratic reforms alone do not offer the full range of solutions necessary for enhancing citizen perceptions of government policy success.

**Conclusions**

One of the aims of the NPM movement was to “...advance a public philosophy that reconfigures the relations between the citizens and the state” by improving efficiency, effectiveness, and performance (Durant, 2010, p. 7). Under NPM, it was expected that higher levels of performance would lead to increased citizen satisfaction, which in turn would promote positive evaluations of government (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Higher performance, however, has not always led to more positive perceptions of government’s performance.

The shortfall of relying on NPM reforms to restore public trust in government may lie in differences that exist between the private and public sectors. In the private sector, corporations must meet customers’ expectations in order to survive. However, in the public sector there is no single measure of success (Cohn Berman, 2008). This often means that performance indicators in public organizations need to be more “citizen driven” and adapted to measure the things that citizens truly care about (Yang & Holzer, 2006). Indeed, public sector organizations need performance metrics that go beyond the simple “profit” and “loss” metrics of the private sector but that still promote accountability (Kelly, 2005; Kelly & Swindell, 2002). In order to consider both dimensions of performance (i.e., what is actually being done and what citizens perceive is being done), new means of evaluation need to be adopted; and, these evaluations should certainly include citizen attitudes alongside more objective metrics (Shingler, Van Loon, Alter, & Bridger, 2008).

Our study presents a comprehensive model of citizens’ perceptions of government performance by examining survey data from 21 national samples. Using a multilevel modelling approach, we found that variation in citizens’ perceptions of government performance within countries was largely a function of individual sociodemographic attributes and political attitudes. In contrast, variation in citizens’ perceptions of government across counties, we found, was mainly a function of the quality of public institutions within a country and (to a lesser extent) prevailing economic conditions.

Ultimately, in this study we demonstrated that citizens’ perceptions of government policy success are a reflection of many factors—not just economic indicators. Perhaps, most important among
these factors are procedural fairness, professionalism, and the integrity of public institutions. Thus, we echo the sentiments of Bouckaert and colleagues (2005) who suggested that, “Satisfaction with public services does not only result from the quality of services” (p. 237).

Notes

1. The base category for the low education variable includes scholastic qualifications equivalent to high school diploma or higher; the base category for the high education variable includes scholastic qualifications below a full university degree.

Disclosure Statement

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest that relate to the research, authorship, or publication of this article.

References


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Priority Issues from a Health Implementation Plan: A Qualitative Study of Local Foundation and Nonprofit Leaders’ Perceptions

Daniel J. Schober – DePaul University
Shannon M. E. Bowers – University of Chicago
Anne Posner – Chicago Department of Public Health

The purpose of this article is to examine how local leaders of health foundations and nonprofit organizations perceive key health issues (such as violence, housing, and chronic disease) included in a municipal health department’s implementation plan. Specifically, we examine how these leaders prioritize health issues and what their ideas are regarding how to address them. To do this, we used a semistructured interviewing strategy to gather feedback from 10 senior leaders of health foundations and 13 senior leaders of nonprofit agencies in the City of Chicago. We conducted a content analysis of these interviews and found that participants emphasized the importance of addressing broad conditions related to violence, economic development, and education across the lifespan using multisector collaboration strategies. These findings suggest that these foundation and nonprofit representatives consider social determinants of health to be key in promoting population health.

Keywords: Community Health Assessment, Implementation Plan, Health Equity

Urban communities face a number of challenges that affect the health and wellbeing of the population. These challenges include things such as chronic disease, violence, and harmful environmental exposure (Frumkin, 2002; Galea & Vlahov, 2005). Local health departments (LHDs) are governmental agencies that serve as the frontline response to these challenges (National Association of County and City Health Officials, 2005; Turnock, 2016). Indeed, LHDs play an important role in promoting population health.

Community health assessment, the process of systematically examining the health status of a community, is often used by LHDs to plan and strategize partnerships, policies, and programs that address urban health challenges (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017; Turnock, 2016).

Typically, LHDs use Mobilizing for Action through Planning and Partnership (MAPP) to carry out these assessments (Erwin, Buchanan, Read, & Meschke, 2017; Hebert-Beirne, Felnner, Castaneda, & Cohen, 2017; Kalos, Kent, & Gates, 2005; National Association of County and City Health Officials, 2018; Shields & Pruski, 2005). The process of MAPP involves four steps. These include engaging community partners by developing a shared vision, conducting four assessments, identifying strategies, and setting goals. MAPP engages stakeholders across sectors (e.g., public health, education, and social services organizations) and typically takes more than six months to complete. It also involves a series of face-to-face discussions, data collection, and planning sessions.

Addressing urban health challenges requires a focus on health equity, which itself presents a number of challenges. One challenge is the lack of documented examples and best practices. A recent review of over 100 reports of cross-sector efforts to address health equity identified a lack of empirical studies regarding processes necessary for implementing health equity initiatives (Shankardass, Solar, Murphy, Greaves, & O’Campo, 2012). Another challenge is the potential for unintended consequences. One such consequence is “equity harms” that may emerge in the implementation of population-based health promotion strategies (Lorenc & Oliver, 2014). These harms occur when population health efforts benefit privileged members of the population more than those who face health inequities.

One approach used to guide health equity efforts is the development of a clear implementation plan. These plans allow officials to understand how key stakeholders in the community prioritize health issues and what their thoughts are for addressing them. Unfortunately, this information is not always easy to collect as it tends to be spread across various community stakeholders. As such, this information tends to be difficult to systematically document.

Given these limitations, a number of scholars have attempted to assess stakeholder perspectives. The findings from these studies have been used to set research agendas as well as strategies for systems change (Blacksher & Lovasi, 2012; Murphy, Fafard, & O’Campo, 2012; Wutzke, et al., 2017). Ultimately, these studies conclude that engaging stakeholders and gaining a sense of their perspectives is important for directing health research and health promotion efforts.

Although the development of a city’s health implementation plan should involve stakeholder input, the time period between input and implementation requires further study. Thus, the purpose of this article is to examine the perceptions of key stakeholders—specifically, local health foundations and nonprofit organizations—on how key community health issues are prioritized. In doing so, we seek to provide insight into the ideas that these leaders have about how health issues in the City of Chicago should be addressed.

Methods

Chicago’s LHD, Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH), is addressing a number of urban health issues to promote health among Chicago residents. Geographically, these residents are spread across 77 neighborhoods that have historically been segregated (Masi, Hawkley, Piotrowski, & Pickett, 2007; Mulder, 2012; Steffes, 2016; United States Census Bureau, 2018). Segregation in these neighborhoods continues today and is associated with neighborhood-based health inequities, such as a higher than national prevalence of sexually transmitted infections, various cancers, and firearm related shootings and fatalities (Chicago Department of Public Health, 2017; French et al. 2017; Morenoff, House, Hansen, Williams, Kaplan, & Hunte, 2007;
Sampson, 2016). Given these health inequities, CDPH has taken a number of steps to promote health and address these issues (Chicago Department of Public Health, 2017).

CDPH used MAPP to assess the 77 neighborhoods throughout Chicago. Public and private partnerships were involved in this assessment. These partnerships enabled cross-sector input during community assessment and implementation (Cohen, Prach, Bocskay, Sayer, & Schuh, 2016). Healthy Chicago 2.0, the implementation plan resulting from the assessment, provides 30 goals and 82 related objectives across 10 priority health issues. Some of these issues are citywide, while others focus on specific neighborhoods in Chicago (Dircksen et al., 2016). Healthy Chicago 2.0 focuses on health equity across all of these issues.

This study involved recruiting and interviewing stakeholders from Chicago-based health foundations and nonprofit organizations. Stakeholders from these organizations were directly involved in the MAPP assessment and implementation. Thus, this study offers a unique opportunity to obtain confidential and objective perspectives of key stakeholders during the Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation period.

We used a content analysis analytical approach for this study. This approach involved the systematic coding and analysis of text to examine its meaning (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). Participants for this study had to meet two criteria. They had to be at least 18 years old and they had to be employed at a Chicago-based foundation or nonprofit organization that served more than one health specific issue (e.g., health services, housing, education) or served a cross-cutting health issue (e.g., promotion of adolescent health across a variety of health issues).

We recruited an initial convenience sample of three participants from the Foundation Directory Online (2018). We scheduled interviews with these participants via e-mail and telephone follow-ups. These initial interviews allowed us to pilot our interview guide. Following these pilot interviews, we adjusted our guide for clarity and flow.

At least one study of risk communication has shown that after 20 interviews with well-informed participants, no new information was generated (Morgan, Fischoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002). Therefore, we aimed for a sample of at least 20 participants for our study. Nonprofit organizations that served more than one health specific issue were contacted for the study via e-mail or telephone call. The first and second authors of this study conducted all interviews.

**Sample Description**

Across the recruitment period, we contacted a total of 47 individuals. Each individual that we contacted represented a unique foundation or nonprofit organization. Out of those that we contacted, 23 individuals agreed to participate in our study, 19 provided no response, and five declined our invitation to participate.2 Interviews took place from June 2017 until December 2017.

Interviews were conducted in person at each participant’s office. However, one interview occurred at a local coffee shop. Ten of the interviews were with individuals employed by local foundations (these participants are identified as P1-P10 below). Thirteen interviews were with individuals employed by local nonprofit agencies (these participants are identified as P11-P23 below). The 23 participants all held senior level positions within their organizations, such as Chief Executive Officer or Executive Director (n=4), Vice President (n=2), Director (n=8), Officer (n=8), and Manager (n=1). On average, participants had worked at their organization for nearly eight years and they had been in their current position for approximately six years. Nineteen of the 23 participants (82.6%) were female.
Table 1. The Ten Health Issues from Healthy Chicago 2.0 Used for Sorting Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Issue</th>
<th>Examples of Health Issue (Also provided on card)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>• Health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Annual dental cleanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Health</td>
<td>• Behavioral/mental health treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Substance abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Environment</td>
<td>• Active transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Neighborhood safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child and Adolescent Health</td>
<td>• Early intervention services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• School-based health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Disease</td>
<td>• Healthy eating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Physical activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>• Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Savings and assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>• Early childhood education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Elementary-high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Post-secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>• Housing cost burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Permanent supportive housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Disease</td>
<td>• Sexually transmitted infections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hepatitis C treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>• Violent crime in public spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Social cohesion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interview Guide

We used a semi-structured interview guide that asked participants a variety of questions about health equity in Chicago. We examined responses to three items from the interview guide. The first item had participants do a card sorting activity using ten health issues from Healthy Chicago 2.0 (see Table 1). Specifically, the participants were asked to sort the cards from highest priority (coded as “10”) to lowest priority (coded as “1”) in terms of what they believed would ensure the healthiest possible city by 2020.

After completing the card sorting activity, participants were then asked, “Could you describe your rationale for your highest three priority health areas?” Finally, participants were asked, “Now, among the three highest health priority areas, could you pick one, and then describe how the city might go about addressing this issue?”

All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriptionist. The first author of this study reviewed transcripts and noted key themes. This information was used to develop a codebook. This same author then coded the interviews using the codebook. The second author of this study also independently coded the data using the codebook. Disagreements were discussed among the authors until consensus was reached. We used the program Dedoose 7 to manage the coding process. All elements of the study were reviewed and approved by the DePaul University Institutional Review Board.
**Figure 1.** Participant Ranking of Health Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Issue</th>
<th>Reverse Score Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Health</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Adolescent Health</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Environment</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Disease</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Disease</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reverse Score Rank (scale=10-1)

Notes: n=23. Two participants ranked only three issues. One participant refused to rank any issues.

**Results**

*Prioritization of Health Issues*

Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of participants’ rankings of health issues along with the average reverse score across participants. As shown, participants ranked violence, economic development, and education as the three most important health issues in Chicago that need to be addressed in order to ensure the healthiest city by 2020. Participants also described the interconnected nature among these three health issues. Our results, therefore, focus on these three issues. Specifically, we focus on the interconnected nature of these issues as well as specific ideas that community leaders have to address these issues.

*Specific Ideas to Address Violence, Education, and Economic Development*

**Violence.** Participants felt that violence was a significant issue that affected other health behaviors, including the fear to “go out to do exercise” (P19) as well as the risk for “drug use” (P20). Among the participants who described ideas for addressing violence (n=5), only one participant focused on the problem directly by saying that “...having guns and weapons and things like that...[leads to] a generational legacy, of being involved in gangs” (P20). In contrast, P14 described the importance of acknowledging the complexity of the problem stating that:

> The first thing is we have to rid ourselves of this thought that it’s something [addressing violence] that you can do with the flick of a wrist...It is a long-term time and cost investment. It is not something that’s going to be done with a drop-in mentoring program or something serving families and kids in isolation.

Table 2 provides example quotes across each of the codes used. A theme that was unique to addressing violence was the importance of dialogue. P6, for example, described the importance of formal community leaders being involved, saying:
Table 2. Coding for Question: Describe How the City Might Go About Addressing this Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code and Definition</th>
<th>Example Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interrelated Issues:</strong> Participant describes causal relationship between Violence (V), Education (E), Economic Development (ED).</td>
<td>“So, we have to really figure out a way to bring equity and economic development in different neighborhoods. If we don’t do that then perhaps we’ll always have this kind of gap in educational quality.” “When you take neighborhoods and communities being displaced, when you take families being displaced, when you take schools being closed, when you take all of these factors you get this convergence of violence...the only way you’re going to start to reverse [this] is start to serve and give the people what you robbed them of in the first place and serve them comprehensively and longitudinally.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantial Effort:</strong> Participant feels addressing V, E, ED takes substantial effort and/or there are multiple factors related to addressing V, E, ED.</td>
<td>“It used to be when I was growing up if I broke a rule someone’s gonna call my mom. Yeah, I’m gonna get in trouble.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Engagement:</strong> Participant describes importance of community in addressing V, E, ED.</td>
<td>“The parents are engaged. The parents are invited to be part of both prioritizing, you know? Parents are included in Chicago Public School system because of local school councils.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parent Engagement:</strong> Participant describes importance of parent engagement in promoting education.</td>
<td>“Go back to the models of churches and other community organizations that maybe know the families in their area and can offer those services in a holistic approach.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faith Sector Engagement:</strong> Participant describes faith sector as one that is important to addressing V, E, ED.</td>
<td>“I think in the same way they approach city planning with sewers and infrastructure that’s how you approach the violence problem. You look at it block-by-block. Who are the people that inhabit this block and this community and what do they need here?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross Sector Systems:</strong> Participant identifies multiple sectors for addressing V, E, ED. Participant may also describe addressing V, E, ED as a “system.”</td>
<td>“And we might have children and kids who maybe have this legacy, a generational legacy, of being involved in gangs. Their grandmother was and your uncle was and that kind of thing, and it’s all they kind of know. If they realize there are other opportunities and the city opens up other opportunities for these kids, I think that perhaps they can see a different way.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gangs, Guns, and Violence:</strong> Participant describes a direct V factor—either gangs or guns—as a part of the problem.</td>
<td>“The first thing is we have to rid ourselves of this thought that it’s something that you can do with the flick of a wrist...It is a long-term time and cost investment. It is not something that’s going to be done with a drop-in mentoring program or something serving families and kids in isolation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complex Violence:</strong> Participant describes complexity of addressing V.</td>
<td>“We’ve been to a lot of different forums, whether it’s the state’s attorney’s office, the sheriff, the churches. I just think that definitely how you approach it, you have to really be talking to the young people also directly and I don’t think we’re necessarily having that dialogue as a system.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence Dialogue:</strong> Participant describes importance of dialogue in addressing V.</td>
<td>“Education is something where we can figure out a way [of] how to come up with a better funding formula ‘cause...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Funding:</strong> Participant describes importance of school</td>
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</table>
funding in promoting E—this could include funding through taxes.

**Neighborhood Development:** Participant describes relationship between neighborhood development and ED.

**Job Creation Strategy:** Participant describes importance of strategy to create jobs to address ED.

**Tax Equity:** Participant describes importance of a more equitable tax system in ensuring ED.

it’s a lot of burden. It’s funded mostly through local resources and property taxes.”

“One of the big things that doesn’t end up on a lot of public health agendas is this issue of displacement, gentrification, and I think it's an issue of economic justice as well.”

“I think that it has to be a cross-sector approach to look at how jobs impact the health of communities and that there are incentives for the employers and the employees that are building long-term skills.”

“We have a very unfair tax base. How we fund our schools. The tax breaks that we give to corporations that there’s no expectation for them, in turn, to add benefit to their public.”

I think the city needs to be involved, the state needs to be involved, and there needs to be just some intentional, very strategic conversations about not only how to solve things but how to put in some long-term solutions in order to make sure that things are sustainable.

In addition to the involvement of formal leaders, participant P2 described the importance of including young people in initiatives to reduce violence:

We've been to a lot of different forums, whether it’s the state's attorney’s office, the sheriff, the churches...you have to really be talking to the young people also directly and I don't think we're necessarily having that dialogue as a system.

**Education.** The participants who ranked education among their top three priorities felt that education promoted “healthy standing throughout their [children’s] lives” (P10) and that it had the potential to “change the trajectory of [a kid’s] life” (P15). P15 also warned of the multigenerational effects that poor education can have, noting that “if we’re not making sure that children are getting early childhood education and good k through 12 education, then...that next generation will continue the cycle.”

Participants who chose to discuss education (n=4) described two specific strategies for reducing educational inequality—greater funding for education and revised tax policies. Indeed, participants described school funding needs specifically for low income communities. The need for equitable school funding was described as something that should be an “intensive funding priority.” Inequitable school funding was described as a result of “political games” (P19). That is, participants believed inequitable school funding resulted from elected officials not appropriately supporting education because they focus on political support for other issues.

To adequately address school funding inequities participants suggested a better funding formula needed to occur through more equitable property taxing. P21, for example, stated that “Education is something where we [need to] figure out a way to come up with [a] better funding formula, ‘cause it’s a lot of burden. It's funded mostly through local resources and property taxes.”
Economic Development. Economic development also emerged as a high priority issue for communities. For example, P19 stated that “I think what’s most important to a lot of people...are jobs, and I think we have a high rate of unemployment or a lot of people who are underemployed or...seeking better opportunities.” The participants that chose economic development as a high priority issue (n=3) identified three primary strategies for addressing the issue: neighborhood development, tax policy, and job creation. P16, for instance, felt that it was important to “create healthy jobs that are good for communities and [it’s] good to keep employers in neighborhoods [especially in] underserved neighborhoods that have been debilitated and deprived of resources.” However, another participant cautioned against neighborhood development arguing that it could also result in displacement. Indeed, this participant said, “One of the big things that doesn’t end up on a lot of public health agendas is this issue of displacement and gentrification; and, I think [this is] an issue of economic justice as well” (P18).

In addition to neighborhood development P16 spoke of the importance of job creation. By creating jobs, P16 suggested, you are:

...getting experts in job creation involved. You’re getting communities involved, all those people at the table to basically say think about how...we address this, how...we get there, what would you need, what does economic development look like?

This participant also mentioned the importance of incentives “for the employers and the employees that are building long-term skills.”

As with education, an issue that participants spoke about in terms of economic development was more equitable tax policy. For instance, P7 stated that “We have a very unfair tax base. How we fund our schools. The tax breaks that we give to corporations that there’s no expectation for them, in turn, to add benefit to the public.” P18 felt that there needed to be “a graduated or progressive tax structure” rather than a “flat tax” where the wealthy pay the same proportion of their income as lower income earners.

Cross-Cutting Approaches to Address Violence, Education, and Economic Development

Overall, participants felt that addressing violence, education, and economic development “requires a lot of work...[and] would take time” (P19). P14, for instance, felt that violence was the result of a “convergence” of factors that would require substantial services to address the social injustices communities faced. As stated by this participant:

When you take neighborhoods and communities being displaced...when you take schools being closed, when you take all of these factors you get this convergence of violence...the only way you’re going to start to reverse [this] is start to serve and give the people what you robbed them of in the first place and serve them comprehensively and longitudinally.

Participants also identified a number of sectors that they believed should be involved in addressing these issues. They also emphasized the importance of prioritizing communities, parents, and families. P16, for example, said that “Maybe you start with communities first and then you bring the rest of the people together.” P7 acknowledged the importance of informal community support in terms of having adults in the community take collective responsibility for children. Specifically, P7 said, “It used to be when I was growing up if I broke a rule, someone’s
gonna call my mom. Yeah, I’m gonna get in trouble.” P19 further described the important role that families played in articulating familial needs and the needs of their children (especially in terms of education). As stated by P19:

I think there needs to be a lot more engagement of community members like families for maybe some of the struggling schools to hear what they really want because I think [the school district] doesn’t do the best of jobs of engaging community members.

Work Within and Across Sectors

Within Sectors. Participants felt that partnerships with community entities (specifically parents) were important. These partnerships often included involvement in local school councils and parent groups. P17 felt that this engagement could be directly translated to academic success, stating that “...the more parents are involved the more likely their child is going to succeed and be supported...”

Another key stakeholder group that emerged was the faith sector. P2 commented about the desire to “go back to the models of churches and other community organizations that maybe know the families in their area and can offer those services in a holistic approach.” Another participant, P7, saw faith communities as an important stakeholder group. However, P7 viewed these communities as important for broader and more psychological reasons than P2. As P7 stated, “I think that faith-based organizations with their parishioners, their constituents, definitely have a role in increasing compassion, increasing communities.”

Across Sectors. Although specific stakeholder groups such as parents and faith communities were mentioned, participants also emphasized that multiple sectors needed to be involved. P14, for instance, stated that “There would have to be the biggest asset map that you could ever think to create.” Calling for more cross-sector collaboration, P11 noted that because each sector has a responsibility to address the problem “it truly is a community issue and all elements of community whether its government, nonprofit, private sector, anchor institutions, [are] responsible for engaging to address these types of community development needs and issues.”

Finally, some participants described the need for a broader system to address these issues. For example, P20 called this:

...a system of care...I think that if you can kind of connect those systems of care...you have some churches...you might have some schools in the area; you might have some mental health agencies or just community agencies that can kind of collaborate together.

P14 identified this as “infrastructure” and advocated for thinking about this infrastructure “the same way they approach city planning with sewers.”

Discussion

The purpose of this article was to examine the perceptions of local health foundation and nonprofit leaders in Chicago about key health issues and understand their ideas for addressing them. Participants in the study prioritized violence, education, and economic development as the most important issues that needed to be addressed in order to ensure that Chicago is a healthy
They emphasized the importance of addressing the broad conditions that cause these health issues; and, they advocated for addressing these issues across the lifespan as well as across multiple generations. Moreover, they stressed the importance of cross-sector collaborations in addressing these issues. Interestingly, traditional public health concerns such as infectious diseases and chronic diseases were prioritized as last and second to last, respectively, by the participants in our study.

The ideas that participants described to address violence add to the strategies mentioned in the Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation plan. Participants’ ideas about reducing violence were broad and emphasized dialogue, while the strategies in the Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation plan focus on specific practices and programs. In terms of education, participants focused on education funding and tax policy. These are two areas that are not specifically mentioned in the Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation plan. Finally, for employment, participants’ ideas aligned with strategies from the implementation plan—especially their ideas related to job creation and a focus on long-term employee skills.

Given that the CDPH has worked with various communities and sectors to implement Healthy Chicago 2.0 over the last two years, some of the additional ideas expressed by the participants in this study have actually been incorporated. For example, the CDPH recently partnered with technology-focused organizations and has received funding from a local foundation to develop an online resource called the Chicago Health Atlas. This resource makes health data available across Chicago neighborhoods over multiple years. The Chicago Health Atlas is accessible to all stakeholders who are advancing health in Chicago (Chicago Department of Public Health, n.d.).

Although the ideas expressed by the participants in this study generally echo the themes in Healthy Chicago 2.0, there are some differences. This may be because participants that were selected for this study came from organizations that address more than one health issue. Participants were also fairly senior within their organizations.

The individual interview format may have also allowed participants to express a unique perspective compared to a more data driven group planning process like what was used for developing the Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation plan. The scope of a stakeholder driven implementation plan differs from the scope of ideas that can emerge in individual interviews. For example, capturing the need for dialogue in a stakeholder implementation plan may be difficult. In practice, dialogue can be obtained in other ways such as through components of evidence-based programs that are emphasized in a stakeholder driven implementation plan. It is important to note, however, that CDPH has maintained a consistent dialog with Healthy Chicago 2.0 stakeholders.

Finally, another key factor that could be attributed to differences between the results from this study and the issues identified in the implementation plan is the nature of both undertakings. The efforts undertaken in this study represent a dynamic approach in which ideas evolve across complex health and social service systems. The Healthy Chicago 2.0 implementation plan, on the other hand, is a static document.

**Practical Implications**

This study contributes in-depth perspectives that can inform health practitioners and administrators in urban communities. The results of the study highlight the role for municipal health departments in addressing social determinants of health (e.g., violence, education, and
To address the numerous challenges that urban communities face, health practitioners and administrators may want to take a long-term approach that involves dialogue with communities and formal leaders. If they do, they should keep three considerations in mind:

1. Systems: Consider assets and the systems that serve the community. Be intentional in addressing system issues through collaborations with other practitioners and administrators who are involved in a different aspect of the system.
2. Engaging diverse members of the community: In this study, participants called for several key actors (across sectors) to be involved in creating change (e.g., churches, mental health agencies, and community members—specifically, young people). Thus, practitioners may need to carefully consider all stakeholders and how to engage each group in addressing issues such as violence, education, and economic development.
3. Addressing policy: Tax policy emerged as a key approach to addressing education and economic development in this study. However, doing so requires advocacy to create widespread change.

The design of this study—a content analysis of in-depth qualitative interviews—is not without limitations. One of the most notable limitations is the potential influence of local events during the data collection period. One of the most significant statewide events during this time was a budget crisis. Just prior to the start of our interviews state lawmakers in Illinois passed their first budget in two years (Dabrowski & Klingner, 2018). Thus, it could be possible that the participants in this study who called for something like a “better funding formula [and end to] political games” related to education may have been influenced by the lack of a state budget and the related political disagreements among state legislators.

During this time period local media organizations were also reporting record levels of gun violence in Chicago. This, despite overall levels of gun-related homicides being down, could have influenced the participants who selected violence as their highest priority issue area for the city (Armentrout, 2017; Buckley, 2017).

A lack of generalizability represents another major limitation of this study. Since all participants were members of Chicago-based foundations and nonprofit organizations, the ability to generalize our findings to other urban areas is limited.

Still, this study provides an in-depth examination of how senior leaders of health foundations and nonprofit organizations prioritize and strategize key health issues. The card sorting activity at the beginning of the interviews also provides us with insights into how participants rank the importance of Chicago’s health issues.

It is important to note that a number of the participants expressed a belief that all ten of the health issues were important and interconnected. The individual interview format, however, enabled participants to confidentially defend their ultimate rankings in an in-depth fashion. Future research should examine the process of implementing cross-sector and long-term health promotion efforts to address community health challenges. Future research should also explore whether, and how, leaders see these types of efforts being supported.
Conclusion

Since 2016, CDPH has addressed many of the health goals in their implementation plan. In a recent update, CDPH reported at least some level of implementation progress on 76% of the strategies developed in the plan (Chicago Department of Public Health, 2017). The variation in the themes that emerged from the interviews in this study highlight the merit of systematically gathering data through key informant interviews—especially during the development of a local government’s health plan implementation.

The findings from this study demonstrate that community leaders from foundations and local nonprofit organizations often have a desire to address social determinants of health when seeking to improve community health outcomes. Indeed, the results of this study suggest that key leaders of foundations and nonprofits in Chicago consider social determinants of health such as violence, education, and economic development to be critical to the promotion of population health. Further, our findings suggest that these community leaders also recognize the importance of cross-sectoral collaborations in order to address these issues. Foundations and nonprofit leaders, thus, may have specific ideas about how to address social determinants of health. They may also have a long-term multigenerational mindset when implementing these ideas.

Notes

1. These assessments are identified by MAPP as “Community Themes and Strengths,” “Local Public Health System,” “Community Health Status,” and “Forces of Change.”
2. Since we implemented only minor changes following the three-interview pilot study, we included the pilot interviews in the final dataset for a total of 23 interviews.
3. Only 22 out of the 23 participants provided rankings. One participant felt that ranking the health issues was not possible.

Disclosure Statement

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References


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Corruption, Accountability, and Discretion
Edited by Nancy S. Lind and Cara E. Rabe-Hemp


Keywords: Public Policy, Governance, Corruption

“Government is corrupt” is an oft-cited refrain for critics of political and policymaking institutions. However, the origins, governance implications, and policymaking effects of this refrain are not well understood. In Corruption, Accountability, and Discretion, editors Nancy S. Lind and Cara E. Rabe-Hemp assemble twelve important articles to address the key themes found in the title of the collection. The collection takes a holistic approach to understanding the meaning, prevalence, policy implications, and oversight and accountability ramifications of corruption in government.

Part I, titled Etiology, looks at causes of corruption. In chapter 1, April K. Clark asks if it is even possible to measure political corruption. Despite objective approaches to measuring corruption (e.g., Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index) as well as subjective approaches (e.g., public perception), Clark admits that “the precise levels of corruption will never be known” (p. 7). Regardless of the true amount of corruption, though, Clark finds that American cynicism of government is attributed to corruption, which largely contributes to public concern regarding government performance.

In chapter 2, Michael J. Pomonte and Scot Schraufnagel examine how corruption influences governance; specifically, they explore how corruption influences the ability of Congress to do its job. To do so, the authors review five congressional scandals: “Koreagate,” ABSCAM, the Keating Five scandal, the House banking scandal, and the Abramoff/DeLay lobbying scandal. They examine these scandals to determine whether any of them caused a drop in congressional approval. The authors find that corruption in Congress is associated with negative congressional approval and a negative impact on the public policy process.
Part II, titled *Permeation of Corruption in Governance*, begins with Kerri Milita and Jaclyn Bunch’s (chapter 3) review of how the Abramoff/DeLay lobbying scandal altered the lobbying environment in America. By examining three common pathways of lobbyist influence: the revolving door, campaign finance, and gift giving, the authors find that despite overwhelming evidence of corruption related to the scandal relatively little has changed in terms of lobbyist influence over the policymaking process. Thus, the authors argue that in order to make impactful change we need stronger rules regarding the employment of congressional staff by lobbying firms and bans on lobbyist sponsored gifts and fundraisers.

Chapter 4 focuses on the role of campaign contributions and the perception of “vote buying.” In this chapter, Renee Prunty and Mandy Swartzendruber view the rapid growth in election spending as being fueled by Political Action Committees (PACs) so that special interest groups can buy votes in their favor. The authors present a number of possible reforms that they believe are capable of leveling the playing field (e.g., stricter enforcement by entities overseeing campaign finance law). The authors concede, however, that without a more substantial change (e.g., publicly financed elections) lobbyists will continue to find and exploit loopholes.

In chapter 5, Thomas E. McClure reviews how campaign contributions to judicial elections create the appearance of corruption and damage the legitimacy of the courts. What is especially unique for judicial races, McClure argues, is that whether or not corruption takes place the public still tends to perceive that corruption stems from donations to judicial campaigns. Thus, McClure recommends recusal laws, anonymous donations, and publicly financed campaigns as methods to rectify the appearance of unfairness created by campaign donations in judicial elections.

Chapter 6 looks at how media coverage and related “dramatic fantasy” themes influenced the 2016 presidential election. In this chapter, John P. McHale points to the two most recognizable themes from the 2016 election, “Crooked Hilary” and “Corrupt Businessman Trump.” Media coverage surrounding corruption charges painted a specific image of both candidates and had a direct negative impact in terms of vote share. As such, McHale describes the influence of media coverage (especially negative coverage) as disheartening to voters and a source for cynicism concerning politics in general.

Part III, titled *Policy Issues*, begins with Cara E. Rabe-Hemp, Philip Mulvey, and Morgan Foster (chapter 7) exploring the role that politicians play in framing and constraining crime policy. The role of corruption in setting this type of policy, the authors argue, is based on public perceptions of the criminal justice system. If the public views the criminal justice system as corrupt, they find, then they are less likely to cooperate with the system and more likely to question its legitimacy. The authors also find that political elites are able to socially construct crime as a worthy policy issue, despite crime rates being historically low.

Eric E. Otenyo and Earlene A. S. Camarillo (chapter 8) examine sexual harassment in local police departments; and, they explore reasons why sexual harassment is largely ignored within these departments. The authors find that organizational culture, the relatively diminished role of women in police departments, and inadequate processes for handling cases of harassment all contribute to the persistence of sexual harassment in law enforcement offices. As such, the authors propose various organizational, legal, and cultural adjustments that they believe are needed to eliminate sexual harassment in police departments. Ultimately, though, the authors suggest that it is the responsibility of authority figures (e.g., mayors and police chiefs) to change organizational cultures that allow sexual harassment to occur.
In chapter 9, Eric E. Otenyo and Parwez Basmal discuss why corruption in defense spending has not yet become a prominent campaign issue. Despite nearly $60 billion in defense contract waste, they argue, defense spending is largely relegated to larger issues that focus on war and the results of war. One explanation as to why corruption in defense spending has not become a prominent campaign issue, the authors suggest, can be attributed to the culture of the military. This is a culture they describe as averse to whistleblowing on issues of corruption. The authors find that the culture of the military is complicit in corruption surrounding defense contracting. However, if military personnel were to reject corruption, they argue, there is a possibility that this topic may become more salient as a campaign issue. Finally, the authors argue that if the US is unable to effectively administer its own contracts, the country’s ability to champion good governance will be diminished.

Part IV, titled Oversight and Accountability, begins with Benjamin Brickers’ (chapter 10) analysis of the Citizens United (2010) court case and its impact on the system of accountability in American democracy. The accountability in question here stems from the money donated to political campaigns and the American public’s ability (or inability) to follow the trail of donations. The Citizens United ruling gave rise to Super PACs, which have the ability to take in unlimited amounts of money to push specific policy positions forward. Since PACs (and Super PACs) cannot be held accountable like individuals can, the Citizens United case created an accountability gap that led to difficulty in the public’s ability to account for campaign spending. Brickers’ discussion of Citizens United, thus, is especially important as it highlights the fact that since the current campaign finance environment was created by the courts it is now up to the courts to reintroduce regulation in campaign spending.

In chapter 11, Elizabeth E. Wheat explores the relationship between judicial review and policymaking. Citing landmark cases (e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Brown v. Board (1954)), Wheat argues that judicial review alters Congressional decisions. These decisions then heavily influence which laws are passed and how they are implemented. Wheat reviews examples of judicial review in three areas: in statutes, of the executive branch, and of Congress. This review is used to highlight how judicial review holds agencies accountable and its influence over policymaking.

Finally, in chapter 12, Maria A. Moore, John Huxford, and Jennifer B. Bethmann review the relationship between whistleblowers and journalists. Whistleblowers, they argue, represent a valuable tool for holding government accountable. Whistleblowers favor the media as an outlet for their story as they are able to make documents public while still retaining their anonymity. Whistleblowers are also able to utilize the media when they fear retaliation from their supervisors. Moore and colleagues provide an important clarification in the case studies that they examine. That is, whistleblowers only turn to the media after internal attempts fail. This is in contrast to the argument of some that whistleblowers seek personal notoriety. As a form of accountability, whistleblowing is chastised only when it jeopardizes issues of national security. It is championed, however, when it is related to other issues. Thus, those who decide to become whistleblowers have a unique ability to hold government agencies accountable and influence policy decisions.

In summary, this collection provides a broad overview of the role of corruption in government. It is important to note, though, that the influence of corruption, accountability, and discretion in lower levels of government (such as municipalities) was not discussed. This is unfortunate given a number of recent cases of local government corruption (e.g. Flint, Michigan’s water crisis). Still, Lind and Rabe-Hemp’s edited volume is a useful resource for academics; and it is potentially an even more useful resource for the general public. The editors have provided an
important survey of the work on corruption that serves as an accessible introduction to the topic by exploring the role that corruption plays in modern government.

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